The Influence of Governance Mechanisms on the Banking Performance: Comparison between the Model Franco-Italian and the Model Germano- Nippon
Keywords:
governance, performance, the system of governance germano-Nippon, the system of governance Franco-Italian
Abstract
The goal of this research is to treat the influence of governance mechanisms on the banking performance in two systems of governance universal. There are three models of governance virtually universal. We are going to put the light on the model germano-Nippon and the model Franco-Italian and on the measures of the performance. Then, we will analyze the effects that exercise internal governance mechanisms on the social performance of banks belong to the context germano-Nippon and the context Franco-Italian. To estimate the performance, we retained three performance measures that are ROA, ROE and MTB, and to apprehend the governance we retained the council of administration, its size, its independence and the concentration of capital. In order to study the impact of the internal governance on the banking performance in the context germano-Nippon and the context Franco-Italian. In this framework, we have produced mixed results, which differ from one context to another.
Downloads
- Article PDF
- TEI XML Kaleidoscope (download in zip)* (Beta by AI)
- Lens* NISO JATS XML (Beta by AI)
- HTML Kaleidoscope* (Beta by AI)
- DBK XML Kaleidoscope (download in zip)* (Beta by AI)
- LaTeX pdf Kaleidoscope* (Beta by AI)
- EPUB Kaleidoscope* (Beta by AI)
- MD Kaleidoscope* (Beta by AI)
- FO Kaleidoscope* (Beta by AI)
- BIB Kaleidoscope* (Beta by AI)
- LaTeX Kaleidoscope* (Beta by AI)
How to Cite
References
Renee Adams, Hamid Mehran (2003) Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies?. 123-142.
Anup Agrawal, Charles Knoeber (1996) Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders. 31(3), 377.
Anup Agrawal, Jeffrey Jaffe, Gershon Mandelker (1992) The Post‐Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re‐examination of an Anomaly. 47(4), 1605-1621.
Barclay Mr, C Hoderness (1991) Negotiated blocktrades and corporate control. 46, 861-878.
A Berger, E Di Patti (2003) Capital Structure and Firm Performance: A New Approach to Testing Agency Theory and an application to the banking industry. 2002-2054.
B Boyd (1995) Dality CEO and Firm Performance: A contingency model. 16, 301-312.
G Caprio, L Laeven, R Levine (2006) Governance and Bank valuation.
Carleton Willard, T James, M Nelson, Weisbach Mr, S (1998) The Influence of institutions on corporate governance through private negotiations: Evidence From TIAA-CREF. LIII(4), 1335-1362.
G Charreaux (1997) The Government of businesses corporate governance, theory and fact.
R Crespi, A Garcia-Cestona Mr, Salas V (2004) Governance Mechanisms in Spanish Banks. Does ownership matter?. 28(10), 2311-2330.
Pablo Andres, Eleuterio Vallelado (2008) Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors. 32(12), 2570-2580.
L Godard (2002) The size of the Board of Directors: determinants and impact on the performance. 1010702, 4-11.
Benjamin Hermalin, Michael Weisbach (2003) Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature. 9(1).
P The (2000) ownership structure, institutional investors and the performance of the company: The point on the knowledge. 25(3), 58-69.
Machesnay (1991) Economy of the enterprise, Eyrolles Malaysian listed companies. 33(7), 1034-1062.
Mc Connel, J Servaes, H (1990) additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. 27.
Pieter Moerland (1995) Alternative disciplinary mechanisms in different corporate systems. 26(1), 17-34.
M Omri (2002) The Role of Institutional Investors and the performance of Tunisian businesses. (58).
M Paquerot (1997) Strategies of rooting of leaders, performance of the firm and the structure of control.
L Pi, S Timme (1993) Corporate Control and Bank Efficiency. 17, 515-530.
G Pinteris (2002) ownership structure, board characteristics and performance of Argentina Banks.
S Prowse (1985) Corporate Governance: International Comparison.
Paula Rechner, Dan Dalton (1991) CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis. 12(2), 155-160.
Dawna Rhoades, Paula Rechner, Chamu Sundaramurthy (2001) A Meta‐analysis of Board Leadership Structure and Financial Performance: are "two heads better than one"?. 9(4), 311-319.
A Shleifer, R Vishny (1997) A survey of corporate governance. 52, 737.
Kenneth Spong, Richard Sullivan (1996) Bank Ownership and Risk Taking: Improving Corporate Governance in Banking after the Crisis.
Whidbee David, A (1997) Board Composition and Control of Shareholder Voting Rights in the Banking Industry. 26(4), 27-41.
Published
2016-06-14
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2016 Authors and Global Journals Private Limited
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.