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 $CrossRef\,DOI\,of\,original\,article:\,10.34257/{\rm GJMBRGVOL20IS5PG43}$ 

Peace Building in Colombia. Regional Impacts on Security of the
 National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction

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Received: 9 December 2019 Accepted: 3 January 2020 Published: 15 January 2020

### 6 Abstract

7 This study evaluates the effects of the National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and

8 Reconstruction (PNCRT) on security in the regions affected by the armed conflict. It focused

<sup>9</sup> on analysing its effect on life threats, infrastructure damage and the spread of illicit crops

<sup>10</sup> through a combination of statistical techniques called Propensity Score Matching and

<sup>11</sup> Difference in Differences.

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13 Index terms— colombia; internal armed conflict; security, peace agreements,

# 14 **1** Introduction

olombia is a very diverse country in terms of climate, geography, institutions and culture. Besides, it's a country 15 that has been built from specific realities at the regional level (Chernick, 1999). The way the territory was both 16 17 settled and politically consolidated since the colony period does not allow any generalisation at any level. In 18 the words of Geertz, "The state-nation in Colombia has been "a social instrument made to respond to unequal identities, unclear wishes and acknowledgements that compete among themselves". (Geertz, taken from González 19 20 pp. 25). Colombia is a country of regions (González, Bolívar, and Vásquez 2003) Several rigorous studies agree that one of the main causes of persisting armed conflict in a country is the concept of a weak or failed state, or 21 even a nonexistent one (Jackson, Quasi-States; Bayart, State in Africa; Zartman, Collapsed States Besley and 22 Torsten, State Capacity, Acemoglu, Ticchi, Vindigni, Emergence States). The Colombian state has indeed an 23 uneven government presence in all regions; unfortunately, this has provided an opening for insurgent groups to 24 be "able to resist the central government's attempts to supposed modernization", to control local areas neglected 25 26 by government institutions and to disconnect them from national markets (González, 2014) and the provision of 27 security ??Bulla y Guarín, 2015). There is no doubt that due to decades of systematic internal conflict and to the evolution of armed opponents at the local level, the Colombian state has been sharing his governance in a 28 coacted, parallel or contested way ??Duarte, 2016, González, 2014, Bates, 2001). 29 Indeed, González (2014) pointed out that the main cause of the internal armed conflict in Colombia for 30 more than five decades together with its devastating effects in terms of human lives and damage to economical 31 infrastructure is the consequence of an uneven presence of the state in all regions. With in this context, ??uarte 32

(2016) also claimed that the unev en presence of the Colombian state is associated with the concentration of power
 in each region. There fore, the state governance capacity or its absence in some regions versus armed opponents,

that have limited their governance in a contested way, would be the main cause of the conflict. To this point, Duarte acknowledges the existence of a state that has adapted itself to each region or even the existence of a

parallel state in different areas of ??olombia. Alves ??2000) and Jackson (1990) state that the conflict can not be perpetuated where there is a weak presence of the state, which is a statement that goes together with what some authors have defined as a failed state. (Acemoglu, Ticchi, Vindigni, 2011); In any case, it has been pointed out that Colombia is a state that has gone through an ongoing consolidation process; a poor state that has been

41 incapable of imposing itself and facing insurgent groups that submit the territory.

Yet, in this regard, some authors share different opinions. Some of them ensure that the unequal presence of the state in regions is due to the convenience of the government in power that pursue economical benefits and take advantage of the lack of regulation and solid institutions; in this case, the state would act as an accomplice. ??Barham y Kleinfield, 2018). Evidence of this is seen in the way self-defence groups became paramilitary groups

### 2 II. RECENT BACKGROUND TO THE NATIONAL

in some regions of the country; in addition to challenging the guerrillas, to decrease land prices for their benefit,
they used violence against civilians, which was endorsed by the military (Barham and Kleinfield, 2018).

48 Whether they were weak, complicit, or still developing, it is safe to say that the various Colombian governments 49 have never had complete control of the country, which created 'possibility conditions' i various opponents of the 50 government to reorganize, exercise local authority, and create conflict in these regions.

Given that state-building depends on peacekeeping (Böge, at al., 2008), it becomes urgent to provide the most affected regions with the proper tools. For this reason, various administrations have negotiated peace agreements with different armed groups at different times during the conflict. Also, they have implemented plans and policies to strengthen state institutions in the regions (López, 2016). In fact, it must be recognized that state capacity has improved in recent decades and, although little, the legitimacy of government institutions has gained space in the territories. (BarreraOsorio, Maldonado, and Rodríguez 2012).

Despite the above, in Colombia, different groups have made the bet of consolidating the state institutions in the regions of conflict; indeed, they have worked for the pacification of the territory together with the reestablishment of security and its eventual economical and social ascent. To this respect, López (2016) notes that there have been at least ten peace plans in Colombia that started during the term of expresident Lleras, ??1958) ??1959) ??1960) ??1961) ??1962) and recently drove to the peace agreement with guerillas of the Revolutionary

62 Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC-EP in 2016, during the term of ex-president Santos.

63 In this framework, this research contributes to the literature of state-building by evaluating the impact of 64 the interventions carried out by the National Policy for territorial consolidation and reconstruction (PNCRT) implemented in conflict regions during the term of Juan Manuel Santos ??2010) ??2011) ??2012) ??2013) ??2014). 65 This policy brought together more than 30 years of government effort through trial and error to establish peace 66 in the regions. It happened at a critical time of internal conflict while negotiations with the guerrillas of the 67 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias-Ejercito del Pueblo 68 -FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional -ELN) were taking place. Finally, 69 as it was said, the negotiations with FARC-EP reached a successful conclusion in 2016. 70

It is worth clarifying that this study relies on a definition of the role of the state which legitimises it. (Mann, 1993); that is both, the power to use violence and the possibility of collecting taxes (known as imperium). This is the basis for studying the fundamental goal of the PNCRT, in other words, the capacity of rebuilding the regions devastated by decades of violence. Of course, this presumes that establishing peace around the regions in conflict is one of basic preconditions to legitimize the power of the State, specifically with regard to the use of force. Indeed, it is expected that the implementation of a peace policy will ensure progress by making the country safe and enabling citizens to exercise their civil and economic rights.

78 Statistical tools such as Propensity Score Matching and the Difference in differences were applied for this study.
79 The former was used to match municipalities that were treated by the Policy with others that shared identical
80 observable characteristics, but which were not treated by the policy. Once the matching of municipalities was
81 achieved, the effects of the policy were compared with the latter, the Difference in Differences technique. Of
82 course, this involved an analysis that took geographical and socioeconomic differences into account.

Thus, this paper not only provided data on how the PNCRT succeeded in re-building peace in regions but 83 also, unlike the existing literature in this area, it brought evidence of the rebuilding of institutional capacity in 84 the regions where conflict has predominated Last, the remainder of this paper focuses on explaining what the 85 PNCRT is, its origins and its main background. It also describes how this policy was implemented, highlighting 86 the importance of its geographical focus, which constituted the major challenge for its evaluation and justified 87 the use of two econometric techniques. Results are classified in three main areas according to the PNCRT 88 objectives in terms of peace building, mitigating threats to human life and survival, attacks on public and private 89 infrastructure, and the eradication of illicit crops. Lastly, conclusions emphasize both the importance of PNCRT 90

<sup>91</sup> and some remaining issues as a basis for further research.

# <sup>92</sup> 2 II. Recent Background to the National

Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction a) From Plan Colombia to the Consolidation Policy Prior to the PNCRT, the Plan Colombia program stood for peace, prosperity and the state strengthening. It started during the term of ex-president Pastrana (1998-2002) and it was incorporated into the Democratic Security Policy during the two terms of ex-president Uribe. Since it was sponsored by the international community, the military force not only increased but was modernised as an offensive strategy against guerrillas. This way, the state presence in the regions evidenced both in the defence policy and in democratic security.

<sup>99</sup> Initially, Plan Colombia prioritized the solving of the armed conflict. Thus, the dialogue with guerilla groups <sup>90</sup> was meant to be the basis of the program. Unfortunately, it didn't succeed because none of the parts showed a <sup>101</sup> real willingness to build peace during the Caguan negotiation in 1999. In fact, while the state carried out the <sup>102</sup> consolidation of counter-insurgency strategies with the help of Comando Sur in the state of Florida, guerrillas <sup>103</sup> took advantage of the demilitarized zone to strengthen their criminal conduct and their militia army.

104 It's important to note that president Pastrana policy left behind other urgent problems such as an increase 105 in the guerrillas purchasing power emerging from the access of drug trafficking. For this reason, when Alvaro 106 Uribe took office, he highlighted the harmful consequences of illegal drugs that threatened the country's economy and democracy. Indeed, during his two terms, president Uribe focused on two pillars: both, illegal crops and
 counter-insurgency war.

During the second Uribe term, the Comprehensive Action Doctrine (Doctrina de Acción Integral -DAI) was enacted and subsequently led by the Centre for Coordination and Comprehensive Action (Centro de Coordinación y Acción Integral -CCAI). This doctrine was designed by Juan Manuel Santos, who was the Minister of Defense at the time. The CCAI was composed of fourteen governmental entities that sought to strengthen the regions that the state gradually recovered by military action.

The Comprehensive Consolidation Program (Programa de Consolidacion Integral (PCI)) was designed based on the DAI, in 2017 and maintained both, the counter-narcotics and the counter-insurgency character of CCAI. Besides, it had a team on its own and included a regional structure that integrated the regions into national markets.

In 2009, the PCI was integrated into the National Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy. By the end of 2011, ex-president Juan Manuel Santos created the Special Administrative Unit for Territorial Consolidation (UACT) for the purpose to prevent any reversal of the improvements of public security forces in terms of security.

# <sup>121</sup> 3 b) The National Policy for territorial Consolidation and <sup>122</sup> Reconstruction

The National Policy for Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction PNCRT came about during the administration of ex-president Santos and was led by the National Security Council. To implement the PNCRT, decree 4161 dated November 3 of 2011, created the Special Administrative Unit for Territorial Consolidation (UACT). This was a legal entity with its assets, national scope, administrative and financial autonomy, that was attached to the Administrative Department for Social Prosperity (Departamento Administrativo para la Prósperidad Social), the government entity that leads the Sector of social inclusion and reconciliation.

The UACT is part of this sector, along with the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (Instituto Colombiano 129 de Bienestar Familiar -ICBF), the Unit for the Victims Assistance and Reparation (Unidad para Atención y 130 Reparación a las Victimas), the National Agency to Eliminate Extreme Poverty (Agencia Nacional para la 131 Superación de la Pobreza Extrema) and the National Centre for Historical Memory (Centro Nacional de Memoria 132 Histórica) ii All the previous efforts that the Colombian State had undertaken to consolidate its presence along 133 the national territory were pursued by the PNCRT. Its reason for being was to establish the institutional and 134 legal control over Colombia's regions; to guarantee the protection of citizens exercising their rights as well as 135 to ensure citizen participation and achieve the economical, social and institutional integration of the targeted 136 regions by creating conditions to sustain secure living conditions. 137

In terms of the conceptual framework of PNCRT, it relies on three major bases consisting of the
counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN), anti-drugs policies from Plan Colombia and a regional and social development
component of the areas where it was implemented. The COIN is a political and military theory built up to help
the state facing an asymmetric war against the insurgency that affects both, political and social order.

142 It's important to note that the PNCRT focused on solving the weak presence of the state in areas that 143 were marginalised by violence. Its main challenge was to maintain security in recovered zones ensuring the 144 irreversibility of the public force improvements in terms of security iii III.

# <sup>145</sup> 4 Strategy for Evaluating the National policy for Territorial <sup>146</sup> Consolidation and Reconstruction

147 ; that would be done by establishing institutions that would pay off debts concerning developmental, institutional,
148 economical and social prosperity at the local level.

Once the policy was defined, to implement it, the government needed to define the municipalities where it would startup. These regions were called « Treatment municipalities ». It was also necessary to find out other districts that shared the same characteristics, called the « Control municipalities », whose comparison with the prior would measure the impact of the policy. Last, data was built after defining a design to measure outcome variables and a period to study the impact of the policy.

# <sup>154</sup> 5 a) Criteria for the selection of the regions

To evaluate the impact of PNCRT, this study uses the intervention regions « Treatment regions » selected by the policy iv As we can see in table 1, the areas were grouped into three major zones of analysis; the northeast zone, that covers the regions of Catatumbo . According to the presidency, the PNCRT selected areas where illicit economical activity, public disturbance, precarious rural living conditions and illegal territory control by armed groups seemed to prevail.

and Arauca; a northwest region that covers the Nudo de Paramillo and Montes de María region and a large
southwest region that encompasses territories from the department of Nariño to the department of Meta. Table
I. Zones according to the PNCRT criteria. For clarity, Figure 1 shows the precise location on the map of
Colombia of the 59 municipalities that were selected to be intervened by the PNCRT and on which its impacts
were estimated. These municipalities, as indicated in the table above, were grouped into three analysis zones,

#### 10II. THE ESTIMATION OR MATCHING METHOD

which are delimited in circles. It is worth reiterating that, for this study, the definition of the treatment regions, 165 selected by the PNCRT, where the internal conflict prevailed, was taken into account. 166

#### Source: created by the author 6 167

As defined by the Office of the President of the Republic, the PNCRT focuses on areas with regional imbalances, 168 repeated disturbances of public order, territorial control by illegal armed groups, illicit economic activities, and 169 precarious living conditions for rural populations v. Furthermore, the policy's criteria for selecting the regions 170 correspond to the various strategies arising from illegal activities. The impacts of the conflict reveal the way 171 armed groups used these areas as corridors for drugs and weapons, rear-guard or protected areas, or areas rich 172 in extractive minerals and an evolution concerning their strategies (Salas-Salazar, 2016) 173

The methodology for assessing the policy's impact has four components: 174

? Select the evaluation period and identify the treatment municipalities in the regions of internal armed 175 conflict Develop Database ? Identify municipalities for the comparison and estimation strategy ? Find measures 176 for outcome variables 177

#### 7 b) Selection of the evaluation period 178

To assess the impact of PNCRT, it was necessary to set up a period before the intervention and a follow-up 179 period (after it). This way, a baseline was defined from 2010, the year in which the intervention was planned but 180 not yet implemented, and the year 2015 (period of evaluation of the impact, for postintervention comparisons). 181 This way, it was possible to have a suitable time to evidence the effects of the policy. Similarly, a fundamental 182 component of the information required is the identification of the regions for the comparison (control regions). 183 which will be explained in detail. 184

Finally, it should be noted that both, longitudinal information and the contrast between the outcome variable 185 trends before and after the implementation of the policy, made the comparison between « control regions » and 186 « treatment regions » possible.

187

#### 8 c) Database construction 188

Three types of data constitute the analysing variables of this study. They were collected to characterise the 189 districts where the policy would be implemented. For this purpose, data related to their social-economic 190 conditions as well as armed conflict and the expansion of illicit crops and drug trafficking in those districts 191 were collected. Nonetheless, to determine the impact of PNCRT, this study only focused on the data related 192 to the armed conflict which eventually would give an account of improvement and security maintenance in each 193 district. 194

To determine the internal armed conflict behaviour, two sources were consulted; on the one hand, the Unity of 195 Attention and Integral reparation of victims, UARIV, which provided data about internal forced displacement; 196 on the other hand, the observatory of the National Center of Historical Memory (CNMH) whose data was based 197 on the internal armed conflict between 1985 and 2015. 198

According to PNCRT, data about drug war should also be taken into account to consolidate security in the 199 districts. The Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System (Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos 200 -SIMCI) which is part of the United Nations office on drugs and Crime provided information on this issue. For 201 this case, a Dummy variable was developed, in which a one (1) was assigned to the districts where there are illicit 202 farming and zero (0) where there is not. 203

Lastly, concerning socio-economic conditions of each district, the National Administrative Department of 204 Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística -DANE) provided information about urban 205 and rural population figures since 1985, linear distance to departmental and national capitals, municipality area, 206 municipality altitude, and Unmet Basic Needs (Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas -NBI). 207

#### d) Identification of municipalities for the comparison i. Con-9 208 trol districts 209

To assess the effect of a program intervention requires to know the difference between the result variable for an 210 individual that has been impacted and the result variable for the same individual if the policy had not existed. 211 The first condition is known since the information exists and the data are available; however, the second, which is 212 a hypothetical condition, cannot be observed because data are not available; this is known as the 'counterfactual' 213 conditional. Yet, to build it, regarding the choice of municipalities and for comparison and control purposes, 214 it was necessary to find out districts that shared the same characteristics as «Treatment districts» in terms of 215 socio-economic, demographic and conflict situation and that could have also been selected by the PNCRT. 216

#### ii. The estimation or matching Method 10 217

The statistical matching technique called Propensity Score Matching (PSM) was implemented to find out the 218 «counterfactual », these municipalities or clones that had the same probability of being covered by the policy. 219

The objective of this methodology is to identify and weight the characteristics that make the probability distribution of the two samples similar in terms of the observable characteristics of treatment and control groups that determined that led them be part of the intervention programme.

The Propensity Score (PS) or participation probability, corresponds to a numerical value between zero and one for each individual that was analysed (districts that were intervened and those that were not). it represents the probability of having been selected for the program according to each one of the observed characteristics of individuals (Municipalities).

Districts were matched according to their estimated probability of being covered, given their observable characteristics. P(x). i.e, those treatment and control municipalities with very similar coverage probabilities. This probability of coverage is defined as:P(X) = P(D = 1|X)(1)

where ??(?? = 1|??) is the probability of participating in the intervention programme given a set of observable characteristics vi Assuming that any selection bias is only due to differences in observable characteristics, the calculation of the program's impact could be estimated in a nonbiased manner, as it is showed by the difference in the average value of the outcome variables of both kinds of districts. The assumptions needed to determine the programme's effects are first, conditional independence (that is, unobservable factors that do not affect participation), and second, considerable overlap in PSs between the participating (treatment or intervened) and non-participating (control) municipalities (Caliendo, 2008;Bernal, 2011).

Both, subject to intervention and not subject to intervention distributions can be obtained by finding a PS for each municipality. There will be an area where these two distributions overlap. Observations that are not within this area of overlap should be removed from the sample to be used. This overlap area is also called the common support area (SP), and any observations of treatment municipalities with PSs greater than the maximum PS for control municipalities should also be discarded, along with those for control municipalities with PSs lower than the minimum score for treatment municipalities; (See Appendix 2).

243 . Once the model's assumptions have met, the impact estimator for the average treatment effect of the treated 244 group (ATT) using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) would be:?? ?????? ?????? = ?? ??(??)|??=1 {??[??(1)]?? 245 = 1, ?? (??)] ? {??[??(0)]?? = 0, ?? (??)]

According to Bernal and ??eña (2011, 2017), ?? ??(??)|??=1 is the estimated value concerning the probability of having been chosen P(X); {??[??(1)|?? = 1, ?? (??)] is the expected value of the observable variables within the group that was covered by the PNCRT; {??[??(0)|?? = 1, ?? (??)] is the contra factual, which corresponds to the expected value of observable variables within the group where the PNCRT was implemented, in the hypothetical case they wouldn't have been intervened. The PSM estimator is the average difference between the municipalities that were covered by the PNCRT and the control municipalities of SP; it is pondered by the participation probability (PS).

On the other hand, the Simple Average Nearest Neighbour Estimator method was used, both, with and without 253 replacement ??Khandker et al., 2010). This estimator allows each treated municipality to be compared with one 254 that has the mathematically nearest probability of having been chosen, but that was not covered by the PNCRT. 255 Subsequently, the probability differences between each treated and untreated municipality are calculated to form 256 a vector of distances that must be ranked from smallest to largest. Next, the value of the analysed variable 257 for each municipality must be compared with the N municipalities with the nearest probabilities in the control 258 group. This work used one (1) nearest neighbour (the PS was also reviewed with three and four municipalities) 259 260

Nt is the total number of municipalities targeted by the policy; the ATT value then equals the exact effect of the PNCRT on the analysed variable (Heckman, 1998).

Appendix 1 lists the results of the probability model for which a logit model was initially estimated. It included variables related to population, conflict, and socioeconomic conditions that make a municipality likely to be a participant of policy intervention during the period before the treatment. In this case, the variables that had the major impact were those related to years of conflict, (historical violence) and social politics, such as the coverage by a subsidized health plan.

Once this estimate was made, it proceeded to review the pre-existence of possible differences between the treatment and control groups before treatment, as presented in Appendix 3. The results of the balance analysis revealed no significant differences between the municipalities selected by the PNCRT for treatment and the control municipalities that were statistically selected according to the established criteria. Additionally, the nearest neighbour matching method of estimation was chosen because it decreases the estimated variance.

However, it should be noted that when comparing two similar municipalities, pre-existing differences could affect the evaluation results in some way. This is the case of municipalities for which some of the unobserved effects of the variables of interest persist over time. To complement the PSM method, the difference in differences model was then necessary to avoid any pre-existing differences that could affect the evaluation results.

# <sup>277</sup> 11 iii. Estimation strategy - The Difference in differences model

The difference in differences model is commonly used in the analysis of quasi-experiments conditions correction. Since it provides greater efficiency in the estimation, this method was applied in this study to correct preexisting conditions between the control municipalities and the treatment municipalities. Logically, if the preexisting difference had not been corrected, the estimate would have been partially endogenous (selection bias) and, therefore, the comparison of means between the control and treatment groups would not have been valid. Similarly, to implement this model, before conducting the evaluation, it was important to check the assumption

of parallel trends. Hence, historical trends of each region of analysis were also reviewed. Annexe 4 shows the ones that shared similar behaviours.

The proposed model for the functional form regarding the PNCRT is Imbens & Wooldridge (2007) model:?? =? +?? D +? T +? (D T) +? (4)

? Y is the outcome variable of interest for municipalities ? D is a Dummy variable that captures the possible 288 differences between the treatment municipalities (D=1) and control municipalities (D=0)? T is the Dummy 289 variable that indicates the time when municipalities are observed and equals 1 for 2015, (the year when effects 290 were examined). ? D.T. is an explanatory variable that is the result of multiplying the two variables; it captures 291 aggregated factors that could cause changes in Y, even during the absence of the policy. ? ? and ? represent 292 parameters associated with explanatory variables Y and T ?  $\mu$  constitutes a parameter that shows fix effects of 293 the model ? ? shows a random error, of average 0: E [? | D, T] = 0. ? is a coefficient of interest that determines 294 the combined impact of variables or the interaction of explanatory variables D and T. 295

# The Impact Assessment of Pncrt a) Measurement of out come variables

The evaluation of the policy's effects examined the reestablishment of security in the regions intervened by the PNCRT, which is considered the absence of goaloriented violence vii due to internal armed conflict. As previously mentioned, according to the definition adopted by the U.N. in 2010, security implies the pacification of an area through a series of measures designed to reduce the risk of (peace) cessation, or of relapsing again into conflict by strengthening the conflict management capabilities of national organizations at all levels, and by laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development.

In the regions were PNCRT was implemented, the evaluation of the effects of the policy relies on the reestablishment of security, which is viewed as the absence of instrumental violence in the internal armed conflict. According to the United Nations definition, in 2010, the maintenance of security implies the territory pacification through a series of measures designed to reduce the risk of peace cessation or the relapsing again into conflict. This should be done by strengthening the conflict management capabilities of national organizations at all levels and by laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development.

However, in this sense, the concept of security depends on how this term is conceived by the government that implements the interventions and the outcome variables show the results of establishing securitization viii

In this sense and according to the government that implemented the PNCRT, there are three categories of 312 threats to be considered. First, threats to human life and survival, which includes: targeted assassinations, 313 specially of politicians, journalists or social leaders who oppose the violent actions of the armed forces; 314 kidnappings, considered as the event in which a person is deprived of his liberty against his will at the hands of 315 the Farc, the ELN, paramilitary groups or even common crime groups; forced disappearances, which may also 316 317 be perpetrated by the same groups and even by State forces, according to Law 589 of 2000, it consists of the deprivation of liberty any persons in any form, followed by concealment and the refusal to acknowledge such 318 deprivation. Other threats to human life and survival include sexual violence, defined by DIH as any act of a 319 sexual nature against the will of the victim; recruitment of minors, that is children, adolescents, young people and 320 adults who have been recruited to be part of the ranks of the insurgent group; displacement from homes, which 321 occurs when individuals or families are forced to leave their homes because of armed group threat; antipersonnel 322 mines, that is a war strategy sought to maintain control at the local level through the distribution of explosive 323 mines in the territories and finally, massacres, defined as a group murder involving at least four deaths. 324

. In this process, it is possible to find different meanings of the government's concept of security, which have been developed obliquely based on what it considers threats that must be addressed militarily.

Second, threats that impact on property, such as military operations, victims of military operations, and damage to property. It is common that attacks perpetrated by insurgent groups, especially FARC or ELN, are carried out with the aim of damaging oil pipelines or electrical towers, destroying military posts, bridges or access roads to regions or any strategic communication points for economic development. measured by the number of hectares with coca crops by a municipality.

## <sup>332</sup> 13 b) PNCRT impacts

Table 2 presents the effects of the PNCRT interventions and provides totals for the country as a whole and each 333 334 analysed region. The first table section lists the impacts of the policy on threats to human life and survival. 335 According to Cardenas, Eslava and Ramirez (2013) this events stress their effects on the civilian population, 336 who has the feeling of being the direct target of the conflict. As can be seen in the table, without exception, all 337 of the results for the variables of interest are negative values (Targetting Killing, Kidnapping, Desappearences, Recrutment of minors, Forced displace households, Antipersonel mines, Victims of antipersonel mines (average) 338 and Massacres); this result shows the positive impact of the PNCRT and the improvement of security in the 339 treated municipalities. Unfortunately, and only the variables of disappearance and recruitment of minors are not 340 statistically significant. 341

The nationwide results for the demining policy stand out, as it is fundamental for the process of land restitution 342 to displaced peasants and to comply with the agreements at the 2010 Ottawa convention. Although the demining 343 success is partly due to the support of civilian organizations, it should not be forgotten that, historically, this 344 has been the strict purview of the military. This has created major obstacles for joint management of the 345 demining process since two divergent perspectives are in play. On the one hand, it is the government that imbues 346 the process with a national security perspective, and on the other hand, civilian organizations have a more 347 humanistic perspective. As we can see in the table, in general, results show there was an improvement regarding 348 security in all regions. Results about the decrease of military actions in the south part of the country, that is the 349 cessation of hostilities against oil and electrical industry are outstanding. 350

Concerning the first section, the threat to human survival and life, all variables showed a decrease in the statistically speaking; that leads us not to ensure that the risk decreased.

On the other hand, results show progress in terms of the eradication of anti-personal mines. The findings in the south-west region evidence the importance of the land restitution to displaced peasants and the effort to accomplish what had been agreed during the Ottawa Convention in 2010.

The satisfactory outcomes in terms of antipersonal mines are a clear example of horizontal institutional 356 coordination focused on a common objective, in which both civil and military organizations worked together 357 358 and in a collaborative way. (Licha & Molina, 2006, in Bulla y Guarin 2015,12). Incidentally, this task was not 359 easy because both had divergent positions; civil organisations acted based on a humanistic approach whereas the 360 military acted according to the national security policy. Anyway, the decrease of anti-personal mines brought excellent outcomes; no doubt it is also due to the information the guerilla group FARC provided about finding 361 explosive devices since they were in peace talks with the state. It must be said, though that it is not so in the 362 case of victims of mine explosions; despite the efforts of military, armed groups and civilian populations, the 363 rate of these events only decreased slightly and results are unfortunately not significant in the municipalities. 364 About displaced household, results show a significant decrease. Indeed, in the northwest region, formed by 365 the departments of Antioquia, Bolivar, Cordoba and Sucre a larger number of two hundred families didn't suffer 366 from rootlessness. Outcomes about displacement are a great step ahead considering that Colombia shows internal 367 displacement rates that are comparable to those of Siria, Iran and the Republic of Congo. 368

Concerning targetting killing, findings were significant; they showed close to three fewer events on average for the Catatumbo and Arauca regions; almost two fewer cases for the southern region and slightly over one less for the northwest. According to the National Center of Historical Memory, this is one of the variables that most intimidate civilian populations since it not only concerns the victim but also creates physical, emotional and social coercion that leads to silence and thus to impunity.

Last but not least, concerning the outcome variables of kidnapping and sexual violence, the rate diminished considerably. However, though results are significant, they are not conclusive because according to the method Differences-in-differences, based on the analysis of parallel trends, these variables presented a dissimilar behaviour before policy intervention (see appendix 4).

The second section of Table 2 presents results that showed a decline in hostilities and infrastructure damage for the south part of the country in terms of bombings of oil pipelines and military operations. According to ??ecaut (2002), attacks on infrastructure are part of a political strategy to impact security. In this sense, results were highly significant because they not only showed seven fewer military operations, that could have compromised electricity towers of Tumaco, but also had a national impact, with an average reduction of more than four events (at 99.9% average level of significance), for the country as a whole.

Lastly, the third section reveals the effects of the policy on the eradication of illicit farming. The increase in 384 hectares planted with coca is the worst outcome in terms of the PNCRT's objectives. In general terms, it can 385 be attributed to two circumstances: on the one hand, the planting of herbicide-resistant coca varieties called 386 la cuarentona and la gringa; on the second hand, the fact that coca planting is highly concentrated in border 387 regions since glyphosate fumigation is prohibited. In fact, between 2008 and 2018, the government of Colombia 388 had to face a lawsuit before the International Justice Court in la Hague for damage caused by the aspersion of 389 this herbicide. This is consistent with the fact that illicit farming has increased in the southwest region by more 390 than eight hundred hectares on average, especially in the municipality of Tumaco, on the Ecuatorian border and 391 in the department of Putumayo, which borders Ecuador and Peru in the Amazon rain forest. Similarly, coca 392 cultivation increased significantly by more than three hundred hectares on average in the northeast region as it 393 is located along the border with Venezuela. 394

On the other hand, Bulla and Guarin, (2015) have pointed out endemic elements present in municipalities like 395 Tumaco in the southwest part of the country. This municipality is characterized by a state institutionality that 396 doesn't reach the whole municipality and then leaves the rest of it in hands of armed organizations such as the 397 FARC and criminal groups. Accessing these isolated territories, mostly made up of dispersed rural population, 398 is a major difficulty, mobility costs can even reach US 40 per trip. Logically, since they are isolated and under 399 the protection of armed and criminal groups, inhabitants of these territories contribute to the illicit activities 400 that have been set. Furthermore, this suggests that the economic impact of institutional strengthening is not 401 economic, while the profits from illicit crops continue to be profitable in this area. This is corroborated by the 402 results pointed out by Aguirre (2020) where it is evident that after the intervention, the fiscal collection in terms 403 of Industry and Commerce barely grew by less than 1%, in this part of the territory. 404

In contrast, the results shown in the northwest region, illicit crops have been reduced. At first glance, and Energy, this part of the country produces a third of Colombia's gold. Of course, illicit mining generates greater benefits than illicit crops. Yet, this activity is the survival source for the inhabitants of the lower Cauca Antioqueño and unfortunately, the armed groups ensure their exploitation by contractual arrangements or the use of force and extortion. V.

# 410 14 Conclusions

Throughout its history, the governments of Colombia have had several initiatives to implement actions to guarantee peace in conflict zones. In fact, since the government of former ex-president Carlos Lleras ??1958) ??1959) ??1960) ??1961) ??1962), many administrations have tried to implement peace programs and negotiations with insurgent groups. Recently, during the mandate of former ex-president Juan Manuel Santos (2004-2008), the National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT) was implemented to ensure the irreversibility of security gains and strengthen the state's presence in territories devastated by decades of violence.

This study aimed to assess the impact on security of the National Policy of Territorial Consolidation and reconstruction (PNCRT) in the conflict territories between 2010 and 2014. It analysed the findings in the regions that were selected by the policy, that is, the north-west region (Montes de Maria and Nudo de Paramillo), the northeast region (Catatumbo and Arauca) and the southwest region (Cauca, Tumaco, Macarena, El Caguán, Tumaco and the Central Mountain range).

Research process required comparing the municipalities affected by the policy with other municipalities that share identical characteristics. It was the Propensity Score Matching method that allowed us to do this. In addition, to evaluate the impacts of the policy in terms of threats to security, threats to human life and survival, attacks on public and private infrastructure and the eradication of illicit crops, this study used the Difference in Difference technique.

In general, after the intervention of the policy in the three zones, the analysis of outcomes showed a decrease concerning attacks against public infrastructure and threats to life and human survival. (Kidnapping, targetting killing, displaced household, anti-personal-mines, victims of them, massacres, disappearance, sexual violence and recruitment of minors. Indeed, Salas (2016) mentions that 2015 was, in fact, the year when there was the lowest percentage of violence.

The results relating to the impact of the antipersonnel mine policy should be highlighted, as it was the policy's 433 greatest of institutional coordination achievement, bringing civil organizations together to help rural populations. 434 In this sense, the government's strategy succeeded in involving civil society to achieve a stable and lasting peace. 435 The evaluation of the implementation of the PNCRT shows significant progress in terms of civil security and 436 respect for life and dignity. It also shows signs of a recovery of political control of the conflict zones, in view of 437 438 the mitigation of attacks on infrastructure. At the same time, the PNCRT does not fully achieve its objectives, in 439 terms of reducing drug trafficking, its efforts are still incipient. Apparently, achieving institutional strengthening 440 is not unthinkable; that would mean being able to reach the most remote rural areas of the country historically

governed by their competitors, controlling the spread of illegal activities and presenting more profitable rural economic alternatives, like a National Rural Guard suggested by the Bulla y Guarin, (2015)

443 On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the Northwest region, where the results showed the lowest 444 number of displaced households, coincides with the only region where no increase in illicit crops was found; in 445 this sense, it is possible to affirm that there is a direct relationship between the expansion of illicit crops and 446 forced displacement. However, this would be a subject of study for further research.

447 On the contrary, the policy did not go very far in eradicating illicit crops.

The results showed a disproportionate increase in coca plantations in the study regions, except for the northwest 448 region; there the decrease in coca leaf cultivation is evident but, unfortunately, the labour force from these crops 449 shifted towards activity related to illicit mining. This result shows that illegality represents the most lucrative 450 economic alternative for thousands of families and armed groups in the conflict regions. Therefore, in the future, 451 policies that promote the eradication of illicit crops must ensure economic alternatives that can guarantee returns 452 453 above those left by illicit activities. Adittionally, the ineffectiveness of politics in this sense is a huge warning signal to state institutions and the peace building. As the Centre for Historical Memory has already pointed out, 454 drug trafficking allows for the financing of armed groups, deepens inequality in the countryside because thousands 455 of families are displaced by the growers or threatened to sell part of their land at a lower price, and increases 456 corruption at the local level. 457

Appendices 15458 1 2 459

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 $<sup>^2(</sup>$  )G © 2020 Global Journals




Figure 1: Figure 1 :

08

Figure 2:

# 15 APPENDICES




Figure 3:




Figure 4:

1

Zone 1 Northeast Re- gion	Zone 2 Northwest Region	Zone 3 Southwest Region
Catatumbo Arauca	Montes de Maria Nudo de Paramillo	Central Mountain Range Cauca Tumaco Macarena Caguan River Putumayo

Figure 5: Table 1 :

Source: created by the author

### $\mathbf{2}$

Observable Characteristics	Total	South West Region	North-East Region	North West Region
Threat to life and Human Survival				
Targetting Killing	-1,21*	-1,85*	-2,57**	1,35*
Kidnapping	-0,49*	-0,54**	-0,78	-0,105
Desappearences	-0,54	$0,\!13$	0,04	-1,30
Recrutment of minors	-0,81	-2,22***	$0,\!128$	0,46
Displace households	-108,00*	$38,\!03$	-132,74*	-
				246,44**
Antipersonel mines	-5,27***	-6,8**	-4,91***	-3,18*
Victims of antipersonel mines (aver-	$0,23^{***}$	$0,\!07$	$0,81^{***}$	0,08
age)				
Massacres	-0,09*	-0,03	-0,07*	0,118
Attacks to public and private				
infrastructure				
Military operations	4,044***	7,335***	3,70*	$0,\!69$
Average number of victims of military	-0,49*	-0,67**	0,259	-0,97*
actions				
Damage to property	$-1,333^{***}$	-1,61*	-0,65	-
				$2,18^{***}$
Eradication of illicit farming				
Hectares of coca crops	428,38*	839,30*	342,22*	-12,61
Difference is statistically significant at $10\%^*$ , at $5\%$			$\%^*$ , at $5\%^{**}$ at $1\%^{***}$	
			Source: crea	ted by the author

Figure 6: Table 2 :

Variables

Population density

Recruitment Illicit crops Targeted assassinations Victims of military operations Damage to property Kidnappings Attacks on the civilian population Massacres Infant mortality

Participation in previous policies Subsidized health care coverage

Aqueduct (running water) coverageGarbage collection coverage Sewer system coverage Characteristics observed in the municipalities municipaliSexual violence-0.272454Sociodemographic characteristics 0.097969

Per capita royalties Population den- 35.78 sity

Total tax revenue Property tax revenue Subsidized health care coverage Industry/commerce (ICA) tax revenue

Garbage collection coverage	44.33			
Infant mortality rate	25.09			
Percentage of voters	0.53			
Recruitment (total for the period 1999-2010)	Conflict-related characteristics 7.01			
Targeted assassinations (total for the period 1999-2010)	11.96			
Participation in Plan Colombia	0.64			
Attacks on civilians	0.37			
Victims of military operations	1.42			
Damage to property	1.88			
Kidnappings (average for the period 1999-2010)	12 10.34257/GJMBRGVOL20IS5PG43 9.50			
Massacres	1.71			

## 460 .1 Acknowledgements

<sup>461</sup> The author is grateful to financial support at the Universitaria Agustiniana for the consecution of this paper.

# 462 .2 Appendix 2-Common support probability charts

## 463 .3 Common support without replacement

Peace Building in Colombia. Regional Impacts on Security of the National Policy for Territorial Consolidationand Reconstruction

466 Common support with replacement This method assumes that unobservable or unavailable variables are not 467 determining factors in the participation of the policy. vii. This is understood as violence for the purpose of 468 eliminating, intimidating, or provoking an opponent. Green P., and Ward T., State-Building and the Logic of 469 Violence in Iraq; page 49. viii.

According to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, the action of promoting or creating security is the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is developed within a political community to treat something like an existing threat towards a valued object, and to enable urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat. Therefore, some variables should be viewed as humanitarian issues, such as antipersonnel mines, and variables such as hectares of coca crops that are more of an economic issue than a national security one but that are considered by the policy to be a security problem.

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