The Governance and the Social Performance of Banks: Comparison between the Model Germano-Nippon and the Model Franco-Italian

Yosra Elhaj Ali

Authors

Yosra Elhaj Ali

Keywords:

governance, social performance, the system germano-nippon, the system francoitalian

Abstract

This article discusses the influence of internal mechanisms of governance on the social performance in the context germano-Nippon and in the context Franco-Italian. We are going to put the light on the model germano-Nippon and the model Franco-Italian, governance and the social performance. Then, we will analyze the effects that exercise internal governance mechanisms on the social performance of banks belong to the context germano-Nippon and the context Franco-Italian. In order to measure the social performance, we have retained the equality between the Man and the woman, the social climate, the transparency of information and the conditions of work and to apprehend the governance we retained the council of administration, its size, its independence and the concentration of capital.

Downloads

How to Cite

The Governance and the Social Performance of Banks: Comparison between the Model Germano-Nippon and the Model Franco-Italian. (2016). Global Journal of Management and Business Research, 16(C5), 25-34. https://journalofbusiness.org/index.php/GJMBR/article/view/2033

Download Citation

References

Renee Adams, Hamid Mehran (2003) Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies?. 123-142.

Albanes (1978) The performance of the enterprise.

Allen Berger, Emilia Bonaccorsi Di Patti (2003) Capital Structure and Firm Performance: A New Approach to Testing Agency Theory and an Application to the Banking Industry. 2002.0(54), 1-37.

G Charreaux (1996) Toward a theory of government enterprises. 1-56.

R Crespi, A Garcia-Cestona Mr, Salas V (2004) Governance Mechanisms in Spanish Banks. Does ownership matter?. 28(10), 2311-2330.

G Garton, A Schmid (2000) Universal Banking and the performance of German firms. 58, 29-80.

Bernadette Kaplan, Minton Steven, N (1994) Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: determinants and implications for managers. 36(2), 225.

Machesnay (1991) Economy of the enterprise, Eyrolles Malaysian listed companies. 33(7), 1034-1062.

D Rhoades (2001) A meta-analysis of board directorship Structure and Financial Performance: are "Two Heads Better Than One?. 9, 311-319.

John Mcconnell, Henri Servaes (1990) Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. 27(2), 595-612.

Wayne Mikkelson, Hailu Regassa (1991) Premiums paid in block transactions. 12(6), 511-517.

Miles Snow, D (1986) Organizations: New concepts for new forms. 28(3), 62-73.

Pieter Moerland (1995) Alternative disciplinary mechanisms in different corporate systems. 26(1), 17-34.

R Morck, A Shleifer, R Vishny (1988) managerial ownership and market valuation. 20, 293-315.

M Omri (2002) The Role of Institutional Investors and the performance of Tunisian businesses. (58).

Sharon Oswald, John Jahera (1991) The influence of ownership on performance: An empirical study. 12(4), 321-326.

John Pearce, Shaker Zahra (1992) BOARD COMPOSITION FROM A STRATEGIC CONTINGENCY PERSPECTIVE. 29(4), 411-438.

Lynn Pi, Stephen Timme (1993) Corporate control and bank efficiency. 17(2-3), 515-530.

G Pinteris (2002) ownership structure, board characteristics and performance of Argentina Banks.

M Porter (1992) The Competitive Advantage of Nations.

P Rechner, D Dalton (1991) CEO duality and organizational performance. 12, 155-160.

Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence Summers (1989) Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers.

Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1997) A Survey of Corporate Governance. 52(2), 737-783.

K Spong, R Deyoung, R Sullivan (1996) What makes a bank efficient? A look at financial characteristics and bank management and ownership structure.

R Zeckhauser, J Pound (1990) are large shareholders effective monitors? An investigation of share ownership and corporate performance. 149-180.