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4

5 **Abstract**

Trade and investment are vital to economic growth and markets' integration. A study was conducted to assess U.S. - Arab trade and investment relations and the impact of Free Trade Agreements on the economic development in the Arab world. The qualitative research utilized publically available trade and investment data for years 2010 -2014. U.S. exports to the 22 Arab countries for Year 2014 amounted to 71.4 billion and accounted for 4.4

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7 *Index terms*— trade, foreign direct investment, U.S. economy, arab economy, free trade agreement.

8 **1 Introduction**

9 With 714 billion barrels, the Arab World sits on 43% of world's total proven oil reserves and produces one third 10 of world oil supply (Fattouh & El-Katiri, 2012). The so-called Arab Spring proved the region to be rife with 11 violent internal ethnic and religious conflicts causing tremendous damages to the economies of several Arab 12 states and some even threatening their very existence. Still, the Middle East plays an increasingly central stage 13 in the geostrategic areas of international politics. Despite playing that pivotal role, its economic performance 14 lags behind other regions in the world and its potential as strong partner in trade relations is yet to be fulfilled.

15 Arab economies have lower performance than other regions in the world in terms of living standards, economic 16 diversification, and employment. Limited integration with global economy is frequently cited as a hindrance to its 17 economic development. The expansion of trade across the world, in recent years, has created new jobs, improved 18 earnings, and helped spread new knowledge and technology.

19 The oil revenues earned by natural-resource rich Arab countries have been poorly utilized and development of 20 manufacturing sector of the economy was not seriously pursued. Oil producing countries were prime examples 21 of "resource curse" where oil revenues deterred rather than aided economic development as well as exacerbated 22 corruption and inequality. In a speech delivered in May 2011 addressing events in the Middle East and North 23 Africa and the launching of his administration's Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative in the Middle East 24 and North Africa, President Obama (2011) illustrated the economic performance of the region by stating "If you 25 take out oil exports, this entire region of over 400 million people exports roughly the same amount as Switzerland".

26 Recently, several oil-rich Gulf countries have actively pursued diversification of their economies in the hope of 27 developing local industries and expanding employment opportunities.

28 Arab countries have not met the challenge of creating employment for their growing labor forces due to weak 29 regulatory environment and the poor governance institutions of Arab states (Lawrence, 2006a). Arab trade 30 with other countries of the world is limited to mainly oil exports and imports of manufactured goods. Arab 31 administrative regimes for conducting business and cross borders trade are extremely burdensome impeding both 32 private sector entrepreneurship and foreign investors. They persisted because they generate benefit for those 33 who know how to work within the system and those who are granted benefits by the system. Changing those 34 regulatory regimes will result in a new set of winners and losers, and therefore has major political implications. 35 This in turn led to the recycling of non-democratic political regimes that have stifled innovation and economic 36 competition leading to the current state of weak economies.

37 The weak Arab integration in the global economy and its small industrial sector had the effect of weak 38 educational systems that have not been able to equip the students with the hands-on skills demanded by the 39 competitive global environment. The inability (or refusal by some) to find a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli 40 conflict, in addition to the newly stirred Sunni-Shia sectarian quarrel, has resulted in the diversion of large sums 41 of funds to the defense budget. This had the effect of weak spending, if any, on infrastructure projects. The other 42 important factor preventing the Arab region from fully realizing its economic potential is the low proportion 43 women constitute of the labor force.

1 INTRODUCTION

44 Trade and investment between the United States and Arab region is relatively limited. United States trade
45 with Arab countries accounts for 4% of total U.S. trade and 1% of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows
46 in 2011 (Akhtar, Bolle, & Nelson, 2013). The Arab region biggest trading partner is the European Union (EU)
47 followed by Japan, with United State ranking third place (Akhtar et al., 2013). Trade between the United States
48 and Arab countries consists mostly of exchanging crude oil for manufactured goods.

49 Since the 1980s, the United States sought stronger trade agenda in the Arab region through bilateral relations
50 as well as the promotion of regional trade integration not just for its economic values, but also for its potential
51 political gains in fostering more stable political environments. In fostering growth and development through
52 trade, the United States argued that increasing economic welfare will promote domestic reforms that are central
53 to America's fight against terrorism and extremist sentiments threatening its own security. The events of 9/11
54 highlight the impact of Arab issues on U.S. security. Actually, the 9/11 Commission stated in its report that "a
55 comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development,
56 more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects
57 for their children's future" ??9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 379).

58 Reinvigorated by events of 9/11 and continuing its previous policy of economic engagement in the Arab region,
59 the United States sought the establishment of free trade agreements (FTAs) with Arab countries. Free trade
60 is based on Adam Smith and David Ricardo notions of comparative advantage where countries that produce
61 certain products more efficiently than others have a comparative advantage and can trade those products to
62 other countries in exchange for goods that other countries have a comparative advantage in producing (Malkawi,
63 2010). In real life, economists agree that free trade is rare. Various domestic importcompeting industries will
64 seek protectionism and state institutions will set their own regulations impacting open trade policy. Trade
65 between economically advanced country and least developed ones, like Arab countries, is usually part of a bigger
66 geostrategic political agenda of the advanced nation.

67 The main aspects of a typical FTA include market access in goods, general services including financial and
68 telecommunications, investment, government procurement, intellectual property rights, labor and environmental
69 standards, and competition policy (Mohamadieh, 2006). The United States has signed and entered into FTAs
70 with 20 different countries and in 2014, 47 percent of its export goods, totaling \$765 billion, went to FTA
71 partner countries (U.S. International Trade Administration, n.d.). All FTAs negotiated by the United States
72 were based on a standard template of the type of agreement the US Congress will agree on. Signing FTAs based
73 on multiple variations of the template would have encouraged different countries to seek similar customized items
74 complicating negotiation process and possibly overwhelming U.S. compliance agencies.

75 Whether due to influence of foreign powers or the acts of competing regional leaders, the economic integration
76 of Arab countries has proven to be an extremely difficult task. This led to United States seeking bilateral trade
77 agreements with the right Arab candidates in terms of economics and politics. Economically, the U.S. exports
78 to those countries will increase, while imports will not threaten U.S. industries. Politically, the FTAs reflect
79 the friendly relations between the partners as well as U.S. appreciation of the support and cooperation of those
80 countries in its fight against terrorism.

81 In 2003, President Bush proposed the creation of a free trade area between the United States and Middle
82 Eastern countries, named MEFTA (Matthijs, 2007). The Bush Administration planned to negotiate bilateral
83 trade agreement with certain Arab countries with the aim of "combining these into a single overarching
84 arrangement between the U.S. and the Middle East region as a whole" ??Lawrence, 2006a, p. 21). The Bush
85 Administration moved then to negotiate FTAs with Morocco, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates
86 (UAE). This was in addition to its earlier signed agreements with Jordan and Israel (extended to cover West Bank
87 and Gaza as beneficiaries of the FTA). The United States FTA agreements with Morocco and Bahrain went into
88 effect in 2006, and that with Oman entered into force in 2009 (Office of the United States Trade Representative,
89 n.d. a). The FTA with Jordan has been in force since 2001 and went thru a gradual elimination of tariffs on all
90 industrial and agricultural products and was fully implemented in 2010. It should be noted that those bilateral
91 agreement would not have been achieved if the United States have chosen the topdown approach of MEFTA, due
92 to the fact that collective negotiations usually stall due to actions of some countries in foot-dragging. Universal
93 Arab participation would most certainly not conclude with those far reaching agreements with Morocco, Bahrain,
94 Oman, and Jordan. From the US standpoint, choosing bilateral bottom-up approach places the United States
95 in a stronger bargaining position than negotiating with a coalition of Arab states. It allows it to choose the
96 sequence with which it negotiates and to place pressures on late comers as well as to use FTAs as a reward for
97 countries that are willing to work closely with the United States. As conditions emerge towards negotiating a
98 MEFTA, Arab countries might find it easier to coordinate their positions and possibly strike a better FTA deal
99 with the United States than the ones afforded by bilateral agreements.

100 By first negotiating bilateral agreements with countries that were most able and willing to engage, the US
101 hoped to use MEFTA to liberalize bilateral trade with the region, facilitate domestic reform, and build mutual
102 trust between the Arab countries to encourage regional economic cooperation (Yousef, 2004). With economic
103 growth comes enhanced political stability and improved conditions for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli
104 conflict leading to reduced security risks and alleviated Islamic fanatical sentiments in the region. The U.S. also
105 hoped to use those FTAs to improve its trading position in the Arab region vis-à-vis the European Union (EU)
106 which has its own set of FTAs and other trade agreements with Arab countries. The geographic proximity of

107 Europe to the Arab region clearly gives it an advantage over distant America. Add to that, the European Union's
108 political attachments to those FTA are less demanding than those signed with United States.

109 For Arab countries, FTAs with United States provide economic advantages such as increased trade and
110 investment. FTAs offer preferential access of Arab goods to the large US market resulting in increased exports
111 and investment by foreign and local firms. FTAs with United States could improve trading of Arab countries
112 with other partners. Arab countries with similar FTAs with United States would have already gone through the
113 required economic liberalization demanded by the US, and as such would have already established the bases for
114 closer regional economic integration. This could lead to the aspired MEFTA the United States is seeking which
115 would spur Arab countries to launch a regional integration among the willing and able. Finally, to sign an FTA
116 with United States would require taking steps to liberalize the economy which, hopefully, could lead to the much
117 sought out domestic political reforms (Lawrence, 2006b).

118 While MEFTA was presented as a regional initiative by the United States, the current FTA negotiation with
119 the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) points to difficulties that had each of Bahrain and Oman sign their own
120 FTAs with the United States in a clear breach of GCC policies. The UAE is currently at an advanced stage of
121 concluding its own FTA, again in a breach of GCC policy. This could be a precursor that a single MEFTA would
122 be difficult to conclude and the end result could be a deeper economic integration among reformer Arab states.

123 In addition to FTAs, the United States has used other tools of trade diplomacy to engage Arab countries,
124 such as Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) and Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) agreements.
125 TIFAs are typically the first step with Arab countries towards free trade agreements. TIFA is a consultative
126 mechanism used by the United States to discuss trade and investment issues with another country, and due to
127 its consultative nature is a non binding agreement. The U.S. has signed TIFAs with Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt,
128 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United
129 Arab Emirates, and Yemen (Office of the United States Trade Representative, n.d. b). By addressing specific
130 trade issues and helping Arab partners to acquire the necessary knowledge and experience to integrate into global
131 economy, the United States hopes to create the needed economic liberalization that could lead to an FTA.

132 The United States also supports the creation of QIZs, authorized by Congress in 1996, where jointly produced
133 goods by Israel with either Jordan or Egypt are allowed to enter the United States without tariff or quota
134 restrictions. The QIZs are intended to promote peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, specifically Egypt
135 and Jordan who have signed peace treaties with Israel. They also intend to benefit the two Arab countries as well
136 as West Bank and Gaza by creating employment and stimulating economic activities (al-Khoury, 2008). QIZs
137 are created in Jordan and Egypt where Israel sends its raw materials that get incorporated in the final Jordanian
138 and Egyptian products to be exported to the United States duty free. There are currently 13 designated QIZs
139 in Jordan employing over 40,000 people and helping it grow its exports to the United States (Israel Ministry of
140 Economy, 2015). In Egypt, 15 designated QIZs have attracted 700 companies and are producing annual revenues
141 of \$1 billion (Egypt Ministry of Trade and Industry, n.d.).

142 The reaction to United States economic initiative, MEFTA, varied among Arab countries. Some were eager
143 to join while others resisted the economic liberalization policies required by FTAs and thru them the change in
144 political positioning driven by United States geopolitical strategy in the area. The United States approach of
145 bilateral agreements made it clear that those excluded have not gone far enough to satisfy U.S. demands. Absent
146 an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, many Arab countries found it difficult to join a U.S. regional economic initiative
147 that seeks, at one stage, the normalization of Arab-Israeli economic and political relationships.

148 In this study, the U.S. -Arab trade and investment were assessed over the past five years (2010 -2014). Arab
149 countries with FTAs signed with United States were reviewed for their trading volume compared to those countries
150 without FTA agreements. US investment in Arab world was also assessed. The first question was designed to
151 provide the readers with recent solid data about trade volumes and investment between the United States and
152 Arab countries over the past five years (2010-2014). The second question was to assess the effects of FTAs on
153 trade volumes between the United States and its Arab partners. The third question was to assess inter-Arab
154 trade over the period of the study for any trends of increased regional economic integration, especially among
155 those that have gone through the liberalizations demanded by the FTAs. While, several studies (Freund &
156 Portugal-Perez, 2012;Matthijs, 2007;Mohamadieh, 2006) have concluded that trade agreements had marginal
157 effects at best on stimulating economic growth in concerned countries, this study revisited the topic with more
158 recent data in addition to assessing investment and inter-Arab trade.

159 2 II.

160 3 Research Method

161 4 III.

162 5 Results

163 Data was collected for both imports and exports of Arab goods to/from the United States from both the United
164 States Census Bureau as well as the IMF. Data in Table 1 and Table 2 show the imports/exports of goods from/to
165 the United States by individual Arab countries. Table 1 is import/export data collected from U.S. Census Bureau

5 RESULTS

166 while Table 2 is that collected from International Monetary Fund. There are slight differences between the two
167 monitoring bodies due to differing in collection methods. They're presented here to the readers for illustration
168 purposes as well as due to the fact the Census Bureau collects data on Palestine (West Bank and Gaza) due to
169 the expansion of FTA with Israel to cover the two territories. The IMF in turn provided more data that were
170 used to develop other tables.

171 Data in Table 1 shows the steady improvement of U.S. exports to Arab countries over the period of 2010 -2014
172 with exports in 2014 totaling 147% increase over that of Year 2010. In contrast, U.S. imports from the Arab
173 region (mainly oil and natural gas) reached its highest volume of \$111.8 billion in 2012 before declining to \$88.2
174 billion in 2014. This decline is expected to continue due to U.S. steady increase of its own oil production through
175 the increased use of fracking and other drilling technologies. With increased pressure on U.S. Administration
176 to lifting the 40 years old ban on U.S. crude oil exports, it's expected that U.S. imports from the Arab region
177 would decrease substantially due to expected fracking boom resulting from ban lifting (U.S. Energy Information
178 Administration, 2015). The expected U.S. entry into the oil exporting arena will have a significant geo-political
179 impact on European dependency on Arab oil. Countries of the European Union would steadily lessen their
180 reliance on oil imports from the unstable and unpredictable Arab region more in favor of American oil. Table
181 4 was constructed from data collected from International Monetary Fund. Arab import of manufactured goods
182 from the United States has increased from \$51.9 billion in 2010 to \$73.1 billion in 2014, 4.5% of total U.S. exports
183 to rest of the world. Arab export of oil and gas showed a decline of \$23.4 billion in 2014 from the total of \$104.5
184 billion in 2012. This is a result of a decline of U.S. oil purchases from the Arab region.

185 Table 5 data shows trading volumes of the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with the
186 United States. It shows a decline of \$11.1 billion of U.S. imports from GCC in 2014 from the height of \$69 billion
187 in 2012. While United States reduced oil imports from the Arab region as a whole an amount of \$23.4 billion in
188 2014 from that of 2012, almost 53% of that reduction came from countries outside the GCC. In 2014, the GCC
189 countries constituted 70.4% of total Arab exports to the United States and 74.8% of its total imports from the
190 region. This explains the strategic importance the United States puts on its relations with GCC countries of
191 which both Bahrain and Oman are signatories to FTA agreements with it. While there are no FTA negotiations
192 between the United States and Saudi Arabia, the latter's oil exports to the United States constituted more than
193 50% of its total oil imports from Arab region (assuming US imports as mainly oil). The United States biggest
194 economic partner in the Arab region is that of the United Arab Emirates with \$24.3 billion worth of goods
195 imported from the United States amounting to 33% of total U.S. exports to the region. Negotiation between
196 the two trading partners to sign an FTA agreement is at advanced stages (Office of the United States Trade
197 Representative. (n.d. a).. Data from Table 5 clearly shows that signing an FTA agreement is not a pre-condition
198 for an improved trading relationship with the United States.

199 For Year 2014, exports to the United States constituted 13% of Saudi Arabia's total exports, while its imports
200 from the U.S. made only 12% of its total imports (see Table 6). While United States imported 15.7% of total oil
201 exports of Iraq, its exports to the country made only 4.5% of total imports of Iraq. For 2014, the Arab countries
202 exports to the United States totaled \$81 billion (or 6.95%) out of the more than \$1.17 trillion exports to the rest
203 of the world, while its imports amount to \$73 billion (or 8.16%) out of the \$894.1 billion total imports from the
204 rest of the world. The aforementioned data did not include Syria due to sanctions imposed by the United States
205 resulting in complete cessations of trade relations between the two countries.

206 The trade between Arab countries with signed FTAs with United States (namely, Bahrain, Jordan, Oman and
207 Morocco) seems to be modest at best (See Table 6). The exports of the four countries to the United States in
208 2014 totaled \$3.8 billion or 3.1% of their total exports of \$122.2 billion, while their imports from the U.S. were
209 \$6.9 billion or 6.1% of their total imports of \$114.2 billion. Individually, Bahrain's exports of \$877 million to
210 United States mounted to 2.37% of its total exports to the world, while its imports of \$1.1 billion amounted
211 to 7.04% of its total imports. Morocco's exports to the U.S. made only 3.61% and its imports 7.02%. While
212 Oman's exports were 1.41% and its imports from the United States were 4.32%. Of the Arab countries that
213 have signed FTA, only Jordan exports of \$1.3 billion to the United States amounted to almost 16% of its total
214 exports while its imports almost 6% of its total of \$22.7 billion. Jordan FTA agreement with United States is
215 clearly helping boost its economy and its people employment opportunities. Jordan, a non-oil producing country,
216 exports to the United States are mainly manufactured goods and other raw material requiring employment of a
217 sizable number of working people. Same argument could be made for Morocco, also a non-oil producing country,
218 while Bahrain's and Oman's exports are mainly oil and natural gas with little impact on employment rates. The
219 oil industry employs small number of people and increasing oil production has limited effects on creating new
220 jobs in a country. Data in Table 7 shows the inter-Arab regional trade for Year 2014. Trading with other Arab
221 countries makes a good percentage of total trade of several countries. The international sanctions against Syria
222 have forced to completely rely on its trade with fellow Arab nations. Majority of Syria's exports of \$12.7 billion
223 (or 96%) went to other Arab countries, while it imported from them approximately 58% of its total imports of
224 \$19.8 billion. Algeria, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan exported over 30% of their total exports to other
225 Arab countries, while Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Somalia and Yemen imported more than quarter
226 (or 25%) of their goods from other Arab countries. Data from Table 7 while showing certain Arab countries are
227 more integrated in their Arab surroundings than others, inter-Arab trade, as a whole, points to a steady progress
228 of economic integration of the Arab region.

229 6 Global Journal of

230 Both Algeria and Saudi Arabia imported more goods from the United States than their Arab neighbors (See
231 Table 8), while Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had more exports to the U.S. than fellow Arab nations. Saudi
232 Arabia's trade with United States surpasses that with all other Arab countries combined (See Table 8).

233 United States investment in Arab region of \$62.7 billion made only 1.3% of its total direct investment abroad
234 (See Table 9). Egypt seems to be attracting the most U.S. investment dollar over the period of study, followed
235 by Saudi Arabia and then UAE. In 2014, the three Arab countries received \$46.4 billion (or 74%) of total U.S.
236 investment in the region. For the period of study (2010-2014) the three nations seem to be the main attraction
237 of U.S. investment in the area. Data collected from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis was based on historical
238 cost bases and what was publically available was only for the three Arab countries shown in Table 9. Hopefully,
239 future researchers will be able to collect U.S. investment data for all other Arab countries for improved analysis.
240 IV.

241 7 Conclusion

242 A qualitative research was conducted to assess the economic relationship between the United States and the Arab
243 countries for the period of 2010-2014. Publicly available data supplied by IMF and U.S. government agencies
244 were utilized for the assessment. Results show trade between the two partners has increased over the period of
245 the study. U.S. exports to the Arab countries increased from \$48.6 billion in 2010 to \$71.4 billion in 2014, while
246 its imports from Arab countries increased from \$73.4 billion in 2010 to \$88.2 billion in 2014 (Refer to Table 1).

247 Trade historically has contributed to improved economic relations between the engaging partners. Those who
248 enjoy healthy exchange of goods tend to have closer political and social relationships. Due to its close relations
249 with Israel, United States presence in the Middle East has always attracted various reactions from different
250 sectors of Arab societies. Arab nationalists and Islamists have accused it of exploiting Arab oil resources to the
251 detriment of Arab people interests. The results of this study show the fallacy of such argument.

252 While United States, and due to its status as a super power, might have political hegemony in the region
253 due to its strategic location and its oil wealth, however, Arab trade with United States is limited and mutually
254 beneficial for the two trading partners. The Arabs have an important buyer in the United States of their oil
255 that provides in return significant financial proceeds. This study showed Arab countries exporting to the United
256 States only \$88 billion (or 8%) of their total exports of \$1.1 trillion, while importing only \$71.4 billion (or 8%)
257 of their needs of \$894 billion (See Table 6). Trade with Arab states made a small portion of U.S. activities with
258 rest of the world. Its exports/imports to/from the region made 4.4% and 3.7% respectively. Due to proximity
259 and weaker political commitments than those required by the United States, Arab region trading is larger with
260 the European Union.

261 Arab countries, such as GCC, seem to successfully utilize their relations with United States to improve their
262 economic conditions. The results of this study did not show a significant improvement of trade between Arab
263 countries with signed FTA with United States over those without it. Only Jordan of the four Arab countries
264 with FTAs with United States seems to have fully utilized the agreement to increase exports to the U.S. and
265 create new jobs for its people.

266 Inter-Arab regional trade constituted a good percentage of total trade of several Arab countries. Increased
267 trade between neighboring countries should increase regional economic integration leading, hopefully, to improved
268 political relationships between Arab governments. Only Saudi Arabia's trade with United States surpassed that
269 of its trade with other Arab countries.

270 U.S. direct investment in the area was around 1% of its total investment abroad for the period of the study.
271 Directing more funds to the area would help in improving trade relations with Arab region. Three Arab countries,
272 namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE seem to enjoy preferred recipient status and making 74% of total U.S.
273 investment in the region in Year 2014. It's hoped that future researchers will have access to more detailed data
274 about annual U.S. investment in every Arab country and expand this study to assess Arab trade with European
Union, China and Japan. ^{1 2}

275 An methodology was used to assess United States trade exploratory qualitative
276 research with Arab countries. The objectives were met by answering the following
277 qualitative research questions: 1. What is the volume of U.S. -Arab trade over
278 the period 2010 thru 2014? Does it show any improvement? 2. Have FTAs
279 contribute to increased volumes of trade and investment between the United
280 States and concerned Arab countries? 3. How does inter-Arab trade between
281 those with signed FTAs compare to those without?

Figure 1:

7 CONCLUSION

1

Year

2015

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Volume

XV

Issue IX

Version

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(B)

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Country Algeria Bahrain 1,235.1 2010 1,194.3 Com oros 1.3 Djibouti 122.8 Egypt 6,832.5 Explo

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Iraq 1,643.1

2,400

Jordan 1,172.2

1,449

Kuwait 2,774.8

2,749

Lebanon 2,009

1,807

[Note: Note. Data collected from U.S. Census Bureau (<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html>)]

Figure 2: Table 1 :

2

Country	2010
Algeria	
Bahrain	
Comoros	
Djibouti	
Egypt	
Iraq	
Jordan	
Kuwait	
Lebanon	
Libya	
Mauritania	
Morocco	
Oman	
Qatar	
Somalia	0
Sudan	5
Syria	405
Tunisia	389

[Note: U.S. Exports to/ imports from Arab states 2010 -2014 (in \$ millions) -IMF Data]

Figure 3: Table 2 :

3

Figure 4: Table 3

3

Year 2015
32
Volume XV Issue IX Version I
(B)
Management and Business Research

Figure 5: Table 3 :

7 CONCLUSION

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Year	Total U.S.	Total Export	Percentage of Exports	Total U.S.	Total U.S.	Percentage of Total U.S.
	Exports to World	to Arab Region	Total U.S. Exports	Imports from World	Import from Arab Region	Imports from Arab Region
2010	1,277	51.9	4.0%	1,968	69.4	3.5%
2011	1,481	61.6	4.1%	2,265	93.6	4.1%
2012	1,545	71.7	4.6%	2,336	104.5	4.5%
2013	1,579	74.8	4.7%	2,331	89.1	3.8%
2014	1,623	73.1	4.5%	2,345	81.2	3.4%

[Note: Note. Data from IMF (<http://data.imf.org/>)]

Figure 6: Table 4 :

5

Figure 7: Table 5

5

Year	2015	Volume	XV	Issue IX	Version	I	(B)
Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman	2013	2014	2010	Import from U.S.	2011	Global	
Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE Total	605	877	1,375	2012	2013	2014	1,335
GCC Total Arab States 69,416	11,765	10,397	3,055	1,330	1,120	1,166	3,000
93,696 104,516 Export to U.S.	658	750	974	2,951	2,854	4,014	1,393
2010 2011 2012 406 498 667	820	546	3,738	1,651	1,515	1,265	2,555
5,079 7,282 12,133 863 1,732 868	48,271	42,762	12,750	2,759	3,157	3,476	15,201
794 1,045 1,131 29,684 44,327	2,165	2,545	12,802	19,930	20,887	20,547	Business
52,116 1,087 2,280 2,103 37,913	64,284	57,877	34,694	17483	24827	27068	Re-
57,164 69,018 Percentage GCC	89,111	81,058	51,903	24,324	40967	53448	search
of total trade with US 54.6%	72.1%	70.4%	66.8%	56601	54,792	61634	
61% 66% Note. Data from IMF				71755	74826	72,960	
(http://data.imf.org/)				66.4%	74.5%	75.6%	
				74.8%			

Figure 8: Table 5 :

6

Country	Export to U.S.	Total Export to World	% of Total	Import from U.S.	Total Import from World	% of Total
Algeria	6,421	59,675	10.76%	2,736	55,899	4.89%
Bahrain	877	37,037	2.37%	1,166	16,567	7.04%
Comoros	2	39	5.13%	4	307	1.30%
Djibouti	11	552	1.99%	138	4,238	3.26%
Egypt	1,123	26,693	4.21%	5,066	68,189	7.43%
Iraq	12,570	79,389	15.83%	2,316	51,455	4.50%
Jordan	1,323	8,379	15.79%	1,320	22,727	5.81%
Kuwait	10,397	91,919	11.31%	4,014	31,635	12.69%
Lebanon	59	3,279	1.8%	1,227	19,992	6.14%
Libya	204	17,068	1.20%	554	19,226	3.04%
Mauritania	92	2,369	3.88%	179	3,856	4.64%
Morocco	852	23,599	3.61%	3,202	45,611	7.02%
Oman	750	53,221	1.41%	1,265	29,305	4.32%
Qatar	546	131,584	0.41%	3,476	30,355	11.45%
Saudi Arabia	42,762	332,321	12.87%	20,547	169,966	12.09%
Somalia	1	809	0.06%	39	2,514	1.55%
Sudan	11	4,350	0.25%	50	9,211	0.54%
Syria	0	12,688	0.00%	0	19,800	0.00%
Tunisia	474	15,345	3.09%	935	24,553	3.81%
UAE	2,545	257,243	0.99%	24,324	273,283	8.90%
Yemen	38	9,471	0.40%	402	15,248	2.64%
Total	81,058	1,167,030	6.95%	72,960	915,475	7.99%
Total excl. Syria	81,058	1,151,661	7.02%	72,960	894,137	8.16%

Note. Data from IMF (<http://data.imf.org/>)

Figure 9: Table 6 :

7 CONCLUSION

7

Country	Exports to Arab Countries	Total Exports	Percentage	Imports from Arab countries	Total Imports	Percent
Algeria	18,128	59,675	30.38%	2,561	55,899	4.58%
Bahrain	3,090	37,037	8.34%	7,200	16,567	43.46%
Comoros	3	39	7.69%	75	307	24.43%
Djibouti	514	552	93.12%	890	4,238	21.00%
Egypt	8,719	26,693	32.66%	9,309	68,189	13.65%
Iraq	2,779	79,389	3.50%	13,190	51,455	25.63%
Jordan	3,954	8,379	47.19%	6,810	22,727	29.96%
Kuwait	6,614	91,919	7.20%	7,257	31,635	22.94%
Lebanon	1,818	3,279	1.8%	2,556	19,992	6.14%
Libya	1,368	17,068	8.01%	3,325	19,226	17.29%
Mauritania	8	2,369	0.34%	310	3,856	8.04%
Morocco	1,089	23,599	4.61%	6,149	45,611	13.48%
Oman	9,506	53,221	17.86%	11,971	29,305	40.85%
Qatar	10,292	131,584	7.82%	5,431	30,355	17.89%
Saudi Arabia	30,432	332,321	9.16%	15,671	169,966	9.22%
Somalia	571	809	70.58%	973	2,514	38.70%
Sudan	2,345	4,350	53.91%	2,149	9,211	23.33%
Syria	12,158	12,688	95.82%	11,417	19,800	57.66%
Tunisia	1,753	15,345	11.42%	1,412	24,553	5.75%
UAE	24,484	257,243	9.52%	29,999	273,283	10.98%
Yemen	1,419	9,471	14.98%	4,736	15,248	31.06%
Total	141,044	1,164,349	12.11%	143,391	915,475	15.66%

Note. Data from IMF (<http://data.imf.org/>)

Figure 10: Table 7 :

8

Country	Exports to Arab Countries	Export to United States	Imports from Arab countries	Import from United States	Year 2015 Volume XV Issue IX Version I (B)	Global Journal of Management and Business Research
Algeria	18,128	3,090	6,421	2,561	2,736	of Management and Business
Bahrain	3	514	8,719	7,200	1,166	Research
Comoros	1,818	2	11	75	4	138
Djibouti	1,368	1,123	877	890	5,066	2,316
Egypt	2,779	12,463	13,190			
Iraq	3,954	1,323	6,810	1,320		
Jordan	6,614	10,397	7,257	4,014		
Kuwait	1,818	59	2,556	1,227		
Lebanon	1,368	204	3,325	554		

Figure 11: Table 8 :

9

Country	U.S. Direct Investment Abroad on a Historical Cost Bases				
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Egypt	12,599	14,950	17,341	18,795	21,320
Saudi Arabia	7,436	8,250	9,488	10,084	10,064
UAE	4,935	5,864	8,335	11,717	15,035
Others	12,595	11,496	13,413	15,067	16,268
Total	37,565	40,560	48,577	55,663	62,687
Total U.S.					
Investment Abroad	3,741,910	4,084,659	4,384,671	4,693,348	4,920,653
Percentage of Total	1%	1%	1.1%	1.2%	1.3%
U.S. Investment					

[Note: Source: U.S. Department of Commerce -Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov)]

Figure 12: Table 9 :

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