

# The Governance and the Social Performance of Banks: Comparison between the Model Germano-Nippon and the Model Franco-Italian

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## Abstract

This article discusses the influence of internal mechanisms of governance on the social performance in the context germano-Nippon and in the context Franco-Italian. We are going to put the light on the model germano-Nippon and the model Franco-Italian, governance and the social performance. Then, we will analyze the effects that exercise internal governance mechanisms on the social performance of banks belong to the context germano-Nippon and the context Franco-Italian. In order to measure the social performance, we have retained the equality between the Man and the woman, the social climate, the transparency of information and the conditions of work and to apprehend the governance we retained the council of administration, its size, its independence and the concentration of capital.

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**Index terms**— governance, social performance, the system germano-nippon, the system francoitalian.

## 1 Introduction

In the face of the existence of the globalization of the industry and of the markets and the global competition high, the banks seek always to protect themselves against the phobia of their disappearances via effective governance. In this framework, the Bank is required to consolidate its performance through effective governance mechanisms. The banking context differs from the context of the firm by the opacity and the prudential regulation. Subsequently, the bank must have governance mechanisms to adapt to its specificities. Governance refers to the mechanisms that managing the actions of the leaders and delineates their latitude discretionary (Charreaux, 1997). This last decade, social performance, occupies an important place in the strategies of the banks and the companies. In this framework, several countries require businesses and banks to publish the social balance sheets provided they have a number of employees beyond the threshold. The social performance is assessed qualitatively. Frequently, the social performance is inspired by the ratio between its social effort and the satisfaction of its employees. In the framework of banking, a few criteria are the social environment and the satisfaction of staff as the main indicators of the social performance.

In this framework, we will analyze and compare the influence of governance on the social performance in the context germano-Nippon and the context Franco-Italian.

## 2 II.

## 3 Review of the Literature

The performance is a goal to achieve to all stakeholders of the Bank. According Albanes (1978), the performance is "the reason of management positions, it implies the efficiency and effectiveness". This researcher as several authors that define the performance by the efficiency and effectiveness. For Miles (1986), the performance is "the capacity of the Organization to achieve a minimum satisfaction of its clientele's expectations Strategic." In the

## 6 ? THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON THE BANKING PERFORMANCE

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managerial literature, we find several definitions that are around between two axes; the social performance external and the social performance internal. The social performance of the Bank Tower in the tower the social climate, the remuneration, the equality and diversity, the training and the policy of disability. The Social Performance External: the social performance will external s interest to stakeholders. This performance and called societal performance. The Social Performance INTERNAL: This performance is interested in the interests of personal.

### 4 a) A few previous research concerning the relationship between governance and performance

The empirical research treat the relationship between the internal mechanisms of governance and the banking performance are very limited.

? The impact of the Board of Directors on the Bank performance Moreover, we will deal with the impact of the size of the Board of Directors on the performance and the impact of the Duality on the performance.

? The impact of the size of the Board of Directors on the Bank performance Adams and Mehran (2003) postulate that the banks that have boards of directors of large size have performance more raised than banks with advice of small sizes. Pearce and Zahra (1992) have shown that the correlation is positive between performance and the size of the Council. Godard (2002) examined the difference in performance between the firms who hold a narrow Council and those who possess a Board enlarged. It is a good idea to check the conclusions of these studies by the following hypothesis: H11: The size of the board of directors has a negative impact on the performance of the banks in a context germano-Nippon. H12: The size of the board of directors has a positive impact on the performance of the banks in a context Franco-Italian.

? The impact of the Duality of direction on the banking performance Rhoades et al. (2001) have postulated that the firms that cumulation the executive positions realize a lower profitability to those who realize a divorce between these two functions. Therefore, the cumulation of two posts generates a rooting of Leader.

On the ground American, Pi and Timme (1993) noted that the cumulation of steering functions and monitoring within the banks generates a low profitability of assets (ROA). This conclusion is consolidated by Rechner and Dalton (1991).

### 5 The hypothesis that arises:

H21: There is a negative impact of the Duality on the banking performance in the context Germano Nippon.

H22: There is a positive impact of the Duality on the banking performance in the context Franco-Italian.

## 6 ? The impact of institutional investors on the banking performance

The presence of institutional investors in the board of directors will result in effects on the performance of the Bank. The effect of the presence of the institutional administrators in the board of directors on the value of the Bank and the company is balance between positive which is confirmed by ??Connell and Servaes (1990), Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), Oswald and Jahera (1991) and negative which is confirmed by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, (1988), Mikkelsen and Regassa (1991), Shleifer & Vishny (1997). According Omri (2002), the presence of institutional investors within the Council improves the performance of companies.

Nevertheless, the research presented above concerning their efficiencies in the control and their positive roles in the improvement of the performance incentive to install the following hypothesis: H31: There is a negative impact of the presence of institutional investors to the Council on the banking performance in a context germano-Nippon. H32: There is a positive impact of the presence of institutional investors to the Council on the banking performance in a context Franco-Italian.

? The impact of the ownership structure on the performance Moreover, we will deal with the influence of the ownership structure on the performance. ? The impact of the share ownership of institutional investors on the banking performance Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2003) stipulate, at the base of his study concerning 695 U.S. commercial banks between 1990-1995, that the large institutional investors generate consequences of monitoring that decrease the agency costs and increase the performance. Empirically, ??Connell and Servaes (1990) prove that there is a positive relationship between the share ownership of institutional investors and the stock market performance.

By contrast, Shleifer & Vishny (1997) postulate that the performance and the efficiency of the firms depend on the behavior of institutional investors and of the activity of their integration within the governance. The hypothesis that arises is: H41: There is a negative impact of capital held by institutional investors on the banking performance in a context germano-Nippon. H42: There is a positive impact of the capital held by institutional investors on the banking performance in a context Franco-Italian. ? The impact of the concentration of capital on the banking performance Spong et al. (1996) inspire, with 143 U.S. banks from 1990 to 1994, that the concentration of capital positively affects the banking performance. Therefore, according to these results we can point out that there is a positive correlation between the concentration of capital and the performance of banking.

On the ground Japanese, Kaplan and Minton (1994) noted that the majority shareholders hold a disciplinary role. These researchers confirm the idea that a concentration of capital is a disciplinary lever.

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On the ground German, Gorton and Schmid (2000) found, experimentally, that the value of organizations is progresses when the concentration of ownership seen an increase. The hypothesis that arises is: H51: There is a negative impact of the concentration of capital in the hands of five majority shareholders on the banking performance in a context germano-Nippon. H52: There is a positive impact of the concentration of capital in the hands of five majority shareholders on the banking performance in a context Franco-Italian.

## 7 III.

## 8 The Methodology a) Presentation of the sample

In the framework of this work, we are going to choose sixty banks in the context Franco-Italian and the context germano-Nippon. The data collected relate the practices of governance and the social performance of the banks of our sample during the year 2013.

The data are collected from the social documents published by the banks. The data collected on the governance concern the characteristics of the Board of Directors and the concentration of capital.

## 9 b) The technique of analysis the data

In order to analyze and compare the impact of governance on the social performance in the banks in the model germano-Nippon and the Hybrid model, we are going to make recourse to the method of analysis of the main components.

## 10 ? The indicators of the social performance and governance

The variables in the social performance

The measures The variables of governance

## 11 The percentage of the capital held by the five majority shareholders

The policy of the disabled

The policy of the disabled 0 If the rate is lower than 5%, 1 otherwise

The number of institutional investors to the Council

The rate of rotation The rate of rotation 0 If the rate is lower than 1%, 1 otherwise

The percentage of the capital held by institutional investors

## 12 The transparency of information

The transparency of information Binary variable; 1 if there is a suggestion box, 0 otherwise.

## 13 The size of the bank

## 14 ? The indicators of governance

The indicators of the governance are the number of six. These indicators are; the size of the Board of Directors, duality, the concentration of capital in the hands of the five majority shareholders, the capital held by institutional investors, the size of the Bank and their number in the board of directors.

## 15 c) The results to interpret

The tables below present descriptive statistics for the components of the social performance in the banks of the model Franco-Italian and the model germano-Nippon.

## 16 i. The results of the model Franco-Italian

The matrix of components The method of principal components analysis reduce the seven variables in three main variables.

The first component is composed of the 70% of the variable political of the disabled, 58% of the variable of the proportion of trained workforce and 74.3% of the variable percentage of women executives. We are going to appoint Performance 1.

As well, the second component is composed of 70.1% of the variable rate of work accidents and 83.8% of the variable absenteeism. For this, we are going to appoint Performance 2.

Finally, the third component is composed of the 68% of the variable in the transparency of information and of the 82.5% of the variable percentage of women members to the board of directors. We are going to appoint Performance 3. Regression 1

The summary table of the model of the performance 1

## 23 TABLE OF THE IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE ON THE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE1

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### 17 Model

Correlation Coefficient 1 ,709  
The analysis of variance The Tailings

### 18 Total

According to the table, our model has a probability of 0.018. Then our model is globally significant. According to this table, the increase in the size of the Bank make this last more effective socially. That is to say the increase of revenues grow the Bank to improve the social life.

### 19 Table of coefficients

The duality has a positive impact on the social performance since it improves the strategic vision. According to the first regression it was:  $PERF1 = -2.4 + 0.72 \text{ Dual} + 0.094 \text{ SIZ} + ?$

### 20 Regression 2

The table récapulatif model for the performance 2 In our case, R is equal to almost 50%, this value is relatively average which indicates an average correlation. Our model social Perf 2, according to the table, has a probability of 0.445. This probability is higher than the threshold of meaning 10%, then our model is not significant.

Therefore, there is not a correlation between the mechanisms of governance and the Social Performance 2. Then we will go to the third regression. Regression 3 In our case, R is equal to almost 60.2%, this value is relatively fort which reflects a strong correlation. Our model perf3, according to the table, has a probability of 0.1. This probability is equal to the threshold of significance 10%, then our model is relatively significant. The impact of governance on the performance 3 According to the table above, the size of the Council has a negative effect on the Social Performance 3. We can conclude that a Council of small size minimizes conflicts of interest and make the Council more harmonious which causes an increase in the social performance.

Thus, the variable TOP5 has a positive impact on the social performance3. The majority shareholders support the increase of the social performance in the banks of the context Franco-Italian.

By contrast, the variable of the percentage of the capital held by institutional investors has a positive coefficient. This positive correlation is explained that the purpose of institutional investors is not, always, profit.

The regression of the Social Performance 3 is as follows: The tables below present descriptive statistics for the components of the social performance in the banks of the context germano-Nippon. The method Analysis of main components reduce the nine variables in four main variables, then these four main components reflects the social performance of banking.

### 21 The matrix of components

The first component is composed of 62.5% of the variable percentage of women executives, 70.8% of the variable percentage of women in the commîtes, 83.5% of the variable percentage of workforce training, 65.3% of the variable transparency of information and 62.6% of the variable political of the disabled. We are going to appoint Performance 1.

As well, the second component is composed of 76.8% of the variable absenteeism and almost 60% of the variable labor discussions. We will appointed this component performance 2.

The third component is composed of 61.4% of the variable rate of accident. We are going to appoint Performance 3. Finally, the fourth component is composed of 81.2% of the variable rate of rotation. We are going to appoint Performance 4. Regression1

### 22 Model

Correlation Coefficient 1 ,635

Our model perf1, according to this table, has a probability of 0.084. This probability is lower than the threshold of significance 10%, then our model is globally significant. According to this table, the variable size of the board of directors has a positive and significant coefficient. Therefore, the size of the Council a significant and positive impact on the social performance in the banks of the context germano-Nippon.

### 23 Table of the impact of governance on the social performance1

Also, the capital held by institutional investors has a negative and significant coefficient. Therefore, the capital held by institutional investors to negatively influence the social performance in a context germano-Nippon.

$PERF \text{ social } 1 = C - 0.12 \text{ Ins} + 1.4$  In this stage, the Social Performance 2 has a correlation coefficient of almost 50%. This value is relatively average that indicates an average correlation. According to this table, our model is not significant. Therefore, we will go to the regression 3 since there is not a correlation between the mechanisms of governance and the Social Performance 2.

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## 24 Regression3 Table of Model

### 25 Model

Correlation Coefficient According to this table, we can conclude that our model is not significant at threshold 10%. According to this table, the proportion of capital held by the five majority shareholders has a negative and significant coefficient. Then, the majority shareholders are always looking for the increase in the financial performance and social performance presents cost (training). Therefore, a capital not concentrated in the banks of the system oriented network will result in an increase of the social performance. Therefore, in the banks of the system oriented network, the increase of capital held by the majority shareholders negatively affects the social performance of the banks.

Also, the variable duality has a negative and significant coefficient. Therefore, we can conclude that the separation of the functions of control and direction creates an improvement of the social performance. Therefore, a duality of functions negatively affects the social performance. The coefficient of regression is low since it is 34% only. Also, 12% of the variability is explained by our model. This model is not significant at threshold 10%. Then, there is not a correlation between the mechanisms of governance and the Social Performance 4.

Finally, in the context germano-Nippon, the social performance of banks is positively affected by the size of the Board of Directors. The Bank and negatively by the duality of functions, the capital held by the five majority shareholders and the percentage of the capital held by institutional investors. Therefore, we have this equation:  $PS = c + ?1 \text{ Top } 5 + ?2 \text{ INS} + ?3 \text{ Dual} + ?3 \text{ Size of the Council} + ?$

According to the method the ACP, the social performance that is affected by the internal mechanisms of governance are: the transparency of information, the equality between the Man and the woman, policy for the handicapped and the percentage of the workforce training.

### 26 d) The effect of governance on the social performance in the two system (hybrid and network oriented)

The following table is constituted by a summary of the effect of internal mechanisms on the social performance in the two systems.

### 27 +

In the banks of the system of governance network oriented, the size of the Council positively affects the social performance. The positive correlation between the size of the Council and the social performance is explained by the importance of the labor factor and the satisfaction of all stakeholders. The Hypothesis H11 is rejected.

The Duality negatively affects the social performance of the banks of the system of governance network-oriented. Therefore, the social performance brings costs and the cumulation of power produces the envy of Leader of the increase of wealth to meet the shareholders and retain its position. Therefore, the monopoly of power generates an inefficiency of the monitoring function, and subsequently a deterioration of the social performance.

This result is confirmed by Kaymak and BEKTA? (2008). The Hypothesis H 21 is accepted.

In addition, the percentage of the capital held by the five majority shareholders to negatively influence the social performance. This relationship reflects that the majority shareholders are seeking the increase of wealth and the Social Performance Generates costs (such as costs of training of staff).

The Hypothesis H31 is accepted. This is confirmed by Rawski (2010).

In addition, the percentage of the capital held by institutional investors to negatively influence the social performance. The increase in the percentage of the capital held by institutional investors causes a deterioration of the social performance since they are going to seek the increase of wealth with a minimization of costs.

## 28 Global Journal of Management and Business Research

Volume XVI Issue V Version I

### 29 Year ( )

The Hypothesis H51 is accepted.

Finally, we find that in the system of governance network oriented the mechanism number of institutional investors members to the Council does not influence the social performance.

In the system network oriented, the internal mechanisms of governance affects the policy of integration of disabled persons, the integration of women executives, the percentage of workforce training, the percentage of women members to the Council and the transparency of internal information (between personal) that influence the internal communication.

The transparency of information enhances the internal communication, rooted the spirit of team work and improves the confidence between the personal. This variable of the social performance is negatively affected by the duality of the posts and the increase in the percentage of the capital held by the majority shareholders and by institutional investors. We believe that this negative correlation to cause that these factors of governance

are seeking the increase of wealth via the decrease of costs and an asymmetry of information. Therefore, the asymmetry of information decreases the likelihood that the employees are asking for financial and social privileges because of the increase in wealth.

In this system, the equality between the Man and the woman is negatively affected by the structure of the shareholdings. The percentage of women executives and the percentage of women in the committees are means in most of the banks. We believe that the negative relationship between the presence of women on boards, the percentage of women managers and the factors of governance because that these factors are seeking the financial performance and the presence of the woman brings costs. The costs are the costs of replacement in case of leave (for example a maternity leave). Therefore, the search for the Wealth via a mitigation of the costs by the shareholders do not agree with the increase in the presence of the woman in the posts of decisions taken.

The percentage of workforce training is negatively affected by the shareholding structure and the duality. We believe that this relationship is born to cause that the training of personnel provides costs which do not align with the interest of the shareholders and the officer.

Also, the policy of integration of the disabled is average in this system. The integration of persons with disabilities brings costs for that integration would be more easy and adapts to the physical constraints of the handicapped. This policy is negatively affected by the duality and the shareholding of the majority shareholders and institutional investors to cause that they seek the increase of wealth and this policy commits the costs. Without doubt, the disabled person deserves to have its rights as the normal person same that his recruitment brings costs. We believe that it must limit the duality and modify the structure of the shareholding in order to increase the equality between the Man and the woman, the transparency of information, the policy for the handicapped and the rate of training.

### 30 e) The hybrid system

In this stage, the size of the Board of Directors negatively affects the social performance. Then, a council of small size positively affects the social performance. To cause that a Council of reduced size is privilege by a easy harmonization between the members in the decision-making which generates a improvement of the social performance. This result is confirmed by Mersland (2009). The Hypothesis H12 is rejected.

We find that the duality positively influences the social performance. Therefore, the duality leads to an improvement of the strategic vision that improves by the following social performance. Therefore, in this context the duality causes a minimization of conflict and of asymmetry of information between these two posts, which positively affects the social performance.

This result is confirmed by Simpson and Gleason (1999). The Hypothesis H22 is accepted.

Also, the percentage of the capital held by the five majority shareholders positively affects the social performance. Therefore, the increase in the percentage of the capital held by the five majority shareholders engenders a improvement of the social performance. We do not believe that the positivity of this relationship is explained by the presence of the State as a majority shareholder. This is confirmed by haw et al. (2010). The Hypothesis H32 is accepted.

Also, the percentage of the capital held by institutional investors positively affects the social performance. Then, the institutional investors will control the leader to work in the interest of the Bank. This result is confirmed by Barry et al. (2011). The Hypothesis H52 is accepted.

Also, the size of the Bank positively affects the social performance. Therefore, an increase in the size of the bank causes an increase of the social performance. The mechanisms of governance affect the policy for persons with disabilities, the percentage of workforce training, the percentage of women executives, the transparency of information and the percentage of women members in the Council.

The policy of the disabled is negatively affected by the size of the Council since it brings costs. These costs are born since it must create specific positions adapt to the physical constraints of the disabled. We believe that the size of the Council affects negatively the policy because of the absence or the presence Low of the representatives of the employees in the Council.

The equality between the Man and the woman is negatively affected by the size of the Council. In the hybrid system, the percentage of women executives is average, but the presence of women in committees is low and sometimes the woman is absent. Therefore, the woman does not participate heavily in the decisionmaking.

In this system, the percentage of the workforce of training is negatively affected by the size of the Council. We believe that the banks that have a low percentage of training because that these banks do not seek to boost the system of individual management of careers in the medium term due to the costs of training. This correlation is negative because the increase in the size of the Council causes a disharmony concerning social decisions since the performance brings social costs.

The transparency of information is negatively affected by the size of the board of directors because the members of the Council favor the asymmetry of information between staff to increase their strategies of rooting.

We believe, to reduce the asymmetry of information in the banks, improve the policy for the handicapped and the equality between man and woman in this context, it is necessary to modify the size of the Council or integrate more of the representatives of the employees.

IV.

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## 31 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have tried to study the impact of the internal governance (the Council of Administration and the structure of property) on the social performance of banks belong to the system Franco-Italian and the system germano-Nippon.

We have studied the impact of governance on the social performance of banks of two contexts during 2013. This impact is studied by the ACP method (principal components analysis) on the two systems.

The effect of governance on the Vari performance from one context to another. We can register that the mechanisms of governance have a significant impact on the performance, although the meaning of this effect remains undetermined. The empirical results show mixed results.

The differences between the impact of governance on the performance on the two systems are explained by several factors such as the local culture in each context, public policy, regulatory and legal context.

## 32 Bibliographies



Figure 1:

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<sup>2</sup>The Governance and the Social Performance of Banks: Comparison between the Model Germano-Nippon and the Model Franco-Italian

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2

				Year
				Volume XVI Issue
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%women	/executives	1 ,743	Components 3 ,366	Global Journal of
%women/commîtes	Policy of	,340	2 -,170 ,825	Management and
the disabled		,715	,220 ,356 -,106	Business Research
Transparency of		,438	,077 -,689	
information				
Absenteeism		,293	-,838 ,006	
Per Cent Training		-,588	,470 ,188	
workforce				
The rate of accidents at		,407	,701 -,160	

[Note: 2016CThe Governance and the Social Performance of Banks: Comparison between the Model Germano-Nippon and the Model Franco-Italian work]

Figure 2: Table 2 :

4

Model	Meaning.
1 Regression	,018A

Figure 3: Table 4 :

5

The variables	The	Likelihood
	coefficients	
(constant)	-2,442	.002
Council size	,030	,266
Duality	,728	,011
TOP5	-,009	,963
INSSIZ	-,126	,489
INS	,052	,799
SIZ	,094	.003

Figure 4: Table 5 :

6

Model	Correlation Coefficient
1	,495A

Figure 5: Table 6 :



7

Model	Sum of squares	Likelihood	
Regression	7,103		,445A
The Tailings	21,897		

Figure 6: Table 7 :

9

Model	Correlation Coefficient
1	,616A

Figure 7: Table 9 :

10

Model	Meaning.
1 Regression	,115
Residual	
Total	

Figure 8: Table 10 :

11

Model	B	
(constant)	1,472	,069
Council size	-,070	,028
Duality	,011	,969

Figure 9: Table 11 :

13

	Components			
	1	2	3	4
%women /executives	,625	-,158	,238	-,159
%women/commîtes	,708	,081	-,535	,204
Policy of the disabled	,626	-,062	-,179	-,453
Transparency of information	,653	,228	,471	,024
Absenteeism	-,177	,768	,234	,315
Per centtrained workforce	,835	,128	-,410	,058
Labor discussions	,500	,596	,229	-,095

Figure 10: Table 13 :

16

Model	B	Likelihood
(constant)	1,913	,102
Duality	-,451	,203
Council size	1429	,084
TOP5	-1,329	,309
INSSIZ	-,135	,459
INS	-.121	,022
SIZ	-,020	,501

Figure 11: Table 16 :

17

	Size of the Council + ?
Regression2 Model 1	Correlation Coefficient ,493

Figure 12: Table 17 :

18

Model	Sum of squares	Likelihood
Règression	7,058	,451A
The Tailings	21,942	
Total	29,000	

Figure 13: Table 18 :

22

The variables	The coefficients	Likelihood
(constant)	1,166	,324
Duality	-,670	,072
Council size	.002	,944
TOP5	-1,844	,032

Figure 14: Table 22 :

23

Model 1	Correlation Coefficient ,332
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Figure 15: Table 23 :

24

Model	Sum of squares	Meaning
1 Regression	3,190	,899
The Tailings	25,810	
Total	29,000	

Figure 16: Table 24 :

26

	System network oriented	Hybrid system
The size of the Council	+	-
Duality	-	+
TOP 5	-	+
Ins siz		
Ins	-	+
The size of the bank		

Figure 17: Table 26 :



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