Paretoimproving Risk selection in Social Health Insurance

peter zweifel; Michael Breuer65

Authors

peter zweifel
Michael Breuer65

Keywords:

risk selection, social health insurance, pareto improvement

Abstract

Social health insurance traditionally imposes mandatory membership in a single pool in the aim of improving the welfare of high risks. However, this creates two problems, inefficiency of a monopolistic scheme and insufficient adaptation to individual preferences. Competition combined with a risk adjustment scheme can be used to improve efficiency. In the presence of preference heterogeneity, risk selection may improve adaptation to individual preferences, resulting in Pareto improvement over the pooling contract. This is shown to be possible both under perfect and imperfect risk adjustment.

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How to Cite

Paretoimproving Risk selection in Social Health Insurance. (2015). Global Journal of Management and Business Research, 15(35), 19-29. https://journalofbusiness.org/index.php/GJMBR/article/view/

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Author Biography

peter zweifel

Peter Zweifel is a prominent researcher affiliated with the University of Zurich, Switzerland, with a strong connection to Austria. His extensive body of work spans health economics, insurance, and risk analysis, including influential studies on risk selection in social health insurance, preference measurement in health, and the challenges of aging societies for health insurers. With over 500 publications and more than 6,500 citations, his research has shaped academic discourse and policy. His h-index of 38 and i10-index of 108 underscore his sustained scholarly impact.

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