

38 1. To identify the challenges faced by tax collectors in Nyarugenge District, Rwanda 2. To show the challenges
39 which prevent informal traders from paying taxes in Nyarugenge District, Rwanda 3. To analyze the relationship
40 between informal trade and tax compliance in Nyarugenge District, Rwanda III.

41 5 Justification and Significance of the Study

42 Tax compliance is a matter of great concern to governments and tax payers, in both developed and developing
43 countries. By answering the question of the study, we believe findings of this research would assist the government
44 of Rwanda and other countries to formulate appropriate policies that motivate tax payers to comp In addition,
45 other researchers will benefit from the findings and pursue more research in this and other related areas.

46 IV.

47 6 Literature Review

48 Tax compliance refers to fulfilling all tax obligations as specified by the law, freely and completely, and it includes
49 submitting a tax return within the stipulated period, correctly stating income and deductions and paying assessed
50 taxes by due date (Atawodi & Ojeka, 2012). Tax compliance has also been defined as the ability of taxpayers to
51 meet their statutory obligations under the tax laws that require them to file tax returns and pay taxes promptly
52 (Abdul- Jabbar & Pope, 2008). existence of governments and the social and political contracts between the
53 governed and those who govern them is a central feature of modern society. The governed entrust those who
54 govern them with the responsibility to provide security as well as physical and social infrastructure, among others,
55 to live and enjoy quality life. They owe the mutual responsibility, to pay taxes. or other levy to the governors.
56 (Edame & Okoi, 2014). exchange of resources, that is, benefit and cost); procedural justice (viewed as the process
57 of resource distribution) and retributive justice (viewed as the appropriateness of sanctions when norm-breaking
58 occurs).Tax compliance behavior of the taxpayer will be in response to whether the procedure is just or not.
59 Retributive justice is a theory of punishment that when an offender breaks the law, justice requires that they
60 suffer in return, and that the response is proportional to the offence (Sellywati et al, 2017). Modern tax systems
61 rely heavily on voluntary compliance for revenue collection. Very clear understanding of why taxpayers meet
62 their obligation s or fail to do so or of how much tax liability is uncollected is critical for measuring administrative
63 performance and for targeting compliance strategies (John & Liucija, 2007).

64 Tax compliance continues to be a critical problem in developing and emergent countries. Governments have
65 to ever widen the tax net through concerted combination of more enforcement and moral suasion, as well as
66 technology-based improvements (Anirudh, 2019).Deterrence models generally predict compliance patterns based
67 solely on the subjective probability and utility of outcomes associated with alternative actions. Yet recent
68 work in behavioral decision theory suggests that compliance decisions may also be affected by how the risks
69 of noncompliance are described and how the decision-maker's preferences are expressed. Cognitive heuristics
70 evoked by these descriptive and procedural variables affect tax compliance. It was found in a study that taxpayer
71 preferences are significantly influenced by descriptive and procedural variables that traditional expected utility
72 models ignore. Using tax decision problems involving how to choose a tax professional, whether to take a
73 questionable deduction, and how to approach an impending tax audit is crucial for a taxpayer. (Casey & Scholz,
74 1991).

75 Non-compliance tax models in the 1970's assume that tax payers are rational actors aiming for benefits. They
76 compare the cost of compliance with the utility of tax non-compliance. As such, they will be noncompliant
77 when the expected penalty and probability of being caught are rather small compared to the utility gained by
78 non-compliance (Michael & Agnar, 1972).

79 Following the classical economic model of tax non-compliance, governments and tax authorities should seek to
80 ensure that the utility of non-compliance is outweighed by the cost of non-compliance. To achieve this the main
81 tools used are increased penalties and the perceived probability of detection of the noncompliant tax payers. In
82 practice it has been noted that reducing tax non-compliance is not just a matter of applying higher penalties
83 or alternatively increasing the probability of detection as the model suggest or both. This has necessitated the
84 search for alternative models which take into account the non-pecuniary aspects of the tax compliance decision
85 (Horodnic, 2018). Recent approaches to tax compliance studies have been based on social and psychological
86 theories with argument that the human element plays a vital role in individual taxpayer compliance decisions.
87 Tax compliance literature indicates that there are still many research gaps that need to be filled with respect to
88 issues concerning tax morals, tax fairness and deterrence measures, for the likely improvement in overall taxpayer
89 compliance (Devos, 2014).

90 That taxpayers' decisions on paying taxes or not paying taxes cannot be explained only by expected economic
91 gains and costs alone. There are many psychological, sociological and demographic variables affecting taxpayer
92 decisions. It will be possible for tax administration to increase tax compliance and tax collection to a degree with
93 conventional tools and practices. Beyond legal obligations, it is necessary to analyze the ethical-cultural norms
94 of the individuals and the society and the behavior of taxpayers and to produce the requisite policy accordingly,
95 so as to increase the voluntary tax compliance and motivate the taxpayer (Serdar, 2019).

96 The potential for behavioural research to contribute to better tax collection and administration has been quite
97 limited. Effective tackling of the task requires a better understanding of attitudes and behavioural motivations of

98 taxpayers against taxation so as to improve both voluntary compliance and tax administration efficiency. Some
99 of the important factors influencing fiscal behaviour are discouragement; personal and social norms; fairness
100 and trust in the tax administration; complexity of the tax system; the role of government and the broader
101 economic environment. A contemporary healthy tax system does not mean exclusively a series of norms and
102 the increase or decrease of the amount of taxes, duties and contributions. Rather it also entails a long history
103 in which it was created and stratified, mindful of a certain behavioural culture of taxpayers which has been
104 shaped in a manner that facilitates the proper operation and compliance with the norms and the consolidation
105 of good practices in the field (Mitu, 2016) Behavioral economics and economic psychology are other disciplines
106 that have been leveraged to explain tax compliance and noncompliance. They cover areas such as rational and
107 irrational decision-making; social representations about taxes, as well as the interaction between tax authorities
108 and taxpayers. From behavioral finance in particular rational choice and tax payments have been addressed from
109 the point of view of prospect theory, mental accounting and framing effects to explain social representations and
110 provide knowledge and understanding of taxation, attitudes and beliefs, personal and social norms, as well as
111 distributional and procedural justice (Olsen & Kirchler, 2018).

112 The theory of planned behavior (TPB) has also been used to investigate the issue of tax compliance. It is based
113 on the notion that there are three components to behavior: attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral
114 control. Seven determinants have been developed to study tax compliance intention, namely, tax morale, tax
115 fairness, trust in government, perceived power of authority, tax complexity, tax information, and tax awareness.
116 Findings are that tax morale, tax fairness and tax complexity have a statistically significant influence on the tax
117 compliance intention of the citizens. It has been further proven that the power of authority, trust in government,
118 tax information, and tax awareness do not show a statistically significant relation to tax compliance intention
119 (Heang &Yongjin, 2020).

120 A study was carried out on factors that determine tax compliance attitude and perception in Kenya, Tanzania,
121 Uganda and South Africa. Findings were that in Kenya and South Africa, citizens who perceive that it is difficult
122 to avoid taxes are more likely to have a tax compliant attitude than citizens who think avoidance is relatively
123 easier. Evidence was also found that individuals who are more satisfied with public service provision are more
124 likely to have a tax compliant attitude in all the four countries. On the other hand, frequent payment to non-
125 state actors, for instance criminal gangs, in exchange for protection, reduces likelihood to have tax compliant
126 attitude. In addition, in Tanzania and South Africa it was established that individuals who perceive that their
127 ethnic group is treated unfairly by the government are less likely to have a tax compliant attitude. The degree
128 to which respondents perceive that it is difficult to know what taxes to pay is also negatively correlated with
129 tax compliant attitude in these two countries. Tax compliance attitude in Uganda is low, mainly because of
130 the low perception about the quality of public services provided among tax payers (Ali, 2013).A study by the
131 World Bank of a cross-section of Ugandan firms shows that an adverse business environment characterised by
132 inadequate Government provision of public capital, bureaucratic bribery and an inefficient legal and regulatory
133 environment could potentially induce a firm's behaviour towards tax evasion (World Bank Group, 2017).

134 V.

135 7 The Informal Sector

136 The definition of what the informal sector is has most times been characterised by negative connotations such
137 as activities that are unrecognized, unrecorded, unprotected or unregulated by public authorities, although it is
138 not confined to marginal activities but also included profitable enterprises. The sector has also been referred to
139 as the shadow, hidden, black, underground, gray, clandestine, illegal, unreported, non-cash and parallel economy
140 (Thomas, 2002).

141 Researchers have defined the informal sector or economy variously according to what best fits with the object of
142 their own analysis. For example, one school of thought discriminates between registered or unregistered economic
143 activity (Joshi et al., 2013),

144 The term "informal sector" was first used in a study of informal income opportunities in urban Ghana, involving
145 the Frafras, one Northern Ghanaian group, as migrants to the urban areas of Southern Ghana. In this study the
146 economic activities of the low-income section of the labour force in Accra, the urban sub-proletariat into which
147 the unskilled and illiterate majority of Frafra migrants are drawn were described. As a result of Price inflation,
148 inadequate wages, and an increasing surplus to the requirements of the urban labour market, there was a high
149 degree of informality in the incomegenerating activities of the sub-proletariat. Given the uncertainty related
150 to the economic activities of the members of the communities studied, income and expenditure patterns were
151 more complex than is normally allowed for in the economic analysis of poor countries. This made evaluation of
152 economic activities difficult as was determination of tax payable (Harth, 1973).

153 The phrases informal sector and informal economy have been interchangeably used in much of economics
154 literature. It constitutes an important component of most economies. It contributes between 25 and 65 percent
155 of GDP and between 30 and 90 percent of total non-agricultural employment in most economies. The trend is
156 likely to continue with the informal economy in sub-Saharan Africa likely to remain large for many years to come.
157 This should not be cause for worries, because the informal sector presents both opportunities and challenges for
158 policymakers. During the five years period between 2010-14, Sub-Saharan Africa unweighted average share of
159 informality reached almost 38 percent of GDP. It was only surpassed by Latin America and the Caribbean, which

160 registered a higher rate at 40 percent of GDP. The comparative figures for South Asia and Europe are 34 percent
161 and 23 percent of GDP in South Asia and Europe respectively. For the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
162 and Development (OECD) member countries, the informal sector is estimated to account for 17 percent of GDP.
163 With limited opportunities in the formal sector, informal activity avails an essential social and economic safety
164 net by providing employment and income to a large number of otherwise vulnerable people. It also offers means to
165 poverty reduction. Between 30 to 90 percent of employment in the non-agricultural sector occurs in the informal
166 sector in some sub-Saharan African countries (IMF, 2017) Other studies have also confirmed the findings above.
167 The importance of the informal sector is equally important in other parts of the world. Estimated average size
168 of informal economy on tax revenue as a percentage of GDP was 37.4 % in Peru, in Latin America it was 34 %
169 while in OECD countries it was 19.89 % (Guillermo & Deyv, 2019).

170 In cities worldwide the informal sector offers a high proportion of employment ranging between 80% on average
171 in Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, Niamey and Ouagadougou, 59% in Lima, Peru, 53% in Ho Chi
172 Minh City, Vietnam and 45% in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Herrera et al 2012).

173 8 VI. Taxation of the Informal Sector

174 The issue of taxation of the 'informal economy' in developing and emergent economies has received increasing
175 attention in recent years as has been that of whether indeed taxation of the informal economy is justified.

176 Questions have been raised regarding the issue with critics arguing that the potential revenue yields are
177 low, administrative costs are high, tax incidence is likely to be regressive, and tax enforcement risks exposing
178 vulnerable tax payers to harassment (Keen, 2012).

179 Failure to pay taxes is not an issue of formality or informality. Thus, reducing informality cannot form the
180 basis of tax policy, because the reasons for not paying taxes vary across both informal and formal sectors. For
181 example, believing that tax rates are unjustifiably high or that there is no evidence of benefits arising from taxes
182 paid are reasons pertinent to firms in both formal and informal sectors. Accordingly, in designing tax policy, the
183 reasons for not paying taxes matter as much as or more than the fact that a firm pays no taxes. (Kanbur &
184 Keen 2015).

185 Taxes from the informal sector have a significant effect on capital development. In a study carried out in the
186 Lagos Metropolis, among the conclusions made was for government not only to create an enabling environment
187 for the informal sector but also give all necessary support for its survival because the sector has contributed
188 immensely to the capital development of the state. It was recommended that the government should continue
189 with its capital development programs by constructing more roads, building hospitals, schools and markets in
190 order to gain the trust of the citizenry (Andy et al 2019).

191 In a study on informal sector tax compliance issues and the casualties between taxation and economic growth in
192 Ghana, empirical evidence findings revealed that attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control
193 were the main determinants of the informal sector compliance factor, and it was recommended that efforts
194 should be geared towards improving tax systems to augment the GDP of the country (Ameyaw et al, 2016). In
195 neighbouring Nigeria, a study carried out in River State findings were that taxing the informal sector boosted
196 revenue generation and positively affected the economic development of developing states in Nigeria (Obara &
197 Nangih 2017).

198 Tax non-compliance is more pronounced in developing and emerging countries. There is no single theory that
199 can explain the phenomenon of tax noncompliance behaviour, however perception and attitude of taxpayers are
200 among the factors contributing towards compliance behaviour. Empirical evidence indicates that taxpayers act
201 according to their belief and attitudes. A framework focusing on tax service and public governance indicates
202 that quality as well as tax system structure are factors relevant to developing and least developing countries, in
203 as far as promoting tax compliance is concerned (Lutfi et al ,2015). There should be greater reliance on locally
204 grounded binding constraints analysis. This must be coupled with careful attention to understanding politics and
205 the drivers of trust in particular contexts, to guide analysis of how best different investments may be combined,
206 prioritized, or sequenced (Wilson et al 2019).

207 Recent interest in the matter of taxing the informal sector has been catalyzed by growing attention to the
208 potential benefits of informal sector taxation in terms of revenue, growth, and governance. With respect to
209 revenue, the informal sector forms a large and, in many countries, growing share of GDP, and thus represents a
210 potentially significant source of tax revenue for cash-strapped governments (Schneider & Montenegro, 2010).

211 9 a) The informal Sector in Rwanda

212 In Rwanda, the informal sector refers to establishments that are not registered with the revenue authority body
213 (RRA) to pay local or national taxes and do not maintain regular operational accounts:(NISR, 2014).Over time
214 Rwanda has recorded significant growth in the formal sector, and the percentage level of the formal private sector
215 and the government of Rwanda's Vision 2020 explicitly promotes private sector development and recognises the
216 informal sector as a key part of the economy. Nevertheless, there is need for concerted effort to expand the formal
217 sector because it enables business enterprises to effectively plan for their future investments and expand their
218 business activities. The expansion would increase domestic revenues (Rukundo, 2015).

219 In Rwanda the informal sector is an enterprise that employs one to nine people. It covers a wide sector
220 and it includes manufacturing, trading, and services. The sector includes market traders, artisans (mechanics,
221 technicians), cottage industrialists, petty hawkers, transport workers, small shops, and micro businesses. Built
222 on experience, a progressive tax system is capable of reducing the chances of evading taxes because it eliminates
223 the onus of self-assessment from the informal sector, such that the duty of evaluating taxable income rests on the
224 tax authority ??Adesoji & Chike, 2016) There is growing evidence that taxing the informal sector encourages
225 them to be more organised and practice better management by way of keeping proper financial and accounting
226 records (Oduwole & Sanni, 2014). When considering the merits of committing scarce resources to taxing small
227 informal sector firms, debate has frequently focused on limited revenue potential, high costs of collection and
228 potentially perverse impacts on small firms. By contrast, recent arguments have increasingly emphasised more
229 indirect benefits of informal sector taxation in relation to economic growth, tax compliance and governance.
230 These potentially broader benefits are increasingly finding support in recent research, but they are contingent
231 on government support and consequently demand further attention. Encouraging tax compliance demands not
232 only lowering costs but also strengthening the potential benefits of formalisation, from increased security to new
233 economic opportunities. Successful reform needs political support from political leaders, tax administrators and
234 taxpayers alike. It also requires institutional reform (Anuradha et al, 2013).
235 The issue of paying tax is a primary nexus between the individual (taxpayer) and the state. Tax laws are
236 examples of purposive administrative law. Compliance is as problematic as non-compliance and tax payers, be
237 they individuals or bodies corporate, have different opportunities for both compliance and noncompliance, and
238 paying tax does not necessarily involve deliberate decisions. Four clusters of factors affecting the content of
239 compliance decisions are material consequences, normative expectations, sociolegal attitudes and beliefs as well
240 as expressive factors (Kent & Kinsey, 1987).

241 10 VII. Resistance to Registration for Tax Purposes

242 In previous studies efforts have been made to find out reasons for not registering for taxes, and selfreported
243 expected tax obligations. One such study was carried out by the World Bank involving small enterprises in
244 Katwe area of Kampala, Uganda in 2011.

245 Despite the numerous benefits of taxation to the economies of various countries there are various reasons as to
246 why potential tax payers do not register for purposes of taxation, as table 1 below indicates (Dekoya et al, 2020).
247 to what enterprise owners would have been expected to pay if they had been registered for tax purposes. As is
248 noted from the table over half of the interviewees (53%) believed their businesses were too small to be taxed.
249 This was distantly followed by the argument that taxes were too high at 12%, closely followed by the potential
250 taxpayer's lack of knowledge of the Taxation Identification Number (TIN) at 11.5%. With the overwhelming
251 belief that one's business is too small to

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253 Volume XXI Issue IV Version I Year 2021 () B be taxed, even if the rates were lowered there has to be a very
254 big reduction for one to even remotely think about paying the tax. Indeed, with the two leading arguments for
255 not registering, it would be surprising if a potential taxpayer bothered to know the TIN.

256 Apart from the reasons given above for not registering, arguments are raised against taxing the informal sector.
257 Low levels of revenues relative to costs incurred in collecting taxes from the informal sector is one of the major
258 arguments. Taxable incomes are usually low or non-existent. Secondly given that majority of informal sector
259 workers are the underprivileged or marginalized, the rural women and youths or those from the ghettos, there is a
260 high possibility that taxation of the informal sector risks being highly income and gender regressive (Pimhidazai
261 & Fox,2012). VIII.

262 12 Theoretical Framework

263 Taxes impact on society in various ways because they are socio-political-economic tools which, through the ways
264 the proceeds are utilized, can greatly change the quality of life people in a community live. A lot of theories
265 have therefore evolved to explain many aspects of taxes and taxation. Some of these are the subject matter of
266 discussion below.

267 13 a) Canons of taxation

268 A Scottish economist argued for a systematic approach to matters of taxation and believed that a tax must be
269 levied on the basis of rules he called canons of taxation. These were equity or ability, certainty, economy and
270 convenience (Adam, 1776). The subject of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government
271 as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities, that is, in proportion to the revenue which they
272 respectively enjoy under the protection of the state

14 Certainty

The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought to be very clear and plain to the contributor and to every other person.

15 Economy

Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings in to the public treasury of the state.

16 Convenience

Every tax ought to be levied at the time and in a manner in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributors to pay it.

Source: Adapted from the An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Adam Smith's canons of taxation outlined above are as valid and sound today as they were in 1776. That his book An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations came out in five editions during Adam Smith's lifetime, in 1776, 1778, 1786 and 1789 is not surprising. All theories and principles of taxation that were postulated later, directly or indirectly derive from these four pillars propounded by the greatly endowed Adam Smith. Indeed, noncompliance arises because of breach of one or several of the canons. A tax that is not equitable, certain, economic or convenient as indicated above provides room for non-compliance. Breach of the cannons of taxation as propounded by Adam Smith will most likely result into non-compliance. Thus, for example a complex tax which the taxpayer does not understand or one which requires the taxpayer to go through a costly process and involving travel to regional tax offices and therefore uneconomic from the taxpayer's point of view is likely candidate for involuntarily evasion. Compliance costs of taxation include three major components, namely money costs, time costs and psychological costs to the taxpayers. Expenditure on professionals such as tax consultants and accountants, investment advisors, tax agents and legal practitioners as well as expenses relating to taxation guides, books and other incidental costs such communication, stationery and travel is referred to as money costs. When these compliance costs are high, they can lead to tax evasion, avoidance or both (Sandford & Hardwick, 1989).

17 b) The Sacrifice or Ability to Pay theory

The sacrifice (or ability to pay) theory derives from Adam Smith's canon of equity as outlined above. He believed that tax payers should make contributions to the public coffers in proportion to the revenue which they enjoy under the protection of the state' (benefits) and also in proportion to 'respective abilities' (ability to pay) which are reflected by the revenues they derive from the economy. It was generally agreed that this not only just but it was also equitable. This principle seeks to ensure that tax subjects the taxpayers to an equal sacrifice (Clifton et al, 2001). This is through introduction of the principle of progression in the tax system. By paying the taxes the individual sacrifices in the form of foregone alternative uses of money paid in terms of taxes. Because equity is concerned with the fair distribution of the tax burden, the ability to pay principle should also consider the incidence of a tax, as the formal incidence, and this is because the person on whom the tax is levied, is not necessarily the same person who actually bears the burden of the tax (Peter & Helen, 2009).

18 c) The Benefit Theory

The Benefit theory, also known as the insurance theory or the Quid Pro quo theory of taxation, relates the sacrifice of the taxpayer in paying the taxes with the benefits they enjoy from governmental expenditure. The benefit theory states that the taxation should be in accordance with the benefit enjoyed by a taxpayer from the facilities or services provided by the Government (Jon, 2000). The theory has been criticized on various aspects. The poor or underprivileged receive greater benefits from the government in the form of free social services like education and health yet they are the least able to bear the burden of taxation. It is also difficult to record every single taxpayer's benefit. Furthermore, the intensity of desire by a particular taxpayer for service from government is difficult to quantify, and therefore it is equally difficult to determine how much the beneficiary is prepared to pay for it.

19 d) The Principle of Maximum Social Advantage

Economic welfare of the community is the goal of state's economic policy. The Principle of Maximum Social Advantage extends the ability-to-pay principle to include the benefits of public expenditure in that it seeks to balance the social advantage of public expenditure and the social sacrifice involved in the payment of taxation. It is alternately called the Principle of Maximum Aggregate Welfare or the Principle of Maximum Social Advantage. It is criticized from the point of view that it is difficult to determine the measures which will lead to maximum social advantage (Ngerebo, 2010).

326 **20 e) Principle of Productivity**

327 To justify its imposition a tax should produce for its government sufficient revenue. Taxes should be productive.
328 The principal tallies with the economy canon propounded by Adam Smith. To justify its imposition. The
329 principle demands of government selection of a few taxes yielding sufficiently large revenues as opposed to a
330 multiplicity of taxes, to avoid high cost of collection, relative the amount collected. This should be so in the
331 medium and long term. The cost-benefit analysis point of view of the principle is attractive because it is logical
332 (Tuan, 2016).

333 **21 f) Principle of Elasticity or Flexibility**

334 The economic or financial systems in which taxes are charged and collected is dynamic. This in turn requires
335 that the tax system should have the capacity to adjust itself in the ever changing globalised environment. The
336 tax system should be fairly elastic so as to enable government, if it deems it necessary for example to raise more
337 funds, to do so without incurring exorbitant costs in this endeavour (Saez & Giertz, 2012).

338 **22 g) Principle of Simplicity**

339 Tax systems should be simple, tax laws should be clear and easily understandable to the common man. Simplicity
340 reduces the cost of collection of taxes and inconvenience to the taxpayers. A Complex tax system breeds corruption
341 in tax administration and may lead to temptations for non-compliance. The taxes should be simple to calculate
342 and encourage selfassessment also to some extent. The basis of arriving at tax liability should be easy to
343 comprehend, tax bands where applied should be logical, the rates should be moderate, the manner and timing
344 of payment should be convenient (Philippe, 2017)

345 **23 h) The lifeblood theory**

346 The theory posits that the system of taxation works like a blood circulatory system. Taxes flow into the
347 government coffers and through government expenditures the taxes flow back into the economy to fund
348 infrastructure and services, among others. Providers of the labour and material inputs are taxed on the profits
349 they generate from their businesses or earnings received as salaries, and the cycle continues (Ajay, 2018).

350 **24 i) Principle of Diversity**

351 Just like businesses manage risk partly through portfolio diversification, governments should adopt similar
352 strategy in evolving fiscal policy (Federico ,2018). Sectors enjoy success or suffer losses differently because
353 the nature of their activities differ. Agriculture depends very much on the vagaries of nature especially in least
354 developed economies. Issues of climatic change are heavily impacting on the sector. The manufacturing and
355 services sector are impacted upon by basically different factors. Government should therefore be cognizant of the
356 risk posed by a narrow tax base which would expose it to shocks when the few sectors suffer negative revenue
357 trends and consequently losses and falling taxable income. Indeed, diversification also satisfies the canon of
358 equity, by covering as many taxpayers and sectors as possible, instead of burdening a few Chowdhury (2015).

359 **25 j) conceptual frame work**

360 A conceptual framework is a structure which the researcher believes can best explain the natural progression of the
361 phenomenon to be studied (Camp, 2001). It is arranged in a logical structure to provide a picture or visual display
362 of how ideas in a study relate to one another and it assists the researcher in identifying and constructing his/her
363 worldview on the phenomenon to be investigated (Grant & Osanloo, 2014). We had dependent and independent
364 variables which are informal trade as the independent and tax compliance as the dependent variable.

365 **26 Independent Variables Dependent Variables Informal trade**

366 Tax compliance

367 **27 Research Methods and Tools**

368 In any research the appropriateness of the methods and tools used contributes a lot on to how the findings of the
369 particular study are reliable and valid.

370 **28 a) Research design**

371 A research design is the arrangement of conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims
372 to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in procedure. It is the conceptual structure in
373 which research is conducted. It constitutes the blueprint for the collection, measurement and analysis of data. It
374 includes an outline of what the researcher did from writing the hypothesis or research question and its operational
375 implications to the final analysis of data (Kothari, 2004).Both primary and secondary sources were used. The
376 study used a combination of cross sectional and descriptive designs in which both qualitative and quantitative
377 approaches were adopted. Questionnaires were administered to respondents who answered both open-ended

378 and close-ended questions. Quantitative data was analysed by means of frequencies, percentages and means
379 correlations to arrive at conclusions. A sample of 14 employees and 96 informal traders were involved.

380 **29 b) Procedures and techniques used for gathering data**

381 We wrote a letter requesting for permission to collect data to the Major of Nyarugenge district who in turn gave
382 an authorization letter to the Executive Secretaries of sectors. These helped in identifying the informal traders
383 and the tax collectors. While collecting data, we obtained relevant information by repeating and putting clear
384 questions to the respondents.

385 **30 c) Study population**

386 Population refers to an aggregate or totality of all the objects, subjects or members that conform to a set of
387 specifications (Polit and Hungler, 1999). We collected and analyzed the views of Nyarugenge district's informal
388 traders and tax collectors. The targeted population was 4,800 operators in the informal sector and 14 tax
389 collectors of Nyarugenge district. The distinction between informal traders and tax collectors in administering
390 questionnaires was based on the fact that informal traders may live their own experiences in not paying taxes
391 which may be different from those lived by tax collectors in collecting taxes. This is presented in table 3 below.

392 **31 Source: Nyarugenge District Department of Finance d)** 393 **Interview technique**

394 An interview can be defined as a conversation between an interviewer and the respondent contacted for the
395 purpose of obtaining information. Two types of interviews were used in this study, that is, the formal or structured
396 interview and the informal or unstructured interview. The structured is based on questions predetermined and
397 specific before the onset of the interviews. The unstructured arise out of the responses to the formal interview.
398 The unstructured interview was conducted to obtain complementary tax collection information.

399 **32 e) Questionnaire**

400 The questionnaire was one of the tools used during the study to collect data. It was in Kinyarwanda, the mother
401 tongue of respondents. This questionnaire comprised both closed and open-ended questions which enabled a mix
402 of qualitative and quantitative information to be gathered. The questionnaire was presented in form of nominal
403 and 5-Likert scale as described in table 4 below.

404 **33 f) Sample size**

405 In selecting the respondents, the researchers used convenience and purposive sampling strategies. Convenience
406 sampling is non-probability sampling where the information is collected from the members of the population
407 who are conveniently or readily available to provide it (Sekaran,2003). Purposive sampling is a type of
408 sampling whereby the researcher uses own judgment or common sense regarding the participants from whom
409 information will be collected (Amin, 2005). Given that the population of informal traders and tax collectors is
410 fairly homogeneous on the information required, we used this technique in selecting the taxpayers, tax collectors
411 and other employees such as Director of Finance, Revenue accountant and Revenue inspectors who were available
412 during the distribution of questionnaires. See table 5 five below.), for a study to be of real meaning it ought
413 to apply valid and reliable instrument. We ensured that the research instruments checked for validity and
414 predetermined its reliability.

415 **34 h) Validity**

416 The level of dependability of the questions in the research instrument or the degree to which a measurement
417 instrument gives the same results each time that it is used, assuming that the underlying item being measured
418 does not change is referred to as validity (Shuttle worth, 2015).

419 Validity determines whether the research truly measures what it is intended to measure or how truthful the
420 research results are (Hamed, 2016). There are various types of validity but most commonly used are content
421 validity and face validity. Content validity looks at whether the instrument adequately covers all the content
422 that it should with respect to the variable. Face validity, is where experts are asked their opinion about whether
423 an instrument measures the concept intended.

424 To ensure validity in research, examination of trustworthiness is crucial. For us to establish the validity of
425 the research instrument in this study, we were helped by research advisors and other experts. We were advised
426 on retaining items based on their relevance, representation and clarity of wording. Thereafter, based on the
427 feedback, we eliminated items that were unclear, irrelevant or redundant.

428 **35 i) Reliability**

429 Reliability refers to the level of dependability of the questions in the research instrument or the degree to which a
430 measurement instrument gives the same results each time that it is used, assuming that the underlying item being

431 measured does not change. Before administering the questionnaires, a pre-test was conducted in Nyarugenge and
432 Muhima sectors, on the instrument whose validity was ensured. The aim was to pre-test the questionnaire with
433 the view to ensure that respondents understood the questions so as to provide appropriate responses. In addition,
434 it helped to check whether administration of the survey procedure as a whole went smoothly (Finn, 2015).

435 To certify that the instrument is reliable a Cronbach's Alpha coefficient of 0.6 and above must be achieved
436 (Amin, 2005). Using SPSS, the calculated value of the instrument reliability was 0.862 Cronbach's Alpha. See
437 table 6 below. While establishing good quality studies through reliability and validity in research, trustworthiness
438 of a research report lies at the heart of issues conventionally discussed. Rigour, which refers to the extent to which
439 the researchers worked to enhance the quality of the studies, is achieved through measurement of the validity
440 and reliability (Joppe, 2004).

441 **36 k) Data Analysis**

442 Raw data from the field was cleaned, coded and by using the SPSS software was entered in the computer.
443 Descriptive statistics, in this case frequencies, percentages, mean and standard deviation scores as were derived.
444 A Likert scale with five points was used for the survey. This is because it allowed the respondents to measure
445 how much they agreed or disagreed with a particular statement ??McLeod et al, 2015).

446 There was need to establish or explain to what extent a change in one or several independent variable(s) could
447 explain a change in the dependent variables. Table 8 below indicates the strength of the relationship was rated.

448 **37 l) Limitations**

449 First, eliciting information from respondents required patience and high degree of tact due to their evasiveness
450 and fear wondering that the researcher may be among the authorities in charge of the District, who after gathering
451 the information, would use it to exact taxes on them. A lot of time was required. Secondly, the informal sector
452 is characterised by lack of or poor records.

453 **38 X.**

454 **39 Findings**

455 This research intended to achieve the following objectives: identify the challenges faced by tax collectors in
456 Nyarugenge District, show the challenges which prevent informal traders not to pay taxes and to analyze the
457 relationship between informal trade and tax compliance.

458 **40 a) Socio-Demographic characteristics of the respondents**

459 The study findings of socio-demographic characteristics (Gender, Age, Education and Experience) are summarized
460 in the following tables. Source: Primary Data Table 9 shows that the majority (64/96), thus 66.7% of the total
461 respondents, were female and (32/96), thus 33.3% of the respondents were male. The researchers concluded that
462 the informal sector was dominated by females. This also shows that in real life the more practicable informal
463 trade was performed by women, therefore policy makers and other stakeholders must consider this when making
464 decisions.

465 **41 Source: Primary Data**

466 The revelation in table 10 is that the majority, that is 49 out of 96, thus 51% of the total respondents, were
467 uneducated. Those who had attained primary level schooling were 47 out 96 thus 49%. This is a key guide to
468 policymakers. Read together with the table on gender above, the implication is that the majority women are of
469 very limited education, and the male are not any much better. This shows that the low level of education was the
470 main factor contributing to the informality of conducting informal trade. Related to this is the evident failure to
471 keep both financial and non-financial records, which is incompatible with taxation compliance. If participation
472 in the informal sector is closely related to low levels of education, then policy in the education sector must be
473 aligned to address this. Programs for tax education have to be rolled out cognizant of the challenge.

474 **42 b) Challenges faced by tax collectors**

475 In order to have accurate information, we prepared questions about the challenges faced by tax collectors from
476 Nyarugenge District on informal trade and the table 11 below provides the field findings. Table 11 shows that
477 5 out of 14 (35.7%) of the tax collectors said that the challenge they face is lack of enough skills in the domain
478 of finance. Those faced with the stigma of social condemnation among taxpayers who are against tax offences
479 were 3 out of 14, that is, (21.4%) tax collectors. In third place, 2 out of the 14 tax collectors (14.4%) said
480 that the challenge faced by tax collectors is means of transport to facilitate taxpayers to reach the area of tax
481 collection. A similar percentage is challenged by poor perceptions on the relevance of tax payment. Finally, 1
482 out of 14 tax collectors (7.1%) out of 14 tax collectors said that the challenge they faced was taxpayers' culture
483 to evade and avoid taxes and carrying on business activity without trading license. The findings reveal that some
484 of the barriers to tax collection and compliance are institutional and can be administratively addressed by the

45 E) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMAL TRADE AND TAX COMPLIANCE

485 Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA). Rejection by society is a psycho-socio problem which must be addressed as
486 such before symptoms reveal themselves by way of stress.

487 **43 c) Challenges faced by informal traders on tax payment**

488 We asked questions about the challenges faced by informal traders in an effort to pay tax in Nyarugenge District.
489 Table 12 indicates a telling and quite significant average mean score of about 4.2000 with regard to challenges
490 faced by informal traders on tax payment. This implies that the challenges are really potent. At the top are
491 the challenges of low capital investment, with a mean score of 4.8438 and lowest standard deviation of 0.36500.
492 This is closely followed by higher tax rate imposed compared with business capacity (most likely reflected by the
493 low capitalisation) whose mean is 4.6667 and standard deviation is 0.47388. This means that respondents differ
494 least on the challenge of low capital, and almost similarly on high tax rates. Scoring lower but also significant
495 figures are challenges of failure to understand the relevance of paying tax and lack of education on tax payment
496 and procedures with a mean of 4.1771 and standard deviation of 0.69577. First of all, this is not surprising given
497 that the level of education of the participants in the informal sector is barely basic, where it exists. This was
498 revealed in section 10.1 on Socio-Demographic characteristics of the respondents.

499 The coincidence of standard deviations with the mean scores, that is, lack of education on tax payment and
500 procedures and failure to understand the relevance of paying tax depicts a high degree of consistency in the
501 findings and therefore reliability and validity of the findings. This is further confirmed by standard deviation of
502 0.47388 and 0.36500 for 4.6667 and 4.8438 scored for higher tax rate imposed compared with business capacity
503 and low capital of investment respectively. It indicates a high level of research rigour as defined in section 9.10
504 on rigour, validity and reliability above.

505 **44 d) Informal traders' opinion on tax payment**

506 After appreciating the challenges faced by tax collectors, as well as those faced by informal traders on tax payment,
507 we found it pertinent that we obtain information on the informal traders' opinions on tax payment. The findings
508 are as in table 13 below. The results from the table 13 logically flow with the findings in table 12 which provides
509 findings on challenges faced by informal traders on tax payment. It is therefore not surprising that top on the
510 list is the demand for increase of the purchasing power of the population through poverty reduction programs.
511 It has a mean score of 4.8438 out of 5.0 and a standard deviation of .3650, the highest and lowest in the table
512 respectively. Coincidentally, at the top of the list in the table of challenges was low capital investment, with a
513 mean score of 4.8438 and lowest standard deviation of 0.36500. Poverty reduction is impliedly most crucial as
514 it enhances income, which in turn would increase savings and therefore the capital in the potential and actual
515 taxpayer's enterprises. In table 13 increase in poverty reduction is followed by sensitising the informal traders
516 for behaviour change which scored a mean of 4.8333 a standard deviation of .37463. In table 11 on challenges by
517 tax collectors social condemnation among taxpayers against tax offences and poor perceptions on the relevance
518 of tax payment ranked higher than most others, expect lack of enough skills of tax collectors in the domain of
519 finance. In table 12 above lack of education on tax payment and procedures as well as failure to understand the
520 relevance of paying tax scored a high average of 4.1771. It is therefore not surprising that sensitising the informal
521 traders for behaviour is the next most important issue on informal traders' opinion on tax payment. Training of
522 informal traders regarding tax payment and monitoring and placement of informal trade to the modern market
523 follow with a score of 4.3438. Sensitizing and training are about creating awareness and therefore closely related.
524 It is also important that when one objectively trains or sensitizes for a purpose or deliverables, the trainees are
525 monitored to assess whether the training was effective and benefited the trainees. It is about impact assessment.

526 A population whose poverty is reduced and who have been sensitised and trained are expected to graduate
527 to a higher level. The enhanced skills and management competences in turn imply business capacity that will
528 require that in addition from internal sources, enterprises can leverage external sources to increase their funding.
529 It is therefore logical that next to poverty alleviation programs, sensitisation and training, facilitation of informal
530 trade to access the business capital, scoring a mean of 4.6667 is next. At the same level of score is reduction of
531 rates imposed on taxpayers' business. This is so because with a wider tax base and well sensitized and better
532 capitalized businesses, more revenue can be raised by a responsive community, with more taxable profits.

533 **45 e) Relationship between informal trade and tax compliance**

534 Correlation is a measure or degree of relationship between variables. Statistical correlation can be positive,
535 negative or zero. In the table below we interrogate the relationship between informal trade and tax compliance
536 in Nyarugenge District. The Spearman's correlation coefficient, r , can take values from +1 to -1.

537 The higher the magnitude of the r , the higher the revealed relationship, whether negative or positive. The
538 findings presented in table 14 show that there is a slight positive relationship between tax compliance with
539 informal trade at 0.666, sig .000. This implies that more has to be done to raise the relationship. On the good
540 side, on their part the informal sector taxpayers are not totally oblivious of their statutory role of paying taxes.
541 The government of Rwanda can do a close study elsewhere, especially in Africa to improve on tax compliance.

542 **46 XI.**

543 **47 Conclusions**

544 The factors for tax compliance and noncompliance are two-way. Governments, including that of Rwanda, must
 545 promote an equitable legal and regulatory environment for the conduct of business in general, and as revealed
 546 in this study, for tax purposes. They must provide enabling tax education programs, set tax rates reasonably,
 547 be evidently seen to provide benefits for the taxes paid and have in place adequate and appropriate institutional
 548 mechanisms and systems that make appreciation of tax issues and payments convenient for the tax payer. The
 549 government has political and social contracts with the people governed, to provide social and other services,
 550 as well as the physical infrastructure like roads and utilities like water and power. On their part the governed
 551 have the reciprocal and statutory obligation to raise the funds, through among others, paying taxes, to enable
 552 government execute its duties and responsibilities under the social and political contracts. They have to pay
 553 taxes, which the government will have set, mindful of the canons and principles articulated above.

554 Respondents were cagey when they were asked about whether there may be inhibitive vices such as frequent
 555 payment to non-state actors, for instance criminal gangs or corrupt officials who offer protection to evaders,
 556 which reduces individual’s likelihood to have tax compliant attitude. With the findings of study which revealed
 557 institutional challenges of, for example, lack of transport, there could be gaps which could allow the vices to
 558 creep in.

559 It is noted from the findings that on their part the informal sector taxpayers in Rwanda are not totally
 560 oblivious of their statutory obligations of paying taxes. However, government has to substantially enhance public
 561 awareness by way of tax education and accompany this with providing tangible benefits in return for the sacrifices
 562 the taxpayer makes.

563 **48 XII.**

564 **49 Recommendations**

565 Tax compliance is only one aspect of the multifaceted and very important matter of the tax discipline. Further
 566 studies can for example be done with respect to the national budgetary processes and fiscal policies in Rwanda
 567 and other developing or emergent countries. These have an impact on compliance or otherwise, with taxation.

568 Nations are so closely interrelated in the globalised world that the impact of this phenomena can be a very
 569 interesting aspect of tax compliance. Study in this area would be value enhance.

570 **50 Global Journal of Management and Business Research**

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1

Reason for not registering for taxes	Share (%)	Median	Expectation of annual tax obligations Mean	Actual annual tax obligations Median	Monthly turnover Mean
High registrationcost	1.5	86,000	224,125	100,000	950,000
Too small to pay taxes	53.0	50,000	111,645	100,000	550,000
Taxes are too high	12.0	95,000	254,943	100,000	1,075,000
No action will be taken	1.0	40,000	60,167	200,000	750,000
Too complicated process	0.7	235,000	380,000	100,000	1,140,000
No time to register	3.2	50,000	195,263	216,000	1,000,000
Do not know what the TIN is	11.5	50,000	941,045	100,000	800,000
Business is just not registered	9.3	60,000	138,058	100,000	500,000
Do not know where to register	3.4	100,000	276,158	100,000	650,000
Other Specify	4.4	50,000	70,625	100,000	575,000

Source: World Bank 2011 Survey Report

[Note: In table 1 above, tax obligation refers]

Figure 1: Table 1 :

2

Canon	Adam Smith's observation
Equity or ability	

Figure 2: Table 2 :

3

Population category	Population under study
Informal traders	4,800
Tax collectors	14
Total	4,814

Figure 3: Table 3 :

4

Response	Mean Range	Scale	Interpretation
Strongly Agree	4.20 -5.00	5	Very High
Agree	3.40 -4.19	4	High
Undecided	2.60 -3.39	3	Average

Figure 4: Table 4 :

5

Strata (Sector)	Number of personnel	Sample size	Justification
Taxation department	8	8	Convenient
Top management	4	4	Convenient
Tax payers	84	84	Convenient
Total	96	96	Convenient

Source: Author (2018)
 g) Validity and Reliability of the Instrument
 According to (Ochieng et al, 2007

Figure 5: Table 5 :

6

Valid items	Sample size	Cronbach's Alpha
45	96	0.862

Source: researchers' data
 j) Rigour, Validity and reliability

Figure 6: Table 6 :

7

Scale Point	Responses	Verbal description	Weighted mean
5	Strongly Agree (SA)	Very high perception	4.21 -5.00
4	Agree (A)	High perception	3.51 -4.50
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree (ND)	Fair perception	2.51 -3.50
2	Disagree (DA)	Low perception	1.51 -2.50
1	Strongly Disagree (SD)	Very low perception	1.0
			- 1.50

Figure 7: Table 7 :

8

Strongly high	0.9 -1.00
High	0.7 -0.9
Moderate	0.5 -0.7
Weak	0.3 -0.5
Very weak	0 -0.3

Figure 8: Table 8 :

9

Gender	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative percentage
Male	32	33.3	33.3
Female	64	66.7	100
Total	96	100	

Figure 9: Table 9 :

10

Education	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative percent
Uneducated	49	51	51
Primary	47	49	100
Total	96		

Figure 10: Table 10 :

11

Statements	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative (%)
Lack of enough skills of tax collectors in the domain of finance	5.0	35.7	35.7
Poor perceptions on the relevance of tax payment	2.0	14.3	50.0
Taxpayers' culture to evade taxes	1.0	7.1	57.1
Social condemnation among taxpayers against tax offences	3.0	21.4	78.5
Business activity without trading license	1.0	7.1	85.6
Means of transport to facilitate taxpayers to reach the area of tax collection	2.0	14.4	100.0

Source: Primary Data 2015

Figure 11: Table 11 :

12

Statement	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
Lack of education on tax payment and procedures	3.0	5.0	4.1771	0.69577
Failure to understand the relevance of paying tax	3.0	5.0	4.1771	0.69577
Higher tax rate imposed compared with business capacity	4.0	5.0	4.6667	0.47388
Low capital of investment	4.0	5.0	4.8438	0.36500

Source: Primary data 2015

Figure 12: Table 12 :

13

Statement	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
Reduction of rates imposed on taxpayers' business	4.00	5.00	4.6667	.47388
Increasing the purchasing power of the population through poverty reduction program	4.0	5.00	4.8438	.36500
Facilitate informal trade to access the business capital	3.0	5.00	4.6667	.49275
Monitoring and placement of informal trade to the modern market	2.0	5.00	4.3438	.47745
Sensitizing the informal traders for behavior change	4.0	5.00	4.8333	.37463
Training of informal trade regarding tax payment	4.0	5.00	4.3438	.47745

Source: Primary data 2016

Figure 13: Table 13 :

14

Correlation		Informal trade	Tax compliance
	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.660 **
Informal trade	Sig. (1-tailed)	.	.000
Spearman's rho	N	96	96
Tax compliance	Correlation Coefficient	.660 **	1.000
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.000	.
	N	96	96

Figure 14: Table 14 :

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²Understanding Tax Compliance in the Informal Sector in a Developing or Emergent Economy: A Case Study of Nyarugenge District Rwanda

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