Executive Compensation and Accounting Performance in French
Keywords:
executive compensation, agency theory, size, performance
Abstract
The empirical study carried out on 37 French companies listed on the SBF120 index over the period 2015 analyzes the relationship between the accounting performance and the level of executive compensation. Our analysis demonstrated that the level of cash compensation (wages and bonuses) is affected by the size of the firm. In addition, it appears that certain governance variables negatively affect the level of executive compensation. In addition, and contrary to expectations, our results show that the ROA's accounting performance does not affect compensation.
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Published
2017-09-07
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