

The Stock Price Effect of the Affordable Care Act

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Abstract

This is the first empirical study to assess the stock price effect of the Affordable Care Act. The timeline for appropriate assessment begins when the Act became law on June 28, 2012 in a 5-4 decision by the United States Supreme Court. Although the study is constrained by the fact that not much time has passed since the June, 2012 Court decision, quarterly returns and stock prices were analyzed for each quarter beginning with the third quarter of 2012 and ending with the first quarter of 2014. This is referred to as the post-Act time period. The results were then compared to similar quarterly data for the period 2004-2007. This is referred to as the pre-Act period. Fifty-seven firms and 912 pre-Act firm quarters were assessed for 5 health care industries in the sector (hospital companies, diagnostic companies, medical device companies, drug manufacturing companies, and assisted living companies). These total firm quarters were then compared to the same 57 firms and 399 firm quarters in the post Act period. Findings indicate that stock prices of these firms are significantly positive in the pre-Act study period but significantly negative in the post-Act study period. The analysis was then broken down by each of the five industries in both the pre and post-Act study periods. Findings again show that stock prices are significantly lower in post-Act time periods with hospital companies, diagnostic companies and medical device companies being the most pronounced in stock price decline. These results have significant bearing on managers and investors in a post Affordable Care Act era. It is possible that the health care sector as a whole may experience continued downward pressure on both earnings and stock prices, while specific industries in the sector may experience more significant impact than others in the quarters and years to come.

Index terms— affordable care act, obama care, share price response, health care industry.

1 Introduction

Health care reform has been a major issue in the United States for the past several years. The result of this reform has consequences for the American consumer of those services, the taxpayers, the firms themselves, and for shareholders of the firms. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (i.e., "Affordable Care Act" or "Obama Care") was signed into law by President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010. The intent of the law was to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of that health insurance. In particular, a key provision of the bill, called the "individual mandate" requires that all Americans maintain a certain level of health insurance or face a penalty.

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The Affordable Care Act is not without controversy. In May of 2014, the Congressional Budget Office of the United States summarized the Pros and Cons of the Act. Below is their summary: Pros:

1. Designed to reduce overall health care costs. 2. Make health care services available to 32 million uninsured Americans. 3. Make preventative services free to all Americans. 4. For those who can't afford it the Federal

4 A) HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

43 government will pay the states to add them to Medicaid. 5. Insurance companies cannot drop anyone once they
44 get sick. 6. Insurance cannot deny coverage for preexisting conditions. 7. Children can be added to parents'
45 insurance until age 26. 8. Does not apply to companies with fewer than 50 employees.

46 Cons:

47 1. 30 million Americans currently covered by private policies may be forced to pay for services they do not
48 use or need. 2. Between 3-10 million people may lose company-sponsored health plans. 3. Increased coverage
49 may in fact raise healthcare costs. 4. Those who do not elect a health care plan will be assessed a penalty (i.e.,
50 tax), at 2% of income, and enforced by the IRS. 5. Taxes were raised in 2013 on households earning in excess of
51 \$200,000 to help subsidize the Act. 6. Medical device manufacturers must pay a new 2.3% excise tax. 7. Drug
52 companies will pay an estimated \$84.8 billion in fees assessed by the Federal government.. 8. Companies will
53 be assessed a 40% excise tax on "Cadillac" health plans (i.e., "full coverage" plans) offered to employees, thus
54 increasing premiums or deductibles.

55 The constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act was affirmed by the Supreme Court on June 28, 2012 in a
56 5-4 decision, with the declaration that the Act constituted a tax and therefore was legal. The upholding of the
57 Act by the Supreme Court began to have implications on stock prices of firms impacted by the Act. Prior to the
58 June, 2012 ruling of the High Court, the broad expectation was that the Act would be overturned, thus, most
59 firms, and their investors, were not overly Year ()D 2014

60 concerned. In the week following the Supreme Court's decision, Health Care Industry stocks were down.

61 The mandate of the Act was that enrollment into a health plan be effective as of March 31, 2014. Although
62 there does not currently exist enough data to make an informed decision on the stock price implications of the
63 Act since March 31, 2014, we can, however, evaluate the industry stocks from the time of the Supreme Court
64 decision in 2012 and compare the stock performance across firms in the sector to pre-Act periods to assess any
65 significant changes between the two time frames. This would give us a broad perspective of how these firms are
66 perceived from a stockholder perspective.

67 2 II.

68 3 Literature Review

69 To assess the stock price impact of the Affordable Care Act, event study methodology is utilized. Fama, Fisher,
70 Jensen and Roll (1969) first use this methodology for determining the impact of legislative rulings on publicly
71 traded firms. It has since become the standard analytical procedure. Jayachandran (2006) observed the effect
72 of an unexpected change in party Congressional control on industry stock prices utilizing this methodology. The
73 impact on health care firms resulting from changes in federal health care policies have also been analyzed in detail
74 with a similar procedure. Kawaura and Sumner (1995) analyzed the impact of patent reform on pharmaceutical
75 companies. Their findings show that these companies were significantly hurt by the reform.

76 Other studies have attempted to analyze the impact of national health reform in the United States on health
77 care firms. Ellison and Mullin (2001) utilized regression analysis in their event study and found that the Clinton
78 health reform plan introduced between 1992-1993 had a significant negative impact on pharmaceutical company
79 stock prices.

80 Miller and Al-Ississ (2010) began some initial research on the Obama health reform plan. The analysis was,
81 however, limited to the comparison of the Massachusetts health care plan. Findings indicate that healthcare
82 firms serving the Massachusetts market experienced a decline in stock prices after adoption of the plan.

83 The simple fact is that no study to date has endeavored to analyze the stock-price effect of the Affordable Care
84 Act. This study will attempt to do just that through analysis of five major industries in the health care sector: 1)
85 Hospital companies, 2) Diagnostic companies, 3) Medical device makers, 4) Drug manufacturers, and 5) Assisted
86 living facilities. Security prices for these firms will be assessed for two periods: 1) Pre-Affordable Care Act time
87 frame ??2004) ??2005) ??2006) ??2007), and 2) Post-Affordable Care Act time frame (third quarter 2012-first
88 quarter 2014). Although limited in time scope, this study will allow us to see ramifications of the Act on security
89 prices of affected firms and stockholders.

90 4 a) Hypotheses Development

91 As previously noted, no current research assesses the stock price effect of the Affordable Care Act. In an effort to
92 do just that, the stock price effects for a sample of health care sector firms are analyzed by quarter for a period
93 prior to enactment of the Act, i.e., 2004-2007, for a total of 16 quarters. These years were selected because they
94 exemplify a return to normalcy after the effects of 9/11 and before the effects of the ensuing recession. The
95 stock price effects of these same firms are analyzed after the Supreme Court ruling establishing the Act as law,
96 i.e., third quarter of 2012 through first quarter of 2014, for a total of 7 quarters. If the Act has no discernible
97 difference across time periods, we should not see significant differences between the pre and post stock prices.
98 This gives rise to the first hypothesis, stated in the null form: H1: The share price responses to unexpected
99 earnings in a pre-Affordable Care Act environment for health care related firms are not significantly different
100 from those in a post-Affordable Care Act environment.

101 The broad changes in health care associated with the Affordable Care Act have undoubtedly affected some
102 health care related industries more than others. In an attempt to better assess this effect, the analysis of

103 hypothesis 1 is further detailed by five major industries impacted by the act, namely: 1. Hospital companies 2.
104 Diagnostic companies 3. Medical device makers 4. Drug manufacturers 5. Assisted living facilities Using the same
105 premise as hypothesis 1, if the Act has no discernible difference across time periods, we should not see significant
106 differences between the pre and post stock prices among the industries. This gives rise to the second hypothesis,
107 stated in the null form: H2: The share price responses to unexpected earnings in a pre-Affordable Care Act
108 environment for health care related industries are not significantly different from those in a post-Affordable Care
109 Act environment.

110 **5 b) Sample Selection**

111 The purpose of this study is to investigate the share price behavior of publicly traded health care firms in the
112 presence both a pre-and post-Affordable Care Act time frame. Following Chang, Cheng and Reichelt (2010), the
113 study is partitioned using a pooled time series approach. The pre-Act period is 2004-2007 (16 quarters) and the
114 post-Act period is third quarter 2012 through first quarter 2014 (7 quarters). Two databases were assembled for
115 health care related sector firms, one for pre and the other for post time periods. A Lexis- III.

116 **6 Methodology a) Hypothesis One**

117 The purpose of the test of the first hypothesis is to assess the relative information content of unexpected earnings
118 of share prices in a pre and post Act environment for total firms in the sample. The following model is used to
119 evaluate information content:CAR it = a + b 1 UE pre + b 2 UE post + b 3 MB it + b 4 B it + b 5 MV it + e
120 it

121 (1) Where: CAR it = Cumulative abnormal return firm i, time t a = Intercept term UE pre = Unexpected
122 earnings for firm i, time t, for all pre-Act firms in sample UE post = Unexpected earnings for firm I, time t, for
123 all post-Act firms in sample MB it = Market to book value of equity as proxy for growth and persistence B it =
124 Market model slope coefficient as proxy for systematic risk MVit = Market value of equity as proxy for firm size
125 e it = error term for firm i, time t The coefficient "a" measures the intercept. The coefficient b 1 is the earnings
126 response coefficient (ERC) for all pre-Act firms in the sample (57 firms, 912 firm quarters). The coefficient b
127 2 is the earnings response coefficient (ERC) for all post-Act firms in the sample (57 firms, 399 firm quarters).
128 The coefficients b 3 , b 4 , and b 5 , are assessed for any potential contributions to the ERC for all firms in the
129 sample. To investigate the effects of the information content of the ERC, there must be some control for variables
130 shown by prior studies to be determinants of ERC. For this reason, the variables represented by coefficients b 3
131 through b 5 are included in the study. Unexpected earnings (UE i) is measured as the difference between the
132 actual earnings (EA i) and security market participants' expectations for earnings proxied by consensus analyst
133 following as per Investment Brokers Estimate Service (IBES) (EX i). The unexpected earnings are scaled by
134 the firm's stock price (Pi) 180 days prior to the forecast: (EA i -EX i) UE i = P i(2)

135 For each cross sectional sample firm, an abnormal return (AR it) is generated for event days -1, 0, and +1,
136 where day 0 is defined as the quarterly earnings release date identified by EDGAR. The Dow Jones News Retrieval
137 Service (DJNRS) is also reviewed to insure that confounding factors, such as change of corporate ownership or
138 form, or management change, are minimized by excluding any firms which contain these events. The market
139 model is utilized along with the CRSP equally-weighted market index and regression parameters are estimated
140 between -290 and -91. Abnormal returns are then summed to calculate a cumulative abnormal return (CAR it
141). Hypotheses 1 is tested by examining the coefficients associated with the quarterly unexpected earnings of pre
142 and post Act firms' financial reports (i.e., b 1 and b 2). There are two possible conclusions; results may be noisy,
143 or interpreted as being less beneficial to investors, which in this event, b 1 , b 2 <0, or these firms will possess
144 an informationenhancing signal to the investor, which will result in b 1 , b 2 >0. Subsequent significance is then
145 assessed.

146 **7 b) Hypothesis Two**

147 The purpose of the test of the second hypothesis is to assess the relative information content of unexpected
148 earnings of share prices in a pre and post-Act environment for firms by industry membership. A model similar
149 to the one utilized for hypothesis one is again used for hypothesis two: = Market value of equity as proxy
150 for firm size e it = error term for firm i, time t Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to test the
151 model for hypothesis one and two. Crosssectional dependence and heteroskedasticity are not likely to be present
152 in stock return metrics since sample firms are not affected by common event dates. (Binder 1985;Bernard
153 1987;Grammatikos and Yourougou 1990). However, whenever a set of multiple regression variables are employed,
154 there is a probability of the presence of multicollinearity within the set of independent variables which may be
155 problematic from an interpretive perspective. To assess the presence of multicollinearity, the Variance Inflation
156 Factor (VIP) is utilized.CAR it = a+b 1 D 1 UE hc + b 2 D 2 UE dc + b 3 D 3 UE

157 IV.

158 8 Results

159 9 a) Hypothesis One Results

160 As indicated in Table 2, the response coefficient b 1 , representing unexpected earnings for all pre-Act firms
161 was .10 with a p-value of .01. Coefficient b 2 , representing post-Act firms was -.03 with a p-value of .01. The
162 other control variables were not found to be significant at conventional levels. This finding indicates that when
163 assessing the impact of the Affordable Care Act from a total firm perspective, there tends to be a significant
164 positive impact on stock prices of the pre-Act time periods but a significant negative impact on stock prices of
165 the post-Act time periods. Hypothesis one, which suggests no difference between the two sample groups must,
166 therefore, be rejected.

167 In addition, whenever a set of multiple regression variables are employed, there is a probability of the presence
168 of multicollinearity within the set of independent variables which may be problematic from an interpretive
169 perspective. To assess the presence of multicollinearity, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIP) was utilized. Values
170 of VIP exceeding 10 are often regarded as indicating multicollinearity. In the test of hypothesis 1, a VIP of 1.5
171 was observed, thus indicating the nonpresence of significant multicollinearity. The response coefficients for the
172 five industries represented by dummy variables are presented in Table 3. As indicated, all post-Act stock prices
173 show a significant decline from pre-Act time periods. The decline is most pronounced for hospital companies
174 (-.06, p-value of .01), diagnostic companies (-.11, p-value of .01), and medical device companies (-.16, p-value of
175 .01). Drug manufacturing companies show a decline that is less dramatic (-.02, p-value of .05), with similar results
176 for assisted living companies (-.01, p-value .10). The other control variables were not found to be significant at
177 conventional levels. This finding indicates that when assessing the impact of the Affordable Care Act from a
178 health care industry perspective, there tends

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181 Volume XIV Issue V Version I Year () D to be a significant negative impact on stock prices of the post-Act time
182 periods for all industries with hospital companies, diagnostic companies, and medical device companies being
183 most pronounced. Hypothesis two, which suggests no difference between the two time period groups by industry
184 must, therefore, be rejected.

185 The Variance Inflation Factor (VIP) was again utilized to assess multicollinearity in the regression model. In
186 the test of hypothesis 2, a VIP of 1.9 was observed, thus indicating the non-presence of significant multicollinearity.

187 11 Conclusion

188 This is the first empirical study to assess the stock price effect of the Affordable Care Act. The timeline for
189 appropriate assessment begins when the Act became law on June 28, 2012 in a 5-4 decision by the United States
190 Supreme Court. Although the study is constrained by the fact that not much time has passed since the June,
191 2012 Court decision, quarterly returns and stock prices were analyzed for each quarter beginning with the third
192 quarter of 2012 and ending with the first quarter of 2014. This is referred to as the post -Act time period.
193 The results were then compared to similar quarterly data for the period 2004-2007. This is referred to as the
194 pre-Act period. Fifty-seven firms and 912 pre-Act firm quarters were assessed for 5 health care industries in
195 the sector (hospital companies, diagnostic companies, medical device companies, drug manufacturing companies,
196 and assisted living companies). These total firm quarters were then compared to the same 57 firms and 399 firm
197 quarters in the post Act period. Findings indicate that stock prices of these firms are significantly positive in the
198 pre-Act study period but significantly negative in the post-Act study period.

199 The analysis was then broken down by each of the five industries in both the pre and post-Act study periods.
200 Findings again show that stock prices are significantly lower in post-Act time periods with hospital companies,
201 diagnostic companies and medical device companies being the most pronounced in stock price decline.

202 These results have significant bearing on managers and investors in a post Affordable Care Act era. It is
203 possible that the health care sector as a whole may experience continued downward pressure on both earnings
204 and stock prices, while specific industries in the sector may experience more significant impact than others in the
205 quarters and years to come. ^{1 2}

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


Figure 1: b 1 =

1

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[Note: D]

Figure 2: Table 1 :

11 CONCLUSION

Where: CAR_{it} = Cumulative abnormal return firm i , time t

a = Intercept term
 D_{1UEhc} = Dummy variable for all hospital
 companies firm quarters in sample
 where 1 = post-Act, 0 = pre-Act
 D_{2UEdc} = Dummy variable for all diagnostic
 companies firm quarters in sample where 1 = post-Act, 0 = pre-Act
 D_{3UEmd} = Dummy variable for all medical device
 companies firm quarters in sample where 1 = post-Act, 0 = pre-Act
 D_{4UEDm} = Dummy variable for all drug manufacturer
 ing companies firm quarters in sample where 1 = post-Act, 0 = pre-Act
 D_{5UEal} = Dummy variable for all assisted living
 companies firm quarters in sample where 1 = post-Act, 0 = pre-Act
 MB_{it} = Market to book value of equity as proxy
 for growth and persistence
 B_{it} = Market model slope coefficient as proxy
 for systematic risk
 MV_{it}

Figure 3:

2

a	b 1	b 2	b 3	b 4	b 5	Adj. R 2
.03.10-.03 (.50) (2.47) a (2.59) a (.48) (.32)		.10	.07	.15		.235 (.26)

Figure 4: Table 2 :

3

Figure 5: Table 3 :

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