A Theoretical Analysis of the Audit Committeeas Role in China
Keywords:
role, audit committee, supervisory board, corporate governance
Abstract
This paper aims to analyze the role of the Audit Committee (AC) in China by employing the following theoretical frameworks: managerial hegemony theory to examine whether ACs in China serve as a mere #x201C;rubber stamp#x201D;; the origin of agency theory to determine whether ACs are supported by the separation of ownership and control to act as overseers and supervisors; and to use resource dependence theory to assess whether ACs provide added value by acting as consultants and trainers in China. Telephone interviews surveying 330 listed companies in China yielded 61 interviews, and the research results reveal that the AC#x2019;s role supports both the resource dependency and agency theories but conflicts with managerial hegemony theory.
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Published
2014-10-15
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