

1 Synopsis of Nigerian Economy and the Growth of Ponzi Schemes

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4 *Received: 15 December 2016 Accepted: 2 January 2017 Published: 15 January 2017*

5

6 **Abstract**

7 This study was conducted to examine the effect of Ponzi scheme on Nigerian Economy.
8 Available researches explored Nigerian economy in terms of its history, structure and growth
9 with no literature on the economy and the growth of Ponzi in the face of the present recession.
10 Nigerian economy is beset with myriads of economic problems ranging from unemployment to
11 bad leadership and structure of governance that has climaxed into economic recession. Ponzi
12 schemes became an alternative to the harsh economic realities in the country and this research
13 investigated the effect of this in the economy. The result shows that there is a strong negative
14 relationship between Nigerian economy and the growth of Ponzi. It created illusive picture of
15 the economy in terms of peoples? living standard and income levels.

16

17 **Index terms**— economy, recession, ponzi schemes, growth, Nigeria.

18 **1 Introduction**

19 Since Nigeria's independence in 1960, many unprecedented political and economic changes have shaped the country.
20 These changes have in one way or the other affected the development and growth of the economy either favourably
21 or adversely. The Nigerian economy itself has gone through ups and downs, however, the history of gloomy days
22 seem to outweigh the history of rainy days for the economy in the long run. According to the African Development
23 Bank (ADB) Group, Nigeria has had sluggish economic growth since the end of 2015 with the rate dropping
24 to an estimated 3% in December 2015, leading the government to adopt expansionary budgetary system in
25 2016 with the aim of stimulating the economy. This sluggish growth is mainly attributed to a slowdown in by
26 inadequate supply of foreign exchange. These foreign exchange restrictions has resulted in cuts in production
27 and labour loss in manufacturing and banking sectors of the economy that lead to a high unemployment rate and
28 reduction in business activities thus limiting the flow of funds in the economy. In addition, liquidity crises hit the
29 economy, this was exacerbated by the implementation of Treasury Single Account (TSA) [4] by the government
30 in a bid to fight corruption. TSA was aimed at ensuring that government and its agencies maintained a single
31 account for its transactions with the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). This mopped up liquidity in the banking
32 system. As the liquidity crises continued, it systemically affected other business sectors in the economy and they
33 started crippling into liquidity crises; banks could barely guarantee loans to various sectors of the economy like
34 the oil and gas, construction, manufacturing and aviation industries. Many businesses closed down (perhaps
35 relocate to neighbouring countries) as they could no longer access funds from the banks at ease, interest rate
36 skyrocketed to a point that CBN issued a warning that seven Nigerian banks may need to merge, or require
37 bail out from their foreign counterparts or brace up for a regional banking over the worsening liquidity problem
38 while other banks recapitalised to mitigate the effect of the crises [8]. Systemically, Nigerian economy slid in to a
39 serious economic crisis affecting mostly youths and households as disposable income crashed due to an unbearable
40 inflation coupled with job losses that resulted thereof. Nigeria degenerated into recession in the second quarter
41 of 2016 after two successive quarters of negative growth [15]. This was consequently confirmed by the National
42 Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the Ministry of Finance grudgingly yielded to it after several undeniable economic
43 indices alluding to the fact (Fig. 1). These economic peculiarities Nigerians faced (decline in crude oil prices and
44 earning to Nigeria, reduction in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), high rate of inflation, increase in exchange

3 SOURCE: ADOPTED FROM NBS B) NIGERIA'S ECONOMIC RECESSION

45 rate, widespread unemployment and loss of job) forced the people to seek alternative means of survival. Oil
46 is unarguably the mainstay of Nigeria's economy and since the fall in global oil prices, it has been grappling
47 hard with the economic realities it found itself. Money at the disposal of both the government and household
48 lost its value in terms of purchasing power, S dollar rate to naira skyrocketed and so on. This exacerbated
49 unemployment rate and led to job loss, massive hunger and starvation in the economy. Ponzi schemes became
50 a ready easy succour for poor living standard of Nigerians. It provided an easy alternative to survival with its
51 promise of a high rate of returns on investment. A number of these 'easy money making' ventures in the form of
52 Ponzi sprang up. These stimulated the economy, people especially the youths even borrowed money to invest in
53 the scheme as it seemed good. Based on this, the first hypotheses was developed to check if there is a relationship
54 between Nigeria's economy and the growth of Ponzi schemes. As more people turned to this 'quick fix' systems
55 to cushion the effect of the harsh economy resulting primarily from poor living standard caused by skyrocketing
56 inflation, the economy was a little bit reflated. People generally had money to spend through the returns from
57 the Ponzi and the banks were busy with customer either withdrawing their matured investment or initiating
58 new ones through their deposits and transfers. The first set of people who went into the scheme benefited quite
59 tremendously and was able to attract new members. Some of them built houses, bought cars and started many
60 more business bearing little or no risk. As a result people became more liquid, they could easily augment for
61 poor/irregular salary, high cost of living occasioned by the bad economy coupled with the economic recession
62 currently ravaging the country. Based on this, the second hypotheses was developed to test the effect of Ponzi
63 schemes on Nigerian economy. The following research questions are formulated below to guide the conduct of
64 the research;

65 2 Literature Review a) Overview of Nigerian Economy

66 Nigeria's economy is largely dependent on oil since the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in 1956 at Oloibiri,
67 Bayelsa State. Oil constitute about 90% of Nigeria's export market and 25% of the Gross Domestic Product
68 (GDP) and consequently forms about 80% of total government revenue [13]. Many researches have been conducted
69 on how to improve the economy of Nigeria away from oil through diversification but the myriad of political and
70 governance issues in Nigeria have marred these efforts. Nigeria has been under both military and civilian rule since
71 independence. The military era was characterised by coups and counter coups leading to instability and civil war
72 that engulfed the country from 1966 -1970. On the other hand, the civilian or democratic rule has not brought
73 about the much anticipated change the people yearn for. Nigeria is blessed with abundant natural/mineral
74 resources and prides itself as the most populous black nation, this makes the country a big market for the world
75 but not much has come their way. The world has estimated Nigeria to be among the fastest growing global
76 economies in the world by the year 2015 [2] but that never materialised. CNN money also ranked Nigeria as the
77 3 rd fastest growing economies in 2015 [2] but the question is "how did a country that promised this much hope
78 slide into a consecutive negative growth (recession) just a year after? The 2015 general election also produced a
79 change of government that caused a negative change in the trend of the economy through inconsistence policies
80 and policy summersault. The body language and hard stance of corruption including the mode of fighting
81 corruption has however painted the country black before investors (more especially the foreign investors). The
82 unprecedented decline in the economy since the government took over power in May 2015, compelled them on
83 31 st August, 2016 to confirm through the Minister of Finance, Mrs Kemi Ade Osun that Nigeria is technically
84 in recession [15]; [10] Fig. 1: Nigeria Economic Growth Index.

85 3 Source: Adopted from NBS b) Nigeria's Economic Recession

86 The National Bureau of Economic Research [9] defined recession as a decline in economic activity in a given
87 economy, lasting more than a few months. It is normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment
88 opportunities, banking system, production, wholesaleretail sector. A country experiences recession when there
89 is a successive significant decline in growth rate and potential of a nation's earnings lasting up to six months.
90 The technical indicator is assumed to be two consecutive quarters of negative economic growth estimated by
91 the GDP of the country [3]. Recession is principally caused by two factors; the endogenous and the exogenous
92 factors. The endogenous factor represents internal factors resulting from conflict of ideas, regulatory negligence,
93 misapplication of economic theories, policy inconsistency or summersault and so on. The exogenous or external
94 factors are usually not within the control of policy makers (they defines the remote factors) such as; natural
95 disaster, climate change, revolution and or war. Our focus here is on the endogenous causes of recession since
96 Nigeria's economic recession is largely internally caused. Nigeria has faced so many leadership problems in the
97 past. Change of government is almost synonymous with change of policies, as a new government is formed; a new
98 idea is generated giving rise to conflict of ideas/interest, policy inconsistencies, misapplication of theories and
99 so on. Successive governments hardly build on the previous or inherited ideas or policies no matter how good.
100 The fig. 1 Nigeria is ridden with poor or misapplication of economic policies. Economic planning connected with
101 exchange rate policies are poorly implemented aided by delay in budget preparation and passage, this to a large
102 extent contributes to recession. Strategic plans to grow the economy through government claims of improving
103 manufacturing/mining sectors of the economy, agriculture and foreign direct investment have not yielded any
104 significant benefit rather the populace continue to languish in poverty [16]. However, giving dollar purchase

105 privileges for importers of selected goods, fixing of exchange rate (cheaply) solely for pilgrims while the business
106 sector buy it exorbitantly has further impoverished the economy. Emmanuel [5] averred that the elimination of
107 dollar privileges (for a few importers on selected items) would help the economic system a bit but has invariably
108 given a few individuals further widening the gap between the rich and the poor, while creating more economic
109 hardship for the people. This is exactly the case with the dollar rate advantage given to pilgrims, it offers undue
110 advantages to people and has legally and illegally enriched some few privileged ones.

111 **4 High Interest Rate**

112 Currently, interest rates from the banking sectors hover between 26 -30%. This is extremely high for a country
113 that wants to develop her Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), it discourages both local and foreign investors.
114 High interest rate regime discourages investment, affects economic growth and subsequently results in widespread
115 unemployment especially for the teeming unemployed youths [12]; [1]; ??14]. It reduces aggregate demand
116 especially from the household because of its effect in the GDP of the country.

117 **5 High Rate of Inflation and Policy Inconsistency**

118 Restrictions on the importation of some essential commodities including some agricultural products like food
119 items and other consumables without developing local production or substitute goods contributed significantly
120 to the high inflation rate in the country. Conflict of interest has also worsened government inconsistency, a
121 situation where the minister of finance supports decrease in monetary policy rate and the CBN governor says
122 otherwise has affected the monetary policy. Inconsistencies in economic policies of government has aided the
123 current economic recession and tightened the monetary policy measures with a long run effect of budget deficit
124 [7].

125 **6 Poor Business Environment and High Taxation**

126 The internal and external factors that affect the operation of business in Nigeria is quite negative; ranging
127 from poor power supply, poor credit facilities, dilapidated infrastructures, loss of investor confidence to double
128 taxation. The economy will strengthen when there is a free flow of economic activities and investors are motivated.
129 Recession presupposes a time where households and businesses are encouraged to hold more cash rather than
130 tax them more. High tax rate regime and or double taxation create an unfavourable business climate [13], lower
131 aggregate demand and slow the economy.

132 **7 c) Policy Measures and Economic Implications**

133 Nigeria has the potential to become a major player in the global economy by virtue of its human and natural
134 resources endowment, however, this potential has remained relatively untapped over the years. Oil prices continue
135 to drive the economy of Nigeria however, bad economic policies had left the country ill prepared for the recent global
136 collapse in oil prices. This is worsened by poor management of the militancy drastically reduced the aggregate oil
137 production through pipeline vandalism, kidnapping of oil workers and general unrest. The current administration
138 of President Buhari seem to be aware of the dangers posed by this and has developed a medium term intervention
139 for this purpose through the launch of his Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) strictly for restoring
140 economic growth while leveraging on the ingenuity and resilience of the Nigerian people. The ERGP [6] focuses
141 on increasing oil production, privatising selected public enterprises and revamping local refineries to reduce
142 petroleum products importation. In order to implement the plan, the government hopes to collaborate closely
143 with businesses to deepen their investments in the power sector, agriculture, manufacturing, service industry
144 and development of solid minerals with a strong support to the private sector to engineer economic growth
145 and development of the country through innovation, science & technology, competition and productivity. The
146 vision of the ERGP is clearly to ensure a sustainable economic growth, increased public/private sector efficiency,
147 diversification and so on. The outlook for the plan is that by the year 2020, Nigeria would be able to attain,
148 stable macroeconomic environment, transformation in agriculture, job creation and massive youth empowerment,
149 sufficiency of power and petroleum products, improved transport infrastructure, healthy foreign exchange inflows
150 and industrialised economy. Government plan on how to fight corruption, reform public service, promote good
151 governance and ensure adequate security for citizens including measures to evaluate and communicate the progress
152 made towards it are well articulated in the ERGP [6].

153 **8 d) Ponzi Schemes in Nigeria**

154 Wikipedia defined Ponzi schemes as a fraudulent investment activity where individuals or organisations pay out
155 returns to investors from new capital paid to the operators by new investors, in lieu of the profit earned (through
156 legitimate sources), while the US securities and exchange commission defined it as an investment fraud that
157 involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. It is
158 a financial investment that pays abnormally high return on investment strictly sequel to aggressive search and
159 entrance of new members bearing little or no risk at all. Not until recently, Ponzi schemes are not common in
160 Nigeria. Its history dates back to an Italian businessman called Charles Ponzi in the 20 th century. He simply

161 developed a system that rewards old investors through the new investors. This idea/business thrives until a time
162 when it will bust (which certainty will). Technically, Ponzi became popular in Nigeria as a result of the recent
163 economic hardship in the country. The operators of the scheme usually enticed new investors by offering a very
164 high return on focus on attracting new investors to make good their promised interest to the earlier investors to
165 create the impression that the investment is lucrative and that investors are profiting thereof. Ponzi scheme is
166 mathematically a financial freedom mechanism that is capable of turning around the fortunes of millions of poor
167 cum greedy people only on a condition that system does not collapse. It typifies a system of 'robbing Peter to
168 pay Paul'. The intelligence behind Ponzi scheme is to be foolish and greedy. This suggest that all the investors
169 must continually be re-investing both their initial capital, the interest and consistently persuade new people to
170 join the scheme bearing no risk in order to keep the platform liquid and mutually beneficial. However, this is
171 unfortunately unrealistic, no matter how long it lasts, since there is a possibility of aeroplane crash, chances are
172 that the scheme is bound to fail at some point.

173 The most popular Ponzi schemes that has dominated Nigerian economy recently with some crashing along the
174 line is listed below; i. MMM Nigeria ii. Get Help Worldwide (GHW) iii. Givers Forum iv. Twinkas v. NNN
175 Nigeria vi. Crowd Rising vii. Nairadonation.com viii. Ultimate Cycler ix. Zigma x. Zarfund Paradise Payment
176 Nigeria etc The operations of these schemes are similar and one common feature among them is aggressive search
177 for new members. A stepwise of how it works is as follows; a. Convince a few potential investors to put their
178 money in the scheme b. After the specified time period, usually one month, return the investment money to the
179 investors plus the agreed interest as profit c. Capitalise on the success of earlier investors to convince and entice
180 more investors to trust their money in the scheme d. This steps are repeated until a point where the system
181 crashes, in this case, the step b of the cycle is threatened and in lieu of returning the investment money and paying
182 the interest as promised, the operators run away with the invested money. MMM (Mavrodi Mondial Moneybox)
183 Nigeria is one of the most common Ponzi scheme in Nigeria being part of the MMM Global Community with
184 its origin traced to the purported founder, Sergei Panteleevich Mavrodi of Russia and dates back to 1989. Its
185 operation in Nigeria became popular in November, 2015. It provides a platform that helps millions of participants
186 worldwide free. The money is then transferred to them given by their own goodwill towards others who needed
187 help in the past. Technically one must provide help to a needy before he can receive help with a promise of
188 30% of whatever amount you provided as help to others after 30 days. Moreover, an additional 10% accrues to
189 individuals for referrals to the scheme to the tune of whatever amount the person was able to provide as help.
190 This sounded very juicy and lucrative for millions of poor and average Nigerian that could barely afford 3 square
191 meals a day. Some people including some organisations invested public monies in the scheme. Subsequently the
192 system collapsed on 14 th December, 2016 leaving millions of Nigerians in debt, frustrated and generally poorer.
193 Nigerian Deposit Insurance Scheme ??11] estimated that about 3 million Nigerians lost N18 billion naira (about
194 \$51.5 million USD) to MMM alone sequel to the crash.

195 Ultimate Cycler is the second most popular in Nigeria. It is a peer to peer donation scheme created by Peter
196 Wolfgang from US. The scheme with a direct member to member payment plan, has no central account to pay or
197 receive money. It provides a six level matrix one can earn from but can only pay (invest) once with as low as
198 N12, 500 less than \$35 USD donated to a sponsor (member) to activate the account. After the member confirms
199 the donation, the system automatically puts four other registered members to pay N12, 500 each to the person
200 giving rise to 400% return on investment. This sounded 'too good to be true' for poor Nigerians, unemployed
201 youths and students alike. It was a matter of convincing people to join the platform and fortunately the amount
202 involved is not pocket breaking, at N12, 500 a lot of people could afford to bear the risk of loss and give it initial
203 attempt. However, this also crashed on 3 rd December, 2016 leaving a great number of people in debt while
204 changing the fortunes of a few very fortunate ones.

205 In the case of ZarFund, it operates more like teamwork, developed by Hannes Jordaan from South Africa.
206 Its members voluntarily donates to their referral to enable them participate in the programme. Every invited
207 person(s) pay to their referral so it was more like a business of searching for people (investors) who in turn pays
208 the referee.

209 Givers Forum operates more like the MMM in that every new member provides help to another which
210 subsequently qualifies the person to request and get help with a weekly reward of 10% to the tune of the help
211 provided plus other bonuses attached.

212 In all these, it is typical that Ponzi scheme is based on aggressive search for new members in the name of
213 investment, the reward is subject to how many people a member is able to bring into the scheme and given a poor
214 economy with people stricken with hunger and greed for quick money, these opportunities are has participated
215 in it despite knowing the inherent dangers given the economic circumstances in the country.

216 9 III.

217 10 Research Methods

218 This exploratory research employed both quantitative and survey design based on the economy and the growth
219 of Ponzi schemes in Nigeria. Interview was conducted across the six geopolitical regions of the country among
220 the youths and civil servants to ascertain peoples' participation in Ponzi. A total of 300 people were interviewed
221 in the six geo-political regions while 600 questionnaires was distributed equally to the six geopolitical zones that

222 make up Nigeria using a five point Likert scale method. This was done to get a holistic view of the growth and
223 impact of Ponzi schemes in Nigeria. The regions comprised of the South East, South South, South West, North
224 East, North West and North Central of Nigeria. The questionnaire was distributed among government workers
225 and students to capture the youths. Out of the 600 questionnaires distributed, 501 was returned representing
226 83.5% response rate. A descriptive analysis was conducted to ascertain the percentage of the response in line
227 with the geopolitical zones. A correlation matrix was carried out with the help of gretl to ascertain the level of
228 significance and the relationship between the economy and the growth of Ponzi schemes in Nigeria. A regression
229 analysis was also conducted to test the hypothesis.

230 A regression model was developed in order to carry out this research; IV.

231 11 Results and Discussion

232 12 a) Descriptive Analysis

233 The interview was conducted across the six geo-political regions of Nigeria as shown below; Authors' computation
234 Table 4.1 above shows that 300 people were interviewed in all the geo-political regions of the country. 65% of
235 them were male while 35% were female, 20% participated in Ponzi just once while the remaining 80% repeatedly
236 engaged in Ponzi in all the regions. A total of 62% of the people have lost money in the scheme at one point or
237 the other while 38% never lost money in the scheme. In order to capture the youth and the working population
238 of the economy, the group of people reported in the interview aged between 18 -35 years old as older people
239 claimed ignorance of the scheme and were generally unwilling to engage in the interview. We excused all the
240 people who do not have knowledge of Ponzi scheme or who have never participated in it (regardless of the age
241 bracket). Analysis of the interview reveals that people from the South Eastern Nigeria engaged more in the
242 scheme representing 18% of the people interviewed in the region. Invariably, they also lost more money in the
243 scheme to the tune of 15% compared to other regions, while the North Eastern part have the least no of people
244 who engaged in the scheme. This is not unconnected with the restiveness in the area resulting from Boko Haram
245 activity. 38% of the people who claim that they have never lost their investment in Ponzi largely accounts for
246 the percentage who still engage in Ponzi scheme. Out of every 6 people invited for the interview, 3 usually had
247 knowledge of at least 2 Ponzi scheme and at least 2 of them usually agreed to have engaged in at least 1of the
248 schemes.

249 The total response rate for the survey as stated earlier is 83.5%. 100 question naire was distributed to each of
250 the six geopolitical regions in Nigeria constituting 16.7% each to make up the 600 copies of questionnaire (Table
251 4.2). Out of the 600 questionnaire, 501 were returned as follows; 91 from South South, 89 from South East, 95
252 from South West, 84 from North Central, 59 from North East and 83 from North West totalling 501 (Table 4.3).
253 The response rate in North East was the lowest, this could be attributed to the insurgency in the area caused by
254 the activities of Boko Haram in tandem with the interview report.

255 Table 4.4 shows the age distribution of the respondents, in the table it could be inferred that most of the
256 respondents are youths (representing 58.2%), this is a reflection of how youths are affected by the economic
257 realities of the country and the resort to Ponzi schemes as an alternative means of survival. This is further
258 confirmed by table 4.5 which shows that BSc/HND holders constitutes the highest number of the respondents
259 at 47.7%. The table 4.5 above shows that 99 respondents were PhD holders, this accounts for 19.8% of the total
260 respondents participated in the scheme and were affected one way or the other. The least of the respondents
261 were high school leavers with 10.8% response rate. The second highest group of respondents are Master degree
262 holders, and this accounted for 21.8% of the respondents.

263 13 b) Correlation Analysis

264 A correlation matrix was conducted with the help of gretl to analyse the relationship between Nigerian economy
265 and the Ponzi scheme. Table 4.6 explains the result of the relationship. The correlation matrix shows that
266 Nigerian economy has a strong negative correlation with Ponzi Participation with a correlation coefficient of
267 -0.8006 and also have strong negative correlation with Ponzi Growth. This suggests that as more and more
268 people participated in Ponzi scheme, the economy of Nigeria was negatively affected. This is correct, the nominal
269 improvement in the life of Nigerians engaging in Ponzi otherwise seen as profit does not last. It is usually followed
270 with a crash of the scheme which spells catastrophe for those in it with attendant loss of money. Some people
271 were lured or coerced into it by friends and families for the bonuses it promised and in other not to lose their
272 own money already in the system. However, as more and more people engaged in Ponzi, the scheme gained
273 prominence and more Ponzi schemes sprang up. This participation grew to a point where some of the schemes
274 like MMM and Ultimate Cycler became a household name. Our investigation shows that one out of every three
275 youths/active civil servant between the age of 18 -45 had engaged in one of the Ponzi schemes (mostly MMM,
276 Ultimate Cycler, Givers Forum or Helping Hand). It grew/became popular over time as people made a living
277 out of it.

278 **14 c) Regression Analysis**

279 An Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression was conducted to assess the significance of the relationship between
280 the dependent and the explanatory variables and subsequently test the hypothesis raised for the study. The sets
281 of the explanatory variables are Ponzi Participation and Ponzi Growth while Nigerian economy constitutes the
282 dependent variable. The result of the OLS is shown below; The regression result in table 4.7 shows that the value
283 of R square for the model with the dependent variable, Nig Economy is 0.838591. This suggests that 83.8% of
284 the variations in the dependent variables is explained by the model. The unexplained variation of 16.2% accounts
285 for the error term in the model. This figure close to 1 suggests that the model is good for the study and the
286 estimates obtained for the variables are reliable.

287 The OLS shows that the value of Ponzi growth coefficient is ?0.394739. This is significant at all level of
288 significance. In addition, coefficient of Ponzi Participation is ?0.523081 and it is also significant at all levels of
289 significance. These finding leads us to the rejection of hypothesis H1 which says that Nigerian economy has no
290 significant relationship with the Ponzi schemes. This finding supports the earlier statement that there is a strong
291 negative relationship between Nigerian economy and the growth of Ponzi schemes in Nigeria. The regression
292 coefficient of -0.394739 means that a unit increase in Ponzi scheme growth will result in a ?0.394739 decrease in
293 Nigerian economy all other things being equal while -0.523081 coefficient suggests that increase in the number of
294 Ponzi scheme participants by one will lead to a decrease in Nigerian economy by ?0.523081. This further confirms
295 the rejection of hypothesis H1 as the growth of Ponzi schemes affects the economy.

296 Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity was conducted to ensure that the variance are constant at different
297 observation and further test the hypothesis. This shows no presence of hetero skedasti city with a pvalue of
298 $2.31721e-009 < 0.05$ therefore, the null hypothesis should be rejected. In addition, a Jarque Bera test of normality
299 of residuals was conducted to ensure the validity of the inferential statistics of the regression model. This shows
300 that the residuals are normally distributed with a p-value of $0.0100362 < 0.05$ therefore, the null hypothesis
301 should be rejected.

302 **15 V. Conclusion and Recommendations**

303 This survey was conducted to examine the economic system in Nigeria and the growth of Ponzi. The Nigerian
304 economy was estimated based on the general welfare of Nigerians, the living standard, spending power and
305 financial buoyancy. This was examined along the participation of people in Ponzi and its attendant growth in
306 order to investigate the current economic crises bedevilling Nigeria in the name of recession.

307 The findings obtained through the descriptive analysis suggest that 83.5% of the respondents comprised of
308 school leavers (SSCE holders), undergraduates, BSc/HND holders, MBA, MSc, PhD and so on. These groups
309 of people constitute the knowledgeable group to make the findings of the study reliable. The correlation matrix
310 shows that there is a strong negative and significant relationship (table 4.7) between the growth of Ponzi scheme
311 and the Nigerian economy. In addition, the OLS table leads us to the rejection of the two hypothesis raised for
312 the study based on the significant relationship and the negative effect of Ponzi scheme on the economy found
313 between the growth of Ponzi and the Nigerian economy.

314 Ponzi scheme has quite played a major role in the lives of average Nigerians by helping to earn 'quick money'
315 without a legal productive means. This improved the disposable income of people (in the short term) and increased
316 their spending power. However, the long term effect on both the individual and the economy is catastrophe. It
317 has affected the banking sector, education sector, employment opportunities/creativity among youths, increased
318 debt and so on. It affected the banking system through deposit withdrawals to invest in Ponzi thereby making
319 the banks less liquid and discouraging savings [17]. The education sector made up of youths took speculative risk
320 to invest their fees in Ponzi in order to raise pocket money and cushion the effect of hardship but ended up losing
321 the investment resulting to school dropout and suspension of studies. It also resulted to loss of creativity and jobs
322 as many Nigerian resorted to the easy or easier way of making money rather than being creative to productive
323 ventures. Ponzi schemes also led many into wanton accumulation of debt as they are paid at the initial stage
324 of the scheme, they could confidently borrow to invest more in it, only to wake up and find that it has crashed
325 midway to their 'anticipated financial freedom'. Generally Ponzi scheme has helped to distribute more poverty in
326 Nigeria than wealth, its effect is systemic and hydra headed. Economic hardship witnessed in Nigeria particularly
327 mid-2015 to date encouraged and continue to encourage the scheme. The immediate cause of Ponzi in Nigeria is
328 unemployment/underemployment and fear of poverty while the remote cause is bad leadership. The hope of an
329 average Nigerian youth about the future appears gloomy. Indeed the future of Nigeria as a whole appears bleak
330 and unsustainable under the current fiscal structure and the only workable antidote to this fear is to restructure
331 its leadership and political structure to open the economy and make it more viable. Restructuring of Nigerian
332 economy into six geopolitical regions to enable resource control and give rise to regional comparative advantage
333 and economies of scale through competition and mass production as well as massive investment in agriculture
334 through industrial farming will rejig the economy and lift it out from its present conundrum. Nigeria is beset
335 with agitations and protests of marginalisation from the regions each calling for a break away. Restructuring will
336 foster accountability and transparency to governance when power and responsibility are devolved closer to the
337 people. This will ultimately enhance leadership quality in the regions and bring competitive development. A six
338 zone structure will assuage the heightened agitation for secession, heal the wound of marginalisation and quest
339 for resource control, create jobs, foster competition, industrialisation, increase accountability and also bring

340 economies of scale in terms of the ability of the regional governments to mobilise adequate tax revenues and
341 channel them to regional development. These measures will open up the economy and give hope to the younger
342 generation of a secured future through massive employment complemented with proportionate investment in
education and skill acquisition

41

Regions	No. of people interviewed	Male	Female	Engaged in Ponzi only once	Engaged in Ponzi repeatedly	Lost Money	Never lost money
South South	50	12%	9%	3%	15%	12%	9%
South East	50	14%	7%	3%	18%	15%	8%
South West	50	12%	8%	5%	16%	12%	7%
North Central	50	11%	5%	3%	12%	10%	6%
North East	50	6%	2%	2%	8%	5%	3%
North West	50	10%	4%	4%	11%	8%	5%
Total	300	65%	35%	20%	80%	62%	38%

Figure 1: Table 4 . 1 :

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	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
South South	100	16.7	16.7	16.7
South East	100	16.7	16.7	33.3
South West	100	16.7	16.7	50.0
Valid North Central	100	16.7	16.7	66.7
North East	100	16.7	16.7	83.3
North West	100	16.7	16.7	100.0
Total	600	100.0	100.0	

Source: Authors' Computation

Table 4.3: Questionnaire returned

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
South South	91	18.2	18.2	18.2
South East	89	17.8	17.8	35.9
South West	95	19.0	19.0	54.9
Valid North Central	84	16.8	16.8	71.7
North East	59	11.8	11.8	83.4
North West	83	16.6	16.6	100.0
Total	501	100.0	100.0	

Source: Authors' Computation

Figure 2: Table 4 . 2 :

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	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Below 18 years	61	12.2	12.2	12.2
18 -25 years	133	26.5	26.5	38.7
Valid 26 -45 years	159	31.7	31.7	70.5
46 -55 years	83	16.6	16.6	87.0
56 years and Above	65	13.0	13.0	100.0
Total	501	100.0	100.0	

Source:
Authors'
Computa-
tion

Table 4.5: Distribution of Respondents by their Highest Qualification

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SSCE	54	10.8	10.8	10.8
BSc/ HND/Under G	239	47.7	47.7	58.5
MBA, MSc, MPA	109	21.8	21.8	80.2
PhD	99	19.8	19.8	100.0
Total	501	100.0	100.0	

Source: Authors' Computation

Figure 3: Table 4 . 4 :

4

6: Correlation Matrix

Correlation coefficients, using the observations 1-501

5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0876 for n = 501

Nig Economy	Growth	Participation	
1.0000	-0.7882	-0.8006	Nig Economy
	1.0000	0.8097	Growth
		1.0000	Participation

Figure 4: Table 4 .

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Model 1: OLS, using observations 1-501

Dependent variable: Nig Economy

	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-ratio	p-value	
const	4.71026	0.0585868	80.3979	<0.0001	***
Growth	?0.394739	0.0427854	?9.2260	<0.0001	***
Participation	?0.523081	0.0422367	?12.3845	<0.0001	***
Mean dependent var	1.976048		S.D. dependent var	0.790680	
Sum squared resid	50.45437		S.E. of regression	0.318299	
R-squared	0.838591		Adjusted R-squared	0.837943	
F(2, 498)	1293.667		P-value(F)	5.9e-198	
Log-likelihood	?135.8563		Akaike criterion	277.7125	
Schwarz criterion	290.3623		Hannan-Quinn	282.6759	
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity -			Test for normality of residual -		
Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present			Null hypothesis: error is normally distributed		
Test statistic: LM = 39.7658			Test statistic: Chi-square(2) = 9.2031		
with p-value = P(Chi-square(2) > 39.7658) = 2.31721e-009			with p-value = 0.0100362		

Figure 5: Table 4 . 7 :

15 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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