

CrossRef DOI of original article:

Stevenson: A Tendentious Explanatory Matrix for Human Homosexual Behaviour

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Received: 1 January 1970 Accepted: 1 January 1970 Published: 1 January 1970

Abstract

This work is expository, analytic, comparative and evaluative, in its methodology. The objective is to interrogate the emotive ethical theories of A. J. Ayer, and C. L. Stevenson, in relation to the phenomenon of homosexuality, in order to ascertain whether or not the causative factors and justificatory reasons of same-sex tendencies, orientations and behaviours can be adequately accounted for, within the context of the emotive or psychological dimension of the human person. In other words, what is pivotal here is whether or not the emotive ethical theories (non-cognitivism) offer a robust conceptual grid and interpretative framework, for engaging in any demanding and rewarding discourse on the issue of human homosexual behavior.

Index terms— bisexuality, comparative, evaluative, emotivism, human, homosexuality, heterosexuality, study.

1 Introduction

o A very large extent, homosexuality presents a paradox for evolutionists who explore the adaptedness of human behavior. If adaptedness is measured by reproductive success, and if homosexual behavior is non-reproductive, then what is its origin? There is little evidence that lineages gain reproductive advantage through offspring care, provided by homosexual members. Therefore, there is little support for the hypothesis that homosexuality is a product of kin selection. 1 Since parents, at times, control children's reproductive decisions and at times encourage children in homosexual behavior, there is some support for the hypothesis of parental manipulation. Support is strongest, however, the in favour of the hypothesis that homosexual behavior comes from individual selection for reciprocal altruism. This is a form of altruism that occurs between unrelated individuals where there will be repayment (or at least the promise of repayment) of the altruistic act in the future. 2 An altruistic behavior can be defined as a behavior that benefits another organism, not closely related, while being apparently detrimental to the organism performing the behavior, the benefit and detriment being defined in terms of contribution to inclusive fitness. In evolutionary biology, reciprocal altruism is a behaviour whereby an organism acts in a manner that temporarily reduces its fitness while increasing another organism's fitness, with the expectation that the other organism will act in a similar manner at a later time. 3 Non-human primates, including the apes, use homosexual behavior in same-sex alliances, but such alliances have not been proven to be relevant in the expanded distribution of human ancestors. 4 Adaptationist explanations do not fully explain sexual behavior in humans, however; social and historical factors also play strong roles. 5 We live in a world where many people judge morality by what they feel; claiming that moral statements are merely expressions of feelings. 6 This is true of the emotivists, who hold that moral statements merely express positive or negative feelings, and are based on personal opinions and values, which are largely arbitrary. 7 a) The Emotivism of A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson: Antecedent and Contextual Discourses Emotivism as a meta-ethical view, claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions, but emotional attitudes. Emotivism is form of noncognitivism or expressivism. It stands in opposition to other forms of non-cognitivism (such as quasirealism and universal prescriptivism), as well as

1 INTRODUCTION

44 to all forms of cognitivism (including both moral realism and ethical subjectivism). 8 Admittedly, the emotive
45 theory did not begin with Alfred Julius Ayer, but it was in Ayer and Charles Leslie Stevenson that the theory
46 gained its popularity. Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong Richards were the first to propose the theory in
47 their work *The Meaning of Meaning*. 9 They gave the term "good" a purely emotive meaning, since they felt
48 that when one makes an utterance that a thing is good, one is merely evoking a semblance of the same feeling
49 in other people. This concept, it is said, is the subject-matter of ethics although Ogden and Richards claimed
50 that in the purely emotive use of 'good' in ethics, the speaker expresses an attitude and evokes a similar attitude
51 in the listener. A Swedish philosopher, Axel Hagerstrom has been credited as the first to formulate the theory
52 of emotivism in 1911. In one of his lectures: "On the Truth of Moral propositions," he formulated, in outline,
53 the emotive theory with particular reference to the concept of duty. 10 It was in early 20th century that A.J.
54 Ayer proposed his own theory of emotivism. In chapter 6 of his *Language, Truth and Logic*, one finds Ayer's
55 earliest attempts to develop, in some detail, what came to be known as the emotive theory of ethics. Ayer claims
56 that one cannot subject an ethical statement to empirical testing, since ethical statements are mere expressions
57 of our personal preferences: 'For in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, is not making factual
58 statement, but merely an expression of certain moral sentiments.' 11 A. J. Ayer's emotivism, originated from the
59 school of Logical Positivism, whose proponents wanted to ground knowledge in what could be known through
60 experience, or what was logically the case. They believed that anything which could not be verified by logical
61 analysis or through sense-experience was deemed unverifiable. As such, to speak about unverifiable things was
62 simply pointless (or meaningless). 12 The cornerstone of their beliefs was the principle of verification. This
63 principle claims that statements about right and wrong are meaningless. They are neither true nor false, because
64 they do not actually state anything.

65 Like other positivists, Ayer was disturbed by the confusion caused by the improper use of language. In his
66 work: *Language, Truth, and Logic*, he examined and analyzed ethical statements in order to find out their true
67 nature, most especially to know whether they are scientific. In chapter 6 of *Language, Truth and Logic*, entitled:
68 "Critique of Ethics and Theology" Ayer began by saying that judgments of value were "expressions of emotion,"
69 when he discussed ethics in particular (as opposed to aesthetics), he abandoned the term 'emotion' and instead
70 used the terms 'sentiment', 'feeling' or 'attitude'. The reason is that some terms, such as 'sentiment', 'feeling',
71 and 'attitude' as subject to moral and ethical qualifications. He argued that ethical judgments express and evoke
72 ethical emotions that are different in kind from non-ethical emotions. 13 Chiefly, Ayer's fundamental claim was
73 that statements could only be meaningful or valuable only if they had factual content. He thought it was possible
74 to differentiate between meaningless and meaningful statements as the latter are either true by definition or, in
75 principle, falsifiable (they could be shown to be true or false). All other statements are disregarded as having
76 no value. Ayer scrutinized ethical statements in order to know whether they were verifiable or factual, and held
77 that the fundamental ethical concepts cannot be analyzed insofar as there is no established criterion for testing
78 their validity. 14 1. "Propositions that express definitions of ethical terms, or judgments about the legitimacy or
79 possibility of certain definitions"

80 In this chapter, Ayer divides "the ordinary system of ethics" into four classes namely: 2. "Propositions
81 describing the phenomena of moral experience, and their causes" 3. "Exhortations to moral virtue," 4. "Actual
82 ethical judgments." 15 Ayer gives particular attention to propositions of the first class, moral judgments, saying
83 that those of the second class belong to science, while those of the third are mere commands, and those of the
84 fourth (which are considered in normative ethics as opposed to metaethics) are too concrete for ethical
85 philosophy. Thus, in saying that 'Telling lies is (morally) wrong', the speaker is not asserting any proposition,
86 but only expressing a feeling or attitude of disapproval towards the action of telling lies. Consequently, the
87 presence of an ethical symbol adds nothing to its factual content. The exception to this is C. L. Stevenson,
88 who in his *Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis* (1963) argues that ethical judgments are truth-apt. In
89 expatiating Ayer's theory of emotivism, Stevenson agreed that ethical statements express the speaker's feelings,
90 but that there exists an element of prescriptivism when uttering moral sentences: 'Your ethical judgment has a
91 quasiimperative force which, operating through suggestion, and intensified by your tone of voice, readily permits
92 you to begin to influence, to modify someone else's interests.' 16 Statements of fact are either logically necessary
93 (true by definition) or observable. But, moral statements are neither analytically nor synthetically verifiable,
94 so there are no moral facts. In summary, Stevenson's claim is that when one says that an ethical judgment is
95 true, what he is really doing is reaffirming that ethical judgment. His example is as follows: "When Mr. A says
96 "Jones ought not to have done it," and Mr. B replies: "that is true," what is the force of B's reply? Rather
97 obviously he too has said, in abbreviated form, the equivalent of "Jones ought not to have done it." His "that
98 is true" permits him as it were to repeat A's remark, thus expressing an attitude (apart from hypocrisy) that
99 is in agreement with A's." 17 Stevenson argues that this sense of truth, as reaffirming what others have said, is
100 not an unusual sense of truth, insofar as it is also typical for factual contexts. However, the important point
101 here is that even if Stevenson's considerations are correct and ethical judgments are truth-apt in this sense of
102 truth, it does not make ethical judgments truth-apt in the ordinary (and interesting) sense of truth. 18 The
103 claim that moral language only expresses attitudes seems to imply that there is no contradiction involved in
104 moral disagreement. That is, if one person says: 'Telling lies is (morally) wrong' and another person say: 'Telling
105 lies is not (morally) wrong,' they are not contradicting each other in any way; but only expressing different
106 personal preferences. However, if the emotivist wishes to deny that the two parties have moral disputes, he or

107 she needs to explain why it looks like they do; since they are clearly trying to argue for something, not just
108 expressing their personal preferences. 19 In this regard, Ayer is in agreement with subjectivists in saying that
109 ethical statements are necessarily related to individual attitudes, but he says they lack truth-value because they
110 cannot be properly understood as propositions about those attitudes. He takes subjectivism to be the thesis that
111 actions are right or good if a person or group of persons approves of it. 20 The subjectivist thinks, according
112 to Ayer, that one can translate statement of value into statements of empirical fact. But, he also thinks that
113 ethical sentences are expressions, not assertions of approval, because while an assertion of approval may always be
114 accompanied by an expression of approval, expressions can be made without assertions. 21 He used "boredom"
115 as an illustration. For Ayer, "boredom" can be expressed through the stated assertion "I am bored" or through
116 non-assertions like tone of voice or any other way of communicating various other verbal statements. He holds
117 that such statement like "Homosexuality is wrong" would be a non-propositional sentence that is an expression
118 of disapproval, and thus not equivalent to the proposition: "I disapprove of Homosexuality." 22 Ayer went further
119 to say that ethical discussions are about the facts. Thus, when arguing over homosexuality, contending parties
120 are constantly bringing facts to each other's attention. One person points out how much homosexuals suffer in
121 searching for identity, and another person points out how much more sophisticated it is to legalize gay marriages,
122 and so on. If they both agree on the facts, but still disagree morally, there would be nothing left to discuss. 23

123 2 b) Homosexuality and Moral Standards

124 Ethics is the practical normative science of the rightness or wrongness of human conduct, as known by natural
125 reason. The subject matter of ethics is human conduct, those actions which are performed consciously and
126 wilfully, and for which one can be held accountable. 24 Ethics also has been defined as that branch of philosophy,
127 moral philosophy, which addresses moral problems and offers the criteria for judgments. It equips us with
128 the tools for critical ethical judgments. 25 Ethics deals with the principle of human behavior, analyzing those
129 elements responsible for our behaviour. It scrutinizes moral questions and offers rational and objective answers to
130 them. Ethics therefore reminds us of the negative consequences of bad action and offers us the approbation that
131 follows good deeds. There is no consensus in ethical opinions regarding how we come to know right and wrong
132 actions. While some thinkers opine that conscience should be used as a moral standard, others claim that it is
133 the consequences of the action, and some others hold unto the dictates of human practical reason (synderesis).
134 The intuitionist school of thought, for example, takes intuition as the moral standard. Intuitionism is an ethical
135 theory which maintains that we know right and wrong actions by intuition. But there is a fundamental problem
136 with these views, they only provide us with opinions which are not necessarily immune from error. ??6 If one
137 person claims that he knows 'by intuition' that homosexuality is morally wrong, another man may also claim
138 to know 'by intuition' that the same action is morally right," thus, leaving us with conflicting intuitions. So,
139 although there is no exclusive or absolute moral standard, a moral standard still remains the foundation for
140 making moral decisions. ??7 Despite the fact that homosexual practices have occurred in the ancient world
141 centuries before their appearance in Athens; the substantial body of evidence of ancient homosexuality that is
142 available, in written forms and archaeological findings, comes from the ancient Greek civilization. That the
143 ancient Greeks practiced homosexuality is a pertinent fact to note, ??8 especially when one considers the pivotal
144 role that the Greek civilization has played in shaping the western world, which is today on many fronts the pace-
145 setter of the world. The Christian tradition has generally proscribed any and all non-coital genital activities,
146 whether engaged in by couples or individuals, regardless of whether they were of the same or different sex.
147 ??9 The Catholic Church's position specifically on homosexuality, developed from the teachings of the Church
148 Fathers, which was in stark contrast to Greek and Roman attitudes towards samesex relations including the
149 "(usually erotic) homosexual relationship between an adult male and a pubescent or adolescent male," is called
150 pederasty. The modern arguments in favor of homosexuality, have been insufficient to overcome the evidence that
151 homosexual behavior is against divine and natural law, as the Bible and the Church, as well as the wider circle
152 of Jewish and Christian (as well as Muslim) writers, have always held. ??0 People have a basic, ethical intuition
153 that certain behaviors are wrong because they are unnatural. We perceive intuitively that the natural sex partner
154 of a human is another human, not an animal. The same reasoning applies to the case of homosexual behavior.
155 The natural sex partner for a man is a woman, and the natural sex partner for a woman is a man. Thus, people
156 have the corresponding intuition concerning homosexuality that they do about bestiality, that it is wrong because
157 it is unnatural. ??1 Natural law reasoning is the basis for almost all standard moral intuitions. For example, it is
158 the dignity and value that each human being naturally possesses that makes the needless destruction of human
159 life or infliction of physical and emotional pain immoral. This gives rise to a host of specific moral principles,
160 such as the unacceptability of murder, kidnapping, mutilation, physical and emotional abuse, and so forth. ??2
161 Many homosexuals argue that they have not chosen their condition, but that they were born that way, making
162 homosexual behavior natural for them. But because something was not chosen does not mean it was inborn.
163 Some desires are acquired or strengthened by habituation and conditioning instead of by conscious choice. For
164 example, no one chooses to be an alcoholic, but one can become habituated to alcohol. Just as one can acquire
165 alcoholic desires (by repeatedly becoming intoxicated) without consciously choosing them, so one may acquire
166 homosexual desires (by engaging in homosexual fantasies or behavior) without consciously choosing them. ??3
167 Since sexual desire is subject to a high degree of cognitive conditioning in humans (there is no biological reason
168 why we find certain scents, forms of dress, or forms of underwear sexually stimulating), it would be most unusual if

4 A) GENETICS AND HOMOSEXUALITY

169 homosexual desires were not subject to a similar degree of cognitive conditioning. The morality of homosexuality
170 is not a philosophical issue per se, but one can use objectivist principles to evaluate the morality of homosexuality
171 in any given situation. ??4 The Catholic Church teaches that respect for homosexual persons cannot lead in
172 any way to approval of homosexual behaviour or to legal recognition of homosexual unions. The common good
173 requires that laws recognize, promote and protect marriage as the basis of the family, the primary unit of society.
174 Legal recognition of homosexual unions or placing them on the same level as marriage would mean not only the
175 approval of deviant behaviour, with the consequence of making it a model in present-day society, but would also
176 obscure basic values which belong to the common inheritance of humanity. ??5 The Church cannot fail to defend
177 these values, for the good of men and women and for the good of society itself. While sexual orientations may
178 not be chosen, in many cases, what behaviors people exhibit in response to their orientations are chosen, and
179 such behaviors can be evaluated morally. A person who by nature, rather than by choice, is more attracted to
180 members of the same sex than the opposite sex, still has the choice to recognize and act in accordance with this
181 fact or to repress or act against it. 36 If a person wishes to achieve happiness and promote his or her life, then
182 he or she must, in a realm as morally important as sex, act in accordance with his or her nature. While many
183 conservatives believe that homosexuality should be outlawed and many liberals believe that homosexuals should
184 be given special rights, objectivism holds that as long as no force is involved, people have the right to do as they
185 please in sexual matters, 37 whether or not their behavior is considered by others to be or is in fact moral. And
186 since individual rights are grounded in the nature of human beings as human beings, homosexuals do not deserve
187 any more or less rights than heterosexuals. 38

188 3 II. Homosexuality: Possible Causes

189 There is a common belief among liberals that people are born either gay or straight. Conservatives tend to
190 believe that sexual orientation is actually sexual preference, which is chosen by the individual. 39 Until a few
191 years ago, 'sexual orientation' was previously called 'sexual preference.' Most scientists today agree that sexual
192 orientation (including homosexuality and bisexuality) is the result of a combination of environmental, emotional,
193 hormonal, and biological factors. In other words, there are many factors that contribute to a person's sexual
194 orientation. 40 There is no consensus among scientists about the exact reasons that an individual develops a
195 heterosexual, bisexual, gay or lesbian orientation. Although much research has examined the possible genetic,
196 hormonal, developmental, social and cultural influences on sexual orientation, no findings have emerged that
197 permit scientists to conclude that homosexual orientation is determined by any particular factor or set of factors.
198 41

199 4 a) Genetics and Homosexuality

200 This notion stem from the belief that the public will become more accepting of homosexuality if they are convinced
201 that it is inborn and immutable. However, a genetic 42 basis to homosexual desire does not prevent homosexuals
202 from choosing not to participate in homosexual activities. Furthermore, when asked if homosexuality was rooted
203 solely in biology, gay gene researcher, Dean Hamer, asserts: "Absolutely not. From twin studies, we already
204 know that half or more of the variability in sexual orientation is not inherited. Our studies try to pinpoint the
205 genetic factors, but not negate the psychosocial factors." 43 Research into the issue of the origins of homosexuality
206 suggests that adoptive brothers are more likely to both be homosexuals than the biological brothers, who share half
207 their genes which suggest that homosexuality is not genetically caused. This suggests that there is no genetic
208 component, but rather an environmental component shared in families 44 If homosexuality were significantly
209 influenced by genes, it would appear in every culture, but in twenty-nine of seventy-nine cultures surveyed by
210 Ford and Beach in 1952, homosexuality was rare or absent. It was very rare in the Siriono, even though there were
211 no prohibitions on homosexual relationships in that culture. The researcher observed only one man displaying
212 slight homosexual traits but apparently not sexually involved with another man. Homosexuality appears to be
213 rare among Orthodox Jews, so much so that learned rabbis, the interpreters of Jewish law, usually allowed men to
214 sleep in the same bed, because likelihood of sexual contact was considered negligible. Kinsey also found very low
215 homosexual incidence among Orthodox Jews...This evidence comes from missionaries who commonly spend 25
216 years of their lives living in one culture, far more than almost any anthropologist....Overall they can be considered
217 as reliable witnesses. For example, in contrast to groups like the Sambia in the New Guinea highlands, where
218 homosexuality was compulsory, only about 2-3 percent of Western Dani (also in the New Guinea highlands)
219 practiced it. However, in another group of Dani who Similarly, Dr. Neil Whitehead a research scientist and
220 biochemist from New Zealand and is his wife Briar Whitehead in their book entitled: My Genes Made Me Do It:
221 A Scientific Look at Sexual Orientation, argues that there is no genetic determinism with regard to homosexuality:
222 were genetically related, homosexuality was totally unknown. Missionaries report that when they were
223 translating the Bible into Dani for this group, their tribal assistants, who knew their own culture intimately, were
224 nonplused by references to homosexuality in Romans 1; they did not understand the concept. Another missionary,
225 with the same group for 25 years, overheard many jests and sexually ribald exchanges among the men, but never
226 a single mention of homosexuality in all that time. When Dani went to help with missionary work among the
227 Sambia, they were astounded at some of the homosexual practices they saw for the first time. Although it is always
228 difficult for a foreigner to be completely sure whether a rare and stigmatized behavior exists, it is certainly true

229 that if three such different experiences of homosexuality can occur in groups of people so closely related genetically,
230 genetically enforced homosexuality is an impossibility.” ??5 Science has not yet discovered any genetically dictated
231 behavior in humans. So far, genetically dictated behaviors of the ”one-gene-one-trait” variety have been found
232 only in very simple organisms. From an understanding of gene structure and function there are no plausible
233 means by which genes could inescapably force homosexual behaviors on a person. ??6 No genetically determined
234 human behavior has yet been found. The most closely genetically related behavior yet discovered (mono-amine
235 oxidase deficiency leading to aggression) has shown itself remarkably responsive to counselling. If homosexual
236 behaviours were genetically inherited, it would have bred itself out of the population in only several generations,
237 and would not be around today. 47 This means that gays with no children would not be able to reproduce their
238 genes. In general, geneticists settle for some genetic influence of rather undefined degree, most agreeing that many
239 genes contribute to any particular human behavior. Geneticists, anthropologists, developmental psychologists,
240 sociologists, endocrinologists, neuroanatomists, medical researchers into gender, and twin study researchers are
241 in broad agreement about an infinitesimal (insignificant) role of genetics in homosexuality. ??8 .However, genes
242 do not make anyone engage in homosexual behavior. There is no genetic determinism, and genetic influence at
243 most is minor. ??9 Is this consensus likely to change? Might some major biological link be discovered which
244 could change everything? After all, science is about discovery. For most of these scientific disciplines, the findings
245 have been clearly established from facts that will not change (e.g. the diversity of homosexual practices between
246 and within cultures; the clearly established stages of human development; the over-riding role of upbringing
247 in the ultimate gender choice of people with ambiguous genitalia). ??0 But what of future studies of brain
248 microstructure, or detailed analysis of genes and function? Will they reveal links between brain structure and
249 human behaviours, or behaviours and genetic sequences? Of course that is a huge possibility. New research
250 findings will continue to be published. But, one can safely conclude that even authors wanting to find such links
251 will almost always include the standard scientific caveats that the influence is minor, and that the environment is
252 pivotal. ??1 Thus, what can reasonably be said about future researches is that it will enter new fields and come
253 up with new links, but none of them will be definitive. ??2 1. They would be admitting that there are those in
254 the homosexual community who, after careful thought, have concluded that it is wrong to be homosexual and
255 that it does not lead to personal happiness and fulfillment. Focusing on those homosexuals who want to change
256 continues to emphasize the immorality and personal destructiveness of homosexuality.

257 Based on the alleged, though unproven, genetic links to homosexuality, most homosexuals claim that their
258 homosexuality is so much a part of their identity, that they can do nothing about it. In his report, ”Homosexuality
259 in America: Exposing the Myths,” Richard Howe suggests two major reasons why homosexual activists promote
260 this myth: 2. They would be denying that homosexuality is physically caused. The more the homosexual
261 community can convince the general public that their homosexuality is beyond their control, the more tolerance
262 or even preferential treatment they can gain in public policy.” ??3 Quite sim Contrary to the myth stated above,
263 in truth there is no gay gene! Even openly homosexual researchers have come to that conclusion. In 1996, a
264 research team of five led by Dean Hamer at the National Cancer Institute released a study that attempted to link
265 homosexuality with a specific region of the X chromosome. Dean Hamer made the statement ”?environmental
266 factors play a role. There is not a single master gene that makes people gay.” ??4 He went on to say, ”I don’t think
267 we will ever be able to predict who will be gay.” A well-known brain study of 1991 by Simon Levay tried to find
268 the differences in the hypothalamuses (a very small portion of the brain) of both homosexual and heterosexual
269 men. Levay, who was one of the researchers and himself a gay activist, offered criticism of his own work: ”It’s
270 important to stress what I didn’t find. I did not prove that homosexuality is genetic, or find a genetic cause for
271 being gay. I didn’t show that gay men are born that way, the most common mistake people make in interpreting
272 my work. Nor did I locate a gay center of the brain.” Clinical professor of psychiatry at the Albert Einstein
273 School of Medicine and past president of the National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality,
274 Dr. Charles Socarides, argues that since psychologists and ministers have treated homosexuality with success,
275 the genetic cause theory must be suspect. ??5

276 5 b) Environment, Nurture and Homosexuality

277 Environments and nature have been over the years seen by many as the causes of homosexual orientation. In
278 his 1980 work *Overcoming Homo sexuality*, Robert Kronemeyer writes: ”With rare exceptions, homosexuality
279 is neither inherited nor the result of some glandular disturbance or the scrambling of genes or chromosomes.
280 Homosexuals are made, not born ’that way.’ I firmly believe that homosexuality is a learned response to early
281 painful experiences and that it can be unlearned. For those homosexuals who are unhappy with their life and
282 find effective therapy, it is ’curable.” ??6 Similarly, in a 1989 USA Today article, a San Francisco State University
283 professor of psychology, John DeCecco and the former editor of the 25-volume, *Journal of Homosexuality*, stated,
284 ”The idea that people are born into one type of sexual behavior is entirely foolish.” Homosexuality is ”a behavior,
285 not a condition,” and something that some people can and do change, just like they sometimes change other
286 tastes and personality traits.” ??7

6 c) Psychosocial factors and Homosexuality

Psychosocial factors have long been neglected, as causative or determinant regarding homosexual behaviours, but a number of recent studies point to their manifest importance. In particular, childhood and adolescent experiences seem to be determinative of future orientation. ??8 Particularly significant are the high proportion of homosexuals who report a distant father-son relation and a feeling of being 'exotic' and separate from their same-sex peers. In addition, as some have suggested, psychosocial factors may turn out to be at the root of the difference between gay and lesbian orientations. ??9 In our society, gender non-conforming boys are far more often singled out from the crowd than girls. This singling-out may have the effect of reinforcing their feelings of difference and thus entrenching their orientation. For girls there is not the same degree of singling-out, so orientation is likely to be much more fluid and even superficial. ??0 However, science is yet to reach a consensus about the exact reasons that an individual develops a heterosexual, bisexual, gay or lesbian orientation. From various researches conducted in the field of science, many have come to the conclusion that genetic, hormonal, developmental, social and cultural influences on sexual orientation, no findings have emerged that permit scientists to conclude that homosexual orientation is determined by any particular factor or factors. ??1 III.

7 Arguments in Favour of Homosexuality a) Homosexuals are born Gay

When advocates of pro-gay theology and philosophy assert that people are born gay, they actually go beyond the generally accepted view that genetics and environmental factors influence a person's behaviour. They suggest that homosexuality is largely caused by a person's genes. ??2 This belief which is itself based on the deterministic philosophy of behaviourism, is designed to suggest that what is inborn is (a) natural or normal, (b) unchangeable, (c) allowed or created by God, as with a congenital defect or one's eye colour, and that it is (d) morally legitimate. The logic and implications of this view are as follows: If a person is homosexual because of an inbred homosexual condition, there is no hope or possibility of change. ??3 And because the homosexual cannot change, all aspects of society must change, including education, religion, and law, in favour of the homosexual. ??4 Basically, the advocacy is to the effect that not only must homosexuality be accepted as socially legal for homosexuals, it must also be promoted as a normal lifestyle option and, if necessary, the church must be pressured to abandon its alleged moral discrimination against homosexuals seeking church membership. ??5

8 b) Homosexuality is not a Sin

Over the years some pro-gay advocates have maintained that homosexuals have no choice in the matter of their sexual predisposition towards persons of the same gender. The homosexual condition or orientation, it is argued, is an evidence of the brokenness and "fallenness" of our present world. ??6 The condition may be classified with disease (such as alcoholism, or allergies), with handicap (such as congenital blindness), and eccentricity (such as lefthandedness). It may even be evil (like sickness or death), but not necessarily sinful (like pride, blasphemy, or murder). ??7 Because homosexuals did not choose to be born gay. So, one should not hold any person responsible for her or his sexual orientation any more than we hold a person responsible for skin colour (nature). ??8 Being a homosexual is not sin, but lustful and inappropriate homosexual activity is sin and therefore, must be avoided. Since it is believed that homosexuals did not choose to be gay, but were born that way, God deserves the credit (or blame) for who or what they are. And since homosexuality is presumably not a sin, but a sinful condition, homosexuals need compassion and acceptance from the church, and other faith communities. ??9

9 c) Homosexuals are normal and Healthy People

Based on the assumption that homosexuality is inborn, i.e. of genetic origin, advocates argue that homosexuality should be accepted as a natural or normal human condition. ??0 They opine that homosexuality is a normal variant of adult sexuality; gay men and lesbians possess the same potential and desire for sustained loving and lasting relationships as heterosexuals, including loving and parenting children. ??1 The variation of this argument is that there are homosexuals in every species on the planet. It is a frequent, natural, and regular occurrence; it is both common and highly essential in the lives of a number of species. This covers everything from mammals to crabs and worms. ??2 According to them, overwhelming evidence shows that homosexuality is a natural occurrence across nearly all species on the planet. This is not a choice, it is a fact of life. When the facts show us that people are who they are, we should allow them to live full lives as they are. ??3 IV.

10 Objections to Homosexuality a) Homosexuality is against the natural Law Theory

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, the natural law is "nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law" (1a-11ae. Q. 94). The eternal law is God's wisdom, inasmuch as it is the directive norm of all movement and action. When God willed to give existence to creatures, He willed to ordain and direct them to an end. ??4 Aquinas argues that on the animal level of man's being, man shares certain biological and natural inclinations with other animals. These inclinations for Aquinas include inclinations towards sexual

343 activities and the tendency to take tender care of offspring; because everything naturally loves itself, the result
344 being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists corruption as far as it can. ??5 From these
345 inclinations God gave man the injunction to multiply and fill the earth, thereby promoting procreation and
346 tendering of offspring. This means that all other forms of sexual activity or the use of the sexual faculties which
347 exclude the possibility of procreation are morally and naturally wrong, since they go against the natural law.
348 Consequently, homosexuality is contrary to the inclination of nature, and morally wrong. ??6 b) Homosexuality
349 is immoral, whether inborn or acquired Regarding the assumption that since homosexuality may be natural
350 or inborn (an unproven assertion) it is by that token, morally neutral or legitimate, one might ask? If it can
351 be demonstrated conclusively that adultery, incest, paedophilia, violence, lying are inherited, would anyone be
352 justified in considering them legitimate or neutral? Should the standard for morality be determined by what is
353 inborn? ??7 Contrary to this view, homosexuality is still immoral, whether inborn or acquired. An immoral
354 behaviour cannot legitimized by a quick baptism in the gene pool. ??8 Morality is not determined by what
355 is inborn. Those wishing to discover God's moral standards must look to the Bible; the Ten Commandments
356 and God's pre-fall order, rather than the latest discoveries of science regarding the post-fall sinful condition,
357 in order to discover the moral guidelines on whether homosexuality is moral and immoral. ??9 From available
358 indications, the leap from what is (alleged facts of the homosexual condition) to what ought to be (the morality
359 of homosexuality) is too large to make. ??0

360 11 c) Marriage serves the common good

361 Marriage between one man and one woman is recognized as a public institution, with its attendant benefits
362 and responsibilities, precisely because it serves the common good. Marriage offers the State its most necessary
363 common good, ??1 by bringing children into the world and raising them in a family that includes the love of
364 their mother and father. The State needs people (citizens) in order to flourish. No people, no State. Under the
365 principle of subsidiarity, the common good is better served when mothers and fathers raise their children, not
366 the State. ??2

367 12 d) Homosexuality obfuscates the character and purpose of 368 marriage

369 Extending marriage to same-sex partners will redefine marriage in such a way that marriage will no longer be
370 understood to have a direct relationship to the procreation and education of children, such that bringing children
371 into the world and raising them, will be seen as extrinsic rather than intrinsic to marriage. ??3 Openness to
372 procreation will no longer belong to the very substance and definition of marriage. It will be reduced merely to
373 an option for those couples who happen to want children. Some might argue that if there is an insistence that
374 openness to procreation belongs to the very essence and definition of marriage, then it would also amount to
375 excluding not only same-sex partners from marriage, but infertile heterosexual couples as well. ??4 Upon careful
376 examination, this objection is neither valid nor compelling. The sexual activity of an infertile heterosexual couple
377 is intrinsically open to procreation, even though their sexual union cannot result in procreation. ??5 The sexual
378 act of an infertile couple is the kind of act that is open to procreation; the fact that it cannot lead to procreation
379 is accidental to the act itself. Under normal circumstances (of fecundity), their act would lead to procreation.
380 On the other hand, the sexual act of a same-sex couple is the kind of act that is never open to procreation. The
381 nonopenness to procreation (regrettably so) constitutes the substance and definition of the homosexual act. ??6
382 Thus, one can rationally hold that openness to life is intrinsic to marriage, without excluding infertile couples
383 from marriage. Infertile heterosexual couples engage in the kind of act that leads to procreation, but homosexual
384 couples do not. Hence, redefining marriage to include same-sex partners will consequently remove the essential
385 public purpose of marriage from its definition: that is, the procreation and education of children, ??7 thereby
386 destroying the goal of marriage, as a social institution meant for the common good. The argument that the
387 legalization of same-sex marriages will have no harmful impact on heterosexual marriage is, therefore, adjudged
388 to be entirely false. ??8 Such a redefinition of marriage will have the necessary effect of reducing all marriages
389 to the status of private relationships with no relation to the common good. This, in turn, renders the public
390 recognition of marriage as an institution utterly superfluous. To render a public institution superfluous is, of
391 course, to undermine and call into question why the state should recognize and support that institution at all.
392 ??9 V.

393 Homosexuality and the Ethical Emotivism of Ayer and Stevenson: an Appraisal

394 Ayer's emotivism states that moral judgments do not function as statements of fact, but rather as expressions
395 of one's emotions, feelings attitude towards an action. He claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions
396 but emotional attitudes. For him, moral language is meaningless because it is nonverifiable, for Stevenson moral
397 language has no factual nor cognitive content, but only an emotive meaning. For him, moral propositions are
398 neither true nor false; they aren't meaningless, but merely allow us to express our emotions. Following this
399 view, it means that moral judgments and ethical concepts such as good and bad have nothing else but emotive
400 meanings or significations. This is tantamount to relativism and subjectivism. ??0 Consequently, the reduction
401 of an ethical issue like Homosexuality to relativistic factors, makes morality a free enterprise (where moral agents
402 are free to institute their individual their personal moral norms or standards of behaviour). Hence, ethically

12 D) HOMOSEXUALITY OBFUSCATES THE CHARACTER AND PURPOSE OF MARRIAGE

403 speaking, emotivism is quite untenable. When a person says that an is bad, he or she is simply expressing his
404 own personal feelings about that action as Ayer and Stevenson seem to claim. Rather, the person is claiming that
405 there is something in that action which renders it intrinsically bad, morally evil or wrong. One is not just trying
406 to manipulate other people's emotions to endorse such action; rather one is making a factual statement which
407 can be either true or false. In line with this reasoning process, when one says that 'homosexuality is good,' such a
408 claim is factually false because it superlatively negates the objectivity of the moral wrongness of homosexuality.
409 Moral statements therefore are not just expressions of personal feelings, but objective statements of facts about
410 human actions. ??1 The ordinary system of ethics, as elaborated in the works of ethical philosophers, is very far
411 from being a homogeneous whole. Not only is it apt to contain pieces of metaphysics, and analyses of non-ethical
412 concepts: its actual ethical contents are themselves of very different kinds. They may be divided into four main
413 classes. ??2 There are, first of all, propositions which express definitions of ethical terms, or judgments about
414 the legitimacy or possibility of certain definitions. Secondly, there are propositions describing the phenomena of
415 moral experience, and their causes. Thirdly, there are exhortations to moral virtue. And lastly, there are actual
416 ethical judgments. It is unfortunately the case that the distinction between these four classes, plain as it seems,
417 is commonly ignored by ethical philosophers, with the result that it is often very difficult to tell from the works
418 of ethicists what it is that they are seeking to discover or prove. ??3 The distinction between the expression of
419 feeling and the assertion of feeling is complicated by the fact that the assertion that one has a certain feeling,
420 often accompanies the expression of that feeling, and is indeed a factor in the expression of that feeling. The
421 main objection to the ordinary subjectivist theory is that the validity of ethical judgments is not determined by
422 the nature of their author's feelings. ??4 Emotivism claims that moral utterances are neither true nor false but
423 are expressions of emotions or attitudes. It leads to the conclusion that people can disagree only in attitude,
424 not in beliefs. So, people cannot disagree over the moral facts, because there are no moral facts. It also implies
425 that presenting reasons in support of a moral utterance is a matter of offering non-moral facts that can influence
426 someone's attitude. It seems that any nonmoral facts will do, as long as they affect attitudes. Perhaps the most
427 far-reaching implication of emotivism is that nothing is actually good or bad. ??5 There simply are no properties
428 of goodness and badness. There is only the expression of favorable or unfavorable emotions or attitudes toward
429 something. Neither ethical subjectivism nor emotivism provide support for any particular moral standards. They
430 are not systems designed to define or support a particular moral or ideological viewpoint, nor do they provide
431 a foundation for justifying moral standards. The reason for this is that they are not moral systems, they are
432 meta-ethical theories. They are theories about the true nature and origin of morality, not justifications for any
433 particular set of moral standards. ??6 Despite early popularity, ethical emotivism is not a popular position
434 today and it is widely considered to be an unduly and unhelpfully simplistic form of Non-Cognitivism. At the
435 psychological level, ethical emotivism is unlikely to feel correct. If one suggests that a certain action is right or
436 wrong, it implies a claim that is true and reflects how one takes the world to be (reflecting a moral belief in one's
437 mind). For instance, one cannot simply boo an action in a rather academic and indirect way. Moral statements
438 are supposed to be truth-apt and descriptive moral judgments. ??7 The most telling and obvious objection to
439 ethical emotivism, for many people, is that it simply does not describe what we do when we are making up our
440 mind on moral issues. According to this objection, deciding what we ought to do in a particular situation is
441 different from asking ourselves what we want to do, sorting out our attitudes or engaging in selfpersuasion. ??8
442 There are some very serious problems with the theory of ethical emotivism that has essentially impugned on
443 its integrity, in the eyes of contemporary ethical theorists. One of the main problems with ethical emotivism is
444 that it does not seem to be able to give an account of the difference between everyday disapprovals and moral
445 disapprovals. 99 Surely moral judgements mean more to us than just an expression of emotion, and most ethicists
446 suggests that moral judgements are (or absolutely have to be) more than just an expression of our emotion to
447 a particular act. ??00 1. Torture is wrong. Also, ethical emotivism is entrapped in the 'Frege-Geach problem.'
448 This is a criticism that takes the form of a standard modus ponens argument:
449 2. If torture is wrong, then torturing your little brother is wrong. 3. Therefore, torturing your little brother
450 is wrong. ??01 facie, this argument appears to be valid in the sense that the conclusion does follow the premise.
451 However, for emotivism, the argument is 'fallacious.' The emotivist would say that this argument commits the
452 fallacy of equivocation because the expression 'torture is wrong' has a different meaning in the second premise
453 than it does in the first premise. It seems that the statement 'torture is wrong' is asserted and therefore is used
454 to express the disapproval of torture. However in the second premise it follows something completely different
455 altogether, it also seems that if one were to analyze the second premise, one would not state any attitude at
456 all. Thus, each occurrence or torture has a different meaning, and the argument does commit the fallacy of
457 equivocation. But it seems bizarre to draw such a conclusion Why is the argument fallacious? It seems that the
458 fallacy can actually be ascribed to emotivism, because in premise 1 it seems to express an attitude, but in premise
459 2 it does not. In this regard, it must be pointed out that it cannot express such an attitude even in premise 1. In
460 terms of recommendations, the ethical emotivist needs to replace the evaluative and non-evaluative dichotomywith
461 the evaluative/mixed/empirical trichotomy. ??02 Also, the problem of explaining apparent entailment relations
462 involving sentences that do not express beliefs and cannot be either true or false, needs to be adequately addressed.
463 ??03 Of course, the emotivists' performative fallacy (has to be addressed) regarding why it is impossible to give the
464 meanings of evaluative words, by specifying the linguistic acts (commanding, recommending, praising, blaming)
465 that utterances of simple evaluative sentences are standardly used to perform. 104 One appealing feature of

466 ethical emotivism is that it may promote a tolerant and accepting attitude towards moral diversity. Hence,
467 according to emotivism, as moral judgments are nothing more than 'pure expressions of feeling,' no one has
468 the right to say their morality is true and another's is false. 105 However, an unappealing feature of ethical
469 emotivism is that it arbitrarily reduces morality to emotions. But, morality cannot be reduced to emotions since
470 our emotions and moral judgments may not always be in agreement with each other. 106 It is a common feature
471 of moral debate that we do not evaluate a moral judgment by its emotional force, but by the reasons that can
472 be given in its support. Homosexuality in humans has been the center of broad discussions and has been widely
473 accepted by many societies in recent times, as a valid alternative to heterosexuality. There are different theories
474 regarding the homosexual behaviour in humans. These theories incorporate chemical, social and personal reasons
475 behind the same sex attractions. 107 There are two main theories as to what causes homosexual attractions.
476 The first theory is that a homosexual orientation is essentially dictated by genetic and/or biological factors. Put
477 simply, some people are "born gay." The second theory is that homosexual attractions develop primarily as a
478 result of psychological and environmental influences and early experiences. Unfortunately, in the public square,
479 the latter theory has appeared to be in decline and the former gaining favor in recent decades. 108 VI.

480 **13 Conclusion**

481 Emotivism states that moral judgments do not concern matters of facts, insofar as they do not describe or
482 represent the world in any way, but are simply emotional responses to it, which is why defenders of emotivism
483 usually claim that moral judgments cannot be true or false. Without prejudice to the exercise of human freewill,
484 a quality that humans have as rational beings, the reduction of moral judgments simply to expressions of one's
485 emotions, and feelings is a travesty of human freedom. 109 Hence, if feelings become the rule of morality, then
486 the morality and ethicality of homosexuality become justified on very spurious, selfish and deflationary grounds.
487 Following the hierarchy of human values, human moral consciousness and rationality, homosexuality is morally
488 reprehensible, since it is evidently contrary to the natural order (against the natural law) apart from the fact
489 that it substantially frustrates the procreative finality of the coital union between married couples. 110

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13 CONCLUSION

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