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# The Impact of Institutional Quality on Monetary Policy in Pakistan Kifayat Ullah<sup>1</sup>, Abdul Wajid<sup>2</sup> and Fazal Ali Khan<sup>3</sup> <sup>1</sup> Karakoram International University Gilgit, Pakistan *Received: 12 December 2015 Accepted: 31 December 2015 Published: 15 January 2016*

#### 7 Abstract

14

This study seeks to examine whether the monetary management in Pakistan is conducted under the framework advocated by the Taylor rule. We investigate this question after modifying the Taylor rule to control for the influence of institutional quality on monetary policy. Even after controlling for institutional quality, we find no evidence that the central bank makes use of the Taylor framework in devising monetary policy. Our results also suggest that by and large the focus of the monetary policy has been on containing inflation.

15 Index terms—institutional quality, monetary management, central bank, taylor rule, ARDL method.

#### <sup>16</sup> 1 I. Introduction

growing body of literature now maintains that sound institutions 1 are essential for sustainable economic growth. 17 Institutional quality can effect overall economic growth by providing the underlying environment for economic 18 activity to flourish. Recent developments in institutional economics suggest that besides affecting the overall 19 economic activity, institutions can also affect the conduct, transmission, as well as the cyclical properties of 20 monetary policy 2. The primary goal of the monetary policy is to stabilize prices and to promote sustainable 21 growth. There is debate in literature whether the monetary policy should be conducted based on some 22 predetermined rule or should the policy maker enjoy discretion in the conduct of monetary policy. Though 23 the debate is not fully settled but literature seems to favor rules over discretion 3. Barring some exception, the 24 monetary policy has not been able to rein in inflation or stabilize output in Pakistan (Qayyum, 2008). This makes 25 it important to thoroughly examine how the monetary policy is conducted, whether the authority follows a rule 26 or the discretion is allowed to influence the monetary policy. This type of investigation has been conducted for 27 Pakistan using the standard Taylor rule framework 4 1 North (1990) defines institutions as "the humanly devised 28 constraints that shape human interaction". These constraints are further divided into formal rules (constitutions, 29 laws, rules etc.) and informal constraints (norms, conventions, self-imposed code of conducts etc.). 2 See for 30 example Huang and Wei (2006), ??alderon et al. (2010), Choudhary et al. ??2010), Duncan (2011) etc. 3 See for 31 example taylor ??1993, ??997, ??007), Clarida et al. ??1999), ??arro and Gordon (1983), ??evenson (1996) etc. 32 4 Studies include Malik and Ahmed (2007), Malik (2007), Iqbal (2009), ??alik and Ahmed (2011) etc., Author 33 ?? ?: Karakoram International University Gilgit, Pakistan. e-mails: kifayat@kiu.edu.pk, wajidiiie@gmail.com, 34 fazal@rspn.org.pk however the standard Taylor rule does not account for the influence of institutions on monetary 35 policy. This study examines the conduct of monetary policy by augmenting the Taylor rule to account for the 36 influence of institutional quality on monetary policy. This has not been done so far in case of Pakistan. 37

# <sup>38</sup> 2 a) Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study are: 1. To estimate the monetary policy reaction function for Pakistan by incorporating institutional quality variable in the Taylor rule framework. 2. To examine whether the monetary policy is procyclical or counter cyclical by incorporating institutional quality in the traditional framework.

# 6 III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY A) THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

# 42 **3** II. Review of Literature

The neo-institutional economist 5 a) Institutional Quality and Monetary Policy stress that institutional factors play an important role in the process of economic growth. Using state activism, property rights and corporate governance as a measure of institutional quality, Huang et al. (2004) examine the relationship between institutional quality and growth by disaggregating foreign direct investment into investment that supports local entrepreneurship and investment that replaces local entrepreneurship. They find that institutional quality influence foreign direct investment. They further find that foreign direct investment that supports local entrepreneurship translates into sustainable growth.

Traditionally, monetary policy and institutional quality have been treated as independent disciplines. Initially, 50 studies were conducted in a principal agent framework to assess the potential negative impact of corruption among 51 government officials, who secured bribes from private citizens interested in government produced goods, on the 52 development of a nation. These studies pointed at identifying the motivating factors among the agents to be 53 honest-the honest the official, the higher the payoff for the nation. Huang and Wei (2006) model the role of 54 institutions in the effectiveness of monetary policy. Using corruption as a proxy of institutional quality they 55 show that institutional quality has implications for the conduct and transmission of monetary policy. They argue 56 that weak Institutions can directly affect monetary policy by weakening the monetary authority in terms of 57

<sup>58</sup> autonomy and by eroding the credibility of the central bank.

# <sup>59</sup> 4 b) Institutional Quality and Cyclicality of Monetary Policy

60 Pro-cyclicality of macroeconomic policy is often described as a problem faced by developing countries (Frankel,

61 2010). Pro-cyclical monetary policy is harmful because it reinforces the business cycle ??Kaminskyet al., 2005).

62 Pro-cyclical monetary policy harms the economic activity because during the periods of rapid economic growth

63 (booms) expansionary monetary policy is pursued leading to overheating of the economy and thereby exerting

64 inflationary pressure while during periods of slower economic growth (busts) contractionary monetary policy is

<sup>65</sup> pursued further pushing the economy towards recession.

# 66 5 c) Taylor Rules: Studies for Pakistan

Studies that have estimated Taylor rule for Pakistan include (Malik and Ahmed, 2007;Malik, 2007;Islam, 67 2009;Iqbal, 2009;Sulaiman et al., 2011;Malik and Ahmed, 2011). All these studies find that the central bank 68 has not been following Taylor rule for the conduct of monetary policy. Malik (2007) and Islam (2009) using 69 counter factual simulations argue that economic performance could have been improved, had the central bank 70 followed Taylor rule. Malik and Ahmed (2007) argue that the reason for non-observance of the rule could be that 71 besides the stability of output and inflation the central bank follows other objectives as well e.g. exchange rate 72 73 stability. They further argue Taylor rule does not hold for Pakistan even after adjusting upwards the parameters of inflation and output gap. 74

All of these studies have failed to find classical Taylor type relationship in the conduct of monetary policy of Pakistan. After failing to observe the classical relationship, they have modified the Taylor type rule by augmenting the Taylor rule with other objectives that the monetary authority may take into consideration. These objectives may include interest rate smoothening, exchange rate management, reduction of trade deficits, government borrowings etc. Most of the studies find that the central bank follows policy of interest rate smoothening while some studies find exchange rate stabilization also significant.

# 6 III. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy a) Theoretical Framework

We seek to examine the effect of institutional quality on monetary policy. Based on recent literature, our premise 83 is that institutional quality affects the outcomes of monetary policy. One way to characterize the monetary policy 84 of a country is through the Taylor type rule. The Taylor rule 6 recommends increasing the policy rate of interest 85 when inflation is above target and lowering interest rate when recession appears to be more of a threat. The 86 Taylor rule works on the assumption that the interest rate channel of monetary policy is very effective (Taylor, 87 1993). Recently, there has been a surge in the literature to incorporate institutional quality into monetary policy 88 framework 7. Few studies which have examined Taylor rule for Pakistan conclude that the central bank does 89 90 not follow the Taylor rule 8 b) Empirical Strategy. Given the view that institutions influence the conduct of 91 monetary policy, it is important to revisit the Taylor rule for Pakistan while controlling for institutional quality. 92 We use the Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) method for estimation of our model. The reasons for 93 using this model are manifold. First, we suspect that the variables used in the analysis are integrated, potentially of different order of integration. Second, if the variables are integrated of different order then the traditional co-94 integration methods like Engel Granger (1987) and Johansen (1991Johansen (, 1995)) cointegration techniques 95 are not applicable. Third, as pointed out by Ruth (2004) and others 9 i. ARDL Method to Co-integration , 96 Taylor rule can be better characterized by accounting for the interest rate smoothening. This can be done in 97

<sup>98</sup> a co-integration framework using the error correction term. Taking into consideration all the above mentioned

99 benefits of ARDL, we consider it the appropriate technique for estimating our model. The ARDL estimation 100 technique is described below.

101 In our case, the general form of the ARDL equation can be written as follows:

Where i=1,2,3?, ? 0 is the intercept, is the trend, c 0,?,? 1,? 2,?,? are parameters.?? is the interest rate, ??????? is the output gap, ????ð???"ð??" is the inflation, ???? is the institutional quality index and is the difference operator i.e.  $\hat{1}$ ?" y t = y t ?y t?1. In this equation, the variables at levels define the long run relationship and variables in difference form define the short run dynamics. The maximum lag will be set to three years and final model will be selected on basis of Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC).

ii. Co-integration Test The Bound testing procedure in ARDL is used to test for existence of co-integration in 107 the model. The bound testing can be carried out for equation 5.7 by testing the following hypothesis: H 0 :? 1 = ?108 2 = 3 = 4 = 0??????? (5.8) If H 0 is rejected then we conclude that there is a long run relationship among the 109 variables. According to Pesaran (1999) the asymptotic distribution of the F-Statistics are non-standard regardless 110 of the degree of integration of the variables when the null hypothesis is of no co-integration. This depends upon 111 whether the variables included in the ARDL model are I(0) or I(1), the number of regressors, whether the ARDL 112 model contains an intercept and/or a trend, and the sample size. Two sets of critical F-values, representing the 113 lower bound and the upper bound, have been suggested by Pesaran et al. (2001). If the statistic is higher than 114 the upper bound, the null hypothesis of no co-integration can be rejected and the next step is to estimate the 115 ARDL based ECM where the short-run and long-run elasticity's may be determined. 116

iii. Long Run Relationship After confirmation of existence of long run relationship, long run coefficients
from equation 5.7 can be extracted by normalizing the coefficients of the variables with respect to coefficient of
dependent variable. In our case this will be done as follows.? 1 i t?1 +? 2 Gap t?1 +? 3 inf t?1 +? 4 IQ t?1
=0?????? (5.9) ?1it?1 =??2Gapt?1 ??3inft?1 ??4IQt?1 i t?1 =? 1 Gap t?1 +? 2 inf t?1 +? 3 IQ t?1 ??????
(5.10)

#### 122 7 Where

123 , and are the long run coefficients.

#### <sup>124</sup> 8 iv. Dynamic Short Run Relationship and Error Correction

The dynamic short run relationship of equation 5.7 can be generated by replacing the long run equation 5.9 by the error correction term. The final dynamic short run equation with error correction can be can be specified as follows:

The coefficient of error correction term (ECM t?1 ) ? represents the speed of adjustment. It tells us the magnitude of the error correction accounted for in the current period.

# <sup>130</sup> 9 c) Data, Variable Definition and Construction

#### <sup>131</sup> 10 i. Data Span

We have used annual time series data from 1984 to 2011, drawn from International Financial Statistics (IFS) for
Pakistan. As the focus of this study is on the impact of institutions on monetary policy, therefore we use annual
frequency data.

ii. Output Gap Output Gap is defined as the difference between the actual output produced within the
economy and the potential output. One of the techniques widely used is the Hodrick -Prescott (HP) Filter.
Assumingy t is the series for which we want to extract the long run trend component, the equation for the HP
filter can be written as follows Where s is the smoothed series or long run series of yt, derived by minimizing the
variance of y t around s t . is the smoothness parameter and it controls the smoothness of the series. For annual
series is generally taken as 100.

141 iii. Inflation

<sup>142</sup> To capture the aggregate level of prices, we have used GDP deflator. Inflation is computed as:

Where subscript shows the current period and t?1shows the previous period. Data for GDP Deflator is also drawn from the International Financial Statistics (IFS).

#### <sup>145</sup> 11 iv. Rate of Interest

The policy interest rate indicates the stance of monetary policy. The most widely used measure of institutional quality comes from the international country risk guide (ICRG) dataset compiled by experts at Political Risk Services (PSR) Group. ICRG Political dataset consist of 12 categories i.e. Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, Investment Profile, Internal Conflict, External Conflict, Corruption, Military in Politics, Religious Tensions, Law and Order, Ethnic Tensions, Democratic Accountability and Bureaucracy Quality. We have selected six indicators from ICRG data set for our analysis because these host the potential to influence monetary

152 policy in one or the other way.

#### <sup>153</sup> 12 d) Principle Component Analysis

Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is a variable deducting method 11 Where, X j is the variable under 154 consideration, P i is the i th principal component; a ji is the factor loading of the j th variable on the i th 155 principal component. The principal components are given by: . We use the normalized data from ICRG dataset 156 to compute composite index of institutional quality using PCA. As in PCA, each variable can be written as linear 157 combination of PCs, in our case this can be done using following formula as: 10 Definition of the components 158 of institutional quality are from ICRG methodology document available at http://www.prsgroup.com/PDFS/ 159 icrgmethodology.pdf. 11 Where ? i is the eigen-value associated with the principle component P i. The composite 160 index of institutional quality can be generated using the principal components generated by equation 5.5 using 161 the following formula as: 162

Where, E i are the eigen-values and is the index of institutional quality. Using annual data from ICRG dataset, institutional quality index is constructed by PCA. We have retained components with eigen-value? 1.0, identified using scree plots, and which account for more than 60 % of variance in the composite index.

#### <sup>166</sup> 13 e) Test of Stationarity

Though, the ARDL method doesn't require to test for the order of integration of the data series, but Ouattara (2006) argues that F-statistics for bounds test provided by Pesaran et al. (2001) remains valid if and only if the variables used in the model are either I(0) or I(1) -any data series in the model should not be integrated of higher order, therefore we employ the Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Perron methods to test the order of integration of the data series.

# 172 14 Year ()

IV. Results and Discussions a) Descriptive Statistics Table 4.1 summarizes the Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. As mentioned earlier, to use the ARDL model the underlying data series should at most be integrated of order one (difference stationary). Table 4.2 shows that the variables are either integrated of order zero or integrated of order one. Therefore, we can now safely proceed with estimation of our model, and the statement of our model.

177 using the ARDL method.

# 178 15 Year () c) Test of Stationarity

#### 179 16 d) Estimation Results

We have used Schwartz Bayesian criterion for selection of our model. Table 4.3 presents results of the selected equation which will be tested for existence of the long run relationship. The test results indicate that a cointegrating relationship exists among the variables as the computed F-statistics lies outside the inconclusive range and is greater than the upper critical bound.

#### <sup>184</sup> 17 ii. Breusch-Godfrey Serial correlation LM test

For the results to be valid there should be no autocorrelation in the residuals of the regression equation. Table 4.5 185 summarizes the results of Breusch-Godfrey Serial correlation LM test. The long run equation results suggest that 186 the relationship between the institutional quality and the rate of interest is insignificant, though positive. This 187 result indicates that in the long run, rate of interest does not respond to changes in institutional quality. Table 188 4.7 shows that there is a negative and highly significant relationship between rate of interest and output gap. This 189 result indicates that when output gap increases, rate of interest is decreased by the monetary authority. This 190 also shows that the monetary policy is pro-cyclical, often described as a problem faced by developing economies. 191 The relationship between inflation and interest rate is positive and highly significant and more than one for one 192 in terms of magnitude. In the long run this relationship is in accordance with the Taylor rule. 193

# <sup>194</sup> 18 f) Dynamic Short Run Relationship

Table 4.8 summarizes the results of short run dynamic equation. High R-Square value suggests that the model 195 has a high explanatory power. Table 4.8 shows that institutional quality effects interest rate for sufficiently longer 196 period. Contemporaneous impact of institutional quality on interest rate is negative but is positive in the next 197 two periods. This does not yield a clear picture regarding the nature of relationship between institutional quality 198 and interest rate. The results further indicate that there is a positive relationship between the rate of interest 199 200 and inflation in the contemporaneous period but there is a negative relationship between these two variables at a 201 year lag. This means that initially the monetary authority reacts to the change in inflation by increasing the rate 202 of interest but down the road this relationship turns around. In the current period, changes in output gap do not 203 affect interest rate as the coefficient of output gap is insignificant. However, the interest rate reacts positively to 204 changes in the output gap at a year's lag. The coefficient of error correction term indicates that three fourth of 205 the error is accounted for in the current period. This shows that the central bank follows a policy of interest rate smoothening, changing the policy rate gradually to achieve the price stability goal. 206

#### <sup>207</sup> 19 V. Conclusion


The results of the study indicate that effect of institutional quality on monetary policy is not clear. Institutional 208 quality affects the monetary policy in the short run but the direction of the impact changes from lag to lag, while 209 in the long run impact of institutional quality is insignificant. The results also suggest that the central bank has 210 been putting more weight on inflation stabilization rather than output stabilization. It could be due to the fact 211 that inflation during the period has, by and large remained at a relatively higher level. Moreover, during most of 212 the period covered by the study's data span the country has been borrowing under the IMF structural adjustment 213 programs. Almost all of these programs required containing the fiscal deficit. This again required a focus upon 214 inflation. We found that the central bank has not been following Taylor rule in setting the policy rate of interest 215 even after controlling for the institutional quality. This result is at variance with the findings for the developing 216 countries in a cross country setting (Duncan, 2011). The reason could be that the institutional quality is poorer 217 in Pakistan than typically observed in the countries included in the said study. Our results also suggest that the 218 central bank follows an interest rates smoothening policy as the error correction term is highly significant and 219 about three forth of the error is accounted for in the current period. Our results confirm that monetary policy 220 of Pakistan is highly procyclical as suggested in the literature. We argued that the pro-cyclicality could be due 221  $1 \ 2 \ 3 \ 4 \ 5$ to the low institutional quality.



Figure 1:



Figure 2:



[Note: v. Institutional Quality]

Figure 9:

Variable	Mean	Median	Max	Min	Std. Dev.	Jarque- Bera	Probability
Call Money							
Rate	8.57	8.53	12.47	2.13	2.74	1.04	0.59
Output Gap	-0.001	-0.95	9.28	-5.78	4.02	1.54	0.46
Inflation	3.73	3.50	8.03	1.06	1.69	1.23	0.53
Institutional							
Quality	45.14	43.23	77.33	13.37	17.33	0.91	0.64

Figure 10: Table 4 . 1 :

4

41

Figure 11: Table 4 .

Figure 12: Table 4 .

 $<sup>^{-1}</sup>$ Like Douglass North, Darron Acemoglu and Dani Rodrik etc. A © 2016 Global Journals Inc. (US)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Taylor (1993) defined the rule over inflation and output gap as: i t = r \* + 0.5y t + 1.5? t , where i t =federal funds rate, ? t =inflation, r \* = real rate of interest, and y t =output gap.7 See for exampleHuang and Wei (2006), Dimakou (2006), Wu (2008), Calderon et al. (2010), Chaudhary et al. (2010) Duncan (2011).8 For exampleMalik (2007), Malik and Ahmed (2007), Islam (2009), Malik and Ahmed (2011) etc.9 For example Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Gerlach-Kristen (2003).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The Impact of Institutional Quality on Monetary Policy in Pakistan

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#### ADF Test

			TODU				
							Order of
		At			At First		Integration
		Level			Difference		-
	No			No			
	Intercept,	Intercept	Intercept	, Intercept,	Intercept	Intercept,	
Variable	No Trend	Only	Trend	No Trend	Only	Trend	
Call Money							
Rate	-0.09	-1.50	-1.71	-4.68***	-4.62***	-4.06***	I(1)
Output Gap	-	-2.95*	-2.82	-5.35***	-5.25***	-5.27***	I(0)
	$3.01^{***}$						
Inflation	-0.15	-2.87*	-3.12	-7.83***	$-7.72^{***}$	-5.56***	I(0)
Institutional							
Quality	-0.40	-1.68	-	-4.62***	-4.55***	-4.50***	I(1)
			$5.40^{***}$				
				PP Test			
							Order
							of
		At		A t First Difference			Integration
	No	Level		No			
		<b>T</b> , ,	т., ,	T / /	т., ,	<b>T</b> , , ,	

	No			No			
	Intercept,	Intercept	Intercept	, Intercept,	Intercept	Intercept,	
Variable	No	Only	Trend	No Trend	Only	Trend	
	Trend						
Call Money							
Rate	-0.12	-1.77	-1.94	-4.68***	-4.62***	-4.60***	I(1)
Output Gap	-	$-2.95^{*}$	-2.75	-7.18***	-7.00***	-7.98***	I(0)
	$3.01^{***}$						
Inflation	-0.51	-2.78*	-3.15	-8.54***	-9.36***	-9.24***	I(0)
Institutional							
Quality	-0.40	-1.86	-2.75	-4.62***	-4.55***	-4.49***	I(1)
Note: $***$ , $**$ and $*$ shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively							

Figure 13: Table 4 . 2 :

#### **43**

 $\mathbf{4}$ 

	Coefficient		
	0.29(0.14)		
	-0.20 (0.11)**		
	$0.50(0.15)^{*}$		
	-0.58 (0.11) ***		
	1.10 (0.25) ***		
	-0.49 (0.28) *		
Inflation (-1) Inflation (-2)			
	-0.09 (0.05) *		
	0.24 (0.06) ***		
	0.06(0.07)		
	-0.20 (0.05) ***		
	0.90(1.54)		
0.96	S.E of Regression	0.74	
-	F-Stats [Prob.]	31.80	
39.07	-	[0.00]	
		_	
		nd 10% re	
Lower Critical F-Static	Upper Critical F-Static	Result	
5% = 3.05	5% = 3.968	Co-	
	- 39.07 Error; ***, ** and * show Table 4.4 : Bound Lower Critical F-Static	$\begin{array}{c} 0.29 \ (0.14) \\ -0.20 \ (0.11)^{**} \\ 0.50 \ (0.15)^{*} \\ -0.58 \ (0.11) \ ^{***} \\ 1.10 \ (0.25) \ ^{***} \\ -0.49 \ (0.28) \ ^{*} \\ 0.51 \ (0.13) \ ^{***} \\ -0.09 \ (0.05) \ ^{*} \\ 0.24 \ (0.06) \ ^{***} \\ 0.06 \ (0.07) \\ -0.20 \ (0.05) \ ^{***} \\ 0.90 \ (1.54) \\ 0.96 \\ S.E \ of \ Regression \\ - \\ F-Stats \ [Prob.] \\ 39.07 \\\end{array}$ Error; ***, ** and * shows significance at 1%, 5% at Table 4.4 : Bound Test Lower Critical F-Static Upper Critical F-Static	

10% = 2.68

10% = 3.53

integrat

Figure 14: Table 4 . 3:

			Year
			Volume XVI Iss
			Version I
			( )
Lag	5 : Breusch-Godfrey	Serial correlation LM test F-statistic Chi-Square	Global Journal of
			agement and Bu
			Research
1	0.759	1.488	
	(0.401)	(0.222)	
2	0.351	1.501	
	(0.711)	(0.472)	
3	0.215	1.516	
	(0.884)	(0.679)	

Note: values in parenthesis indicate probability

Figure 15: Table 4 .

**46** 

F-statistic

Value 0.0046 (0.94)

Figure 16: Table 4 . 6 :

 $\mathbf{4}$ 

7 : Long Run Relationship	
Dependent Variable: Call Money	
Rate	
Variable	Coefficient
Output Gap	$-0.39 \ (0.16)^{***}$
Inflation	$1.60 \ (0.35) \ ***$
Institutional Quality	0.01  (0.05)
Intercept	$1.27 \ (2.22)$
Note: values in parenthesis indicate standard error; $^{***}$ , indicate significance at 1%,	

Figure 17: Table 4 .

**48** 

Variable

Figure 18: Table 4 . 8 :

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